Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was tried before a jury in the circuit court and convicted of four counts of attempted armed robbery, four counts of conspiracy to commit those offenses, and related crimes. The court of special appeals concluded that the four conspiracy convictions should merge, leaving but one such conviction, and rejected Petitioner's remaining contentions, holding (1) the instructions satisfied the constitutional requirement that the jury be advised of the State's burden to prove beyond a reasonable doubt each element of the charged crimes, and (2) fundamental fairness did not require merger of conspiracy to commit armed robbery and attempted armed robbery. Petitioner sought review of the latter two holdings of the court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in issuing its jury instructions; and (2) because the convictions targeted two different crimes, fundamental fairness did not require merger of Petitioner's conviction for conspiracy to commit armed robbery with his attempted armed robbery convictions. View "Carroll v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent entered a gas station owned and operated by Petitioner, where she mis-stepped on even ground and twisted her knee. Respondent subsequently filed a negligence suit against Petitioner. The trial court denied Petitioner's request to include on the special verdict sheet a question specifically addressing the assumption of risk defense and thereafter entered judgment in favor of Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court's failure to adequately present assumption of the risk constituted error because Petitioner had a right to present the defense to the jury, and that error prejudiced Petitioner's case. Remanded for a new trial. View "S&S Oil, Inc. v. Jackson" on Justia Law

The Maryland Dream Act seeks to exempt certain students from paying out-of-state tuition rates at higher education institutions in Maryland. Following the enactment of the Act, MDPetitions.com petitioned to refer the Act to Maryland's 2012 general election ballot. The State Board of Elections certified the petition for referendum. In response to the Board's certification, Appellants, representing a group of individuals supporting the Act, challenged its referability and sought to remove the Act from consideration on the November 2012 ballot. The trial court entered summary judgment against Appellants, finding that the Act was a proper subject for referendum. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the Act was not a law "making any appropriation for maintaining the state government" within the meaning of Md. Const. art. XVI, 2, and therefore was not exempt from referendum. View "Doe v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a test technician's certification that a driver refused to complete an alcohol concentration test after initially submitting to it - when coupled with the evidence that the driver had been explained the testing procedure and was in "good health" - was prima facie evidence of refusal under Md. Code Ann. Transp. 16-205.1. The ALJ and Maryland Office of Administrative Hearings found that it was and suspended the driver's commercial driver's license. The circuit court reversed, holding that the Motor Vehicle Administration failed to show evidence that the driver refused the test. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) there was prima facie evidence of refusal, and (2) the ALJ's finding that the driver refused to complete the test was supported by substantial evidence. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. McMillan" on Justia Law

For some years, the Board of Education of Baltimore County belonged to a governmental group purchasing consortium, which competitively bid a roofing services contract on behalf of its members. The Board relied on that contact to fulfill its needs for roofing repair services. Appellant Building Materials Corporation of America, a nationwide manufacturer of roofing materials, questioned the Board's authority for that practice under the pertinent statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when viewed in the context of the entire education law and regulations promulgated under that law, the competitive bidding statute did not bar the Board from using its membership in an intergovernmental purchasing consortium for the procurement of roofing repair services. View "Bldg. Materials Corp. of Am. v. Bd. of Educ." on Justia Law

Respondent filed a medical action against Petitioner, a medical doctor. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether a completed case information report, on which an election of a jury trial is noted and which is filed with the complaint, but not served on the opposing party, is a proper vehicle for demanding a jury trial. The court of special appeals held that it was and, therefore, reversed the judgment of the circuit court, which had reached the opposite result. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a case information report form, being neither a "paper" nor a "pleading" and, in any event, having not been served on the opposing party, is neither a proper nor timely means of demanding a civil jury trial pursuant to Md. R. 2-325(a) and (b). View "Duckett v. Riley" on Justia Law

The parties in this case were the parents of a minor child, whose custody they agreed to share when they both lived in Maryland. Mother subsequently moved to Virginia and filed a motion to modify custody. Concurrently, Mother moved to relinquish jurisdiction to Virginia. The circuit court denied Appellee's motions. The circuit court subsequently granted Mother's motion to alter or amend or alternatively to revise judgment and also relinquished jurisdiction to Virginia. Father appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the court was not required to hold a hearing prior to granting Mother's motion seeking to revise the court's dismissal of her action; (2) Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 9.5-207 clearly and unambiguously contemplates that a party or a court, upon motion, will raise the issue of inconvenient forum, even when the jurisdiction of the court is continuing and exclusive, and therefore, the "inconvenient forum" provisions of section 9.5-207 applied to this child custody case; and (3) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it found Maryland to be an inconvenient forum for the underlying child custody dispute and therefore relinquished its jurisdiction to Virginia. View "Miller v. Matthias" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of distributing and possessing a controlled dangerous substance. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. Defendant subsequently filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel sued Petitioner during the representation for unpaid legal fees. The postconviction court granted Petitioner a new trial, reasoning that counsel had a conflict of interest in representing Petitioner. The court of appeals reversed after applying the general test set forth in Strickland v. Washington. At issue on appeal was whether the exception to Strickland's general rule applied in this case. The exception, set forth in Cuyler v. Sullivan, states that the defendant is excused from proving the prejudice prong of the Strickland test upon a showing that counsel was burdened by an "actual conflict of interest." The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) this case entailed a conflict of interest governed by the Sullivan rubric; and (2) Petitioner was entitled under the Sullivan rule to the benefit of the presumption of prejudice only if he could show the conflict of interest was "actual" in the sense that it had an adverse effect upon counsel's performance. Remanded. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law

After having been convicted on an agreed-upon statement of the facts of wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun illegally and of being in possession of a handgun after conviction of a disqualifying offense, Defendant appealed. Before any action was taken by the court of special appeals, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider whether the use by police of a Taser that fired two metal darts in the back of Defendant affected a Terry stop or Defendant's arrest. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the use of a Taser in this case converted what otherwise may have been a Terry stop into a de facto arrest for Fourth Amendment purposes, and there did not exist sufficient probable cause to arrest Defendant; and (2) Defendant's statement to the police that he had a gun in his pocket and the gun recovered from him should have been suppressed. Remanded for a new trial. View "Reid v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree felony murder. Petitioner's defense at trial was that his participation in the crimes with which he was charged was coerced. Petitioner argued on appeal that the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury with respect to duress was error. The court of special appeals affirmed, rejecting, in the process, the State's argument that the defense of duress is not applicable to felony murder. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) in Maryland, duress is a defense to felony murder; but (2) to establish and be entitled to the defense of duress, a defendant need not first prove he attempted to stop or thwart the offense that he was compelled to commit. Remanded for a new trial. View "McMillan v. State" on Justia Law