Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

On two separate occasions, Respondent Edy Sanchez filed for benefits with the Workers' Compensation Commission while previous orders, in the same claim, were pending on appeal in the courts. The Commission decided that it lacked jurisdiction to consider Respondent's requests because of the pending appeals. The circuit court affirmed, holding that the Commission did not retain jurisdiction pending an appeal because the issues raised in the new filings did not fit within the jurisdictional provisions of Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-742. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Commission had jurisdiction over Respondent's new issues under section 9-736(b). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under section 9-736(b), the Commission retains jurisdiction to hear new issues while other issues in the same claim are pending on appeal, so long as no evidence was taken or decision made on the new issues in the hearing from which the appeal was taken; and (2) section 9-742 was not intended to reduce the Commission's ongoing jurisdiction to grant relief, notwithstanding the appeal. View "Potomac Abatement, Inc. v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from the judicial sale of a condominium owned by Petitioner and conducted by two court-appointed trustees that were employed by a law firm (collectively, Respondents). Following the sale, Petitioner filed a complaint, alleging breach of fiduciary duty involving actual fraud and breach of fiduciary duty involving constructive fraud by the trustees and alleging vicarious liability by the law firm. The trial judge granted Respondents' motion to dismiss, concluding that Respondents were entitled to qualified judicial immunity for their actions in connection with the sale. The court of special appeals (1) reversed with regard to Petitioner's allegations of actual fraud, and (2) affirmed with regard to the other causes of action on grounds of qualified judicial immunity. The Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that Respondents were not entitled to absolute judicial immunity, and the concept of qualified public official immunity was inapplicable to the circumstances of this case. View "D'Aoust v. Diamond" on Justia Law

In McQuitty I, Dylan McQuitty, by and through his parents, successfully sued Ms. McQuitty's physician and his practice (collectively, Spangler) for having failed to obtain Ms. McQuitty's informed consent to treatment, which resulted in severe injuries to Dylan during his birth. In a series of post-trial motions following McQuitty I, Spangler moved to reduce the verdict in favor of the McQuittys. After the verdict but prior to resolution of the post-trial motions, Dylan died. The circuit court found that Dylan's death did not absolve the portion of the judgment allocated to Dylan's future medical expenses. The Court of Appeals held (1) the trial court properly denied Spangler's motions for post-trial relief; (2) the post-verdict death of Dylan did not absolve Spangler from the finality of the jury's award of future medical expenses; (3) the hospital, for which summary judgment was entered in its favor as to liability and damages during McQuitty I, was not a joint tort-feasor under Maryland's Uniform Contribution Among Tort-Feasors Act, such that its settlement release from the McQuittys did not entitle Spangler to a reduction of the judgment against them; and (4) post-judgment interest on the verdict accrued from the date of the original judgment. View "Spangler v. McQuitty" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who had a latex allergy, asked her son's school to use non-powdered latex gloves so Plaintiff could enter the building safely. The school subsequently requested Plaintiff to withdraw her son from the school. Plaintiff filed a complaint against the school, alleging that the school had discriminated against her on the basis of a handicap and that the school had unlawfully retaliated against her request for accommodations. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Plaintiff. The court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court issued a writ of certiorari to consider whether discrimination because of a "handicap," within the meaning of the Maryland statutory provisions, should be construed strictly to create a demanding standard for qualifying as disabled, as certain federal cases had construed the term "disability" as used in the federal Americans with Disabilities Act. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the court of special appeals erred in applying this standard to reverse the jury's verdict in this case; and (2) the jury was presented with sufficient evidence to determine that Plaintiff was the victim of discrimination because of a handicap under the Maryland statutory provisions. View "Meade v. Shangri-La P'ship" on Justia Law

Petitioner Elroy Matthews invoked Md. Rule 4-345(a) to challenge the legality of the sentence he received following his plea of guilty to certain charges as part of a plea agreement. Petitioner argued that the sentence was illegal because it exceeded the sentence to which the court had bound itself. The circuit court denied the motion without a hearing. The court of special appeals held that a challenge to the legality of a sentence on the ground that it violates a binding term of a plea agreement is not cognizable under Rule 4-345(a), and even if it were, the sentence Petitioner received was not illegal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Rule 4-345(a) is an appropriate vehicle for challenging a sentence that is imposed in violation of a plea agreement to which the sentencing court bound itself; and (2) the sentence Petitioner was serving was illegal because it exceeded the sentencing cap to which the circuit court agreed to be bound. Remanded for resentencing. View "Matthews v. State" on Justia Law

The Maryland Insurance Commissioner approved a filing by Allstate Insurance Company and Allstate Indemnity Company (collectively, Allstate) giving notice of its intent to cease writing new property insurance policies in certain geographic areas of the state. The Commissioner concluded that the filing was subject to administrative review under Md. Code Ann. 19-107(a) and Md. Code Ann. Ins. 27-501(a) and that it satisfied the pertinent criteria under both statutes. The circuit court affirmed both aspects of the Commissioner's ruling. The court of special appeals affirmed but on alternative grounds, holding that section 27-501(a) did not apply to the filing and that, even if it did, the statute was not violated. The Court of Appeals affirmed but, again, on different grounds, holding (1) the Commissioner did not err in finding that section 27-501 did apply to the Allstate filing, and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support the Commissioner's decision. View "People's Ins. Counsel Div. v. Allstate Ins. Co." on Justia Law

A police officer was dispatched to investigate a two-car collision, where she determined that one of the cars involved in the collision was owned by Respondent, Dana Carpenter. After a post-crash investigation, the officer requested Carpenter to submit to a chemical breath test, and Carpenter refused. Following a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) suspended Carpenter's license for refusal to submit to the breath test. The circuit court reversed the suspension, determining that the police officer did not possess reasonable grounds to detain Carpenter. The Court of Appeals reversed the district court, holding that, pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Transp. 16-205.1(b)(2), the ALJ's determination that the police officer had reasonable grounds to detain Carpenter was supported by substantial evidence and was not premised upon an erroneous conclusion of law. Remanded with directions to affirm the decision of the ALJ. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Carpenter" on Justia Law

Verizon Maryland, a telecommunications company, and the staff of the Public Service Commission (PSC) obtained PSC approval of a global settlement of six pending cases. Verizon employed an alternative form of regulation (AFOR) under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Co. (PUC) 4-301 that included up to $6,000,000 in bill credits to customers with out-of-service complaints that were not resolved in compliance with specified standards. PSC approved the AFOR pursuant to PUC 4-301. A technicians union objected, contending that the service quality aspects of the AFOR did not ensure the quality, availability, and reliability of service required by PUC 4-301. The circuit court affirmed PSC's approval of the AFOR. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that PSC acted within its discretion in approving the AFOR, as PUC 4-301's use of the term "ensuring" did not require that PSC be completely certain that Verizon's incentive strategy would result in compliance with standards. View "Commc'ns Workers of Am., ALF-CIO v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of Md." on Justia Law

The claims in these consolidated cases were largely identical in that they shared similar allegations of violations of the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (SMLL), the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA), and common law breach of contract. Appellees in these cases were mortgage companies, who were assignees of the original lenders, and Appellants were individual borrowers. The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissals of each of the cases by the circuit courts, holding (1) the SMLL does not restrict a lender to a single loan origination fee, as long as the aggregate fees charged and collected do not exceed the statutory maximum; (2) Appellees were not required by the SMLL to provide borrowers, who did not intend to use the proceeds of their secondary mortgage loans for commercial purposes, a disclosure form designed expressly to advise commercial borrowers only under the SMLL; and (3) certain Appellants failed to support sufficiently their allegations of breach of contract, CPA violations, and claims in accounting with specific facts. View "Polek v. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank" on Justia Law

After Petitioners, Montgomery Preservation, Inc. and others, made proper formal requests, the Montgomery County Planning Board of the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (MNCPPC) decided not to recommend a certain building for historic designation, and not to amend the county's master plan or historic preservation to include the building. The Planning Board forwarded this non-recommendation to the Montgomery County Council, which, sitting as an administrative agency, concluded it could take no action on the matter and therefore did nothing. Petitioners sought a writ of administrative mandamus, claiming that the Council's inaction rendered the Planning Board's previous recommendation final and appealable. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, holding that no judicial review of the Planning Board's recommendation could take place because the Council had indeed "acted" under the relevant statute. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Planning Board's recommendation was not a final appealable agency decision. View "Montgomery Preservation v. MNCPP" on Justia Law