Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

While incarcerated, Petitioner Daniel Genies masturbated in sight of a female correctional officer, while smiling and making eye contact with her, despite her orders to stop. Genies was subsequently charged with committing the common law offense of indecent exposure and violating Md. Code Ann. Corr. Servs. 8-803, which prohibits an inmate with intent to harass a correctional officer from indecently exposing private parts of the inmate's body in the officer's presence. A jury acquitted Genies of the statutory offense but convicted him of the common law offense. The court of special appeals affirmed. Genies appealed, arguing that the statutory, specific intent crime preempted the field, with respect to indecent exposure by an inmate to a correctional officer, and thus the trial court erred by failing to dismiss the charge of common law indecent exposure. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) did not err in failing to dismiss the common law charge because section 8-803 was intended to serve as a discrete offense, supplementing rather than supplanting the common law, so both prevailed; and (2) did not abuse its discretion by denying Genies's motion for a new trial without a hearing. View "Genies v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, a pair of adult children, sued Griffith Energy Services, an energy company that spilled heating oil in Petitioners' parents' home, and its attorneys for fraud and negligent supervision. Petitioners' parents (Parents) had previously sued Griffith and won a judgment after a jury trial. The circuit court dismissed Petitioners' lawsuit, holding, inter alia, that Petitioners' claims were barred by res judicata. The court of special appeals affirmed, reaching only the res judicata issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners were in privity with Parents, and (2) thus, the intermediate appellate court did not err in holding that Petitioners' claim was barred by res judicata. View "Cochran v. Griffith Energy Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

This case involved a long-standing dispute between Appellants, the Tomes Landing Condominium Association and MRA Property Management, and Appellees, twenty-five condominium unit purchasers. The unit purchasers were granted partial summary judgment in the amount of one million dollars against MRA and the Association on the ground that the operating budget that MRA and the Association supplied as part of a "resale package" provided to the unit purchasers violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Act) because the budgets had the effect of misleading the unit purchasers in connection with their purchases of the condominiums. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the etnry of summary judgment was inappropriate, as (1) the Act could apply to disclosures made in a resale certificate by a condominium association and its management company during the sale of a condominium; and (2) there existed a dispute of material facts as to whether the operating budgets provided by MRA and the Association to the unit purchasers constituted unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Act. View "MRA Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Petitioner Muhammad Abdul-Maleek was convicted in the district court of theft. Petitioner exercised his right to appeal and was afforded a de novo trial by jury in the circuit court. The jury likewise convicted Petitioner of left, and the circuit court imposed a more severe sentence than that imposed by the district court. Petitioner appealed, asserting that the circuit court impermissibly based his sentence on the fact that he exercised his right to appeal and receive a de novo jury trial. The Court of Appeals vacated the sentence, holding that Petitioner was entitled to resentencing because the court's comments at sentencing could cause a reasonable person to conclude that the sentence was based in part on Petitioner's exercise of his right to a de novo trial on appeal. Remanded for resentencing. View "Abdul-Maleek v. State" on Justia Law

In 1999, the Baltimore City Council enacted an urban renewal plan (Plan) to renew a portion of Baltimore City. A five-block area located in the renewal area was the subject of protracted litigation between 120 West Fayette, LLLP and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The current iteration of the litigation focused on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the City and the Maryland Historical Trust relating to the treatment of historic properties in connection with the Plan. The MOA required the City to submit redevelopment plans to the Trust for approval. After the Trust's director provided conditional approval of a fifth set of plans 120 West Fayette (Appellant) filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights interpreting the terms of the MOA. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that Appellant was neither a party to, nor an intended beneficiary of, the MOA, and therefore, Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant, at best an incidental beneficiary to the MOA, could not file a suit requesting declaratory judgment that interprets and enforces an agreement to which it had no part. View "120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

A pit bull named Clifford escaped from its pen and attacked Dominic Solesky, a minor, who initially sustained life threatening injuries as a result of his mauling. Dominic's parents, as next friends of Dominic, sued Defendant landlord. The trial court granted judgment for Defendant, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to permit the issue of common law negligence to be presented to the jury. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that the evidence had been sufficient to create a valid jury issue as to the extent of Defendant's knowledge of Clifford's dangerousness with respect to the then common law standards in dog attack negligence cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed after modifying the Maryland common law of liability as it relates to attacks by pit bull dogs against humans, holding that when an owner, landlord, or other person who has the right to control the pit bull's presence on the subject premises knows, or has reason to know, that the dog is a pit bull or pit bull mix, that person is strictly liable for the damages caused to a plaintiff who is attacked by the dog on or from the owner's or lessor's premises. Remanded for a retrial. View "Tracey v. Solesky" on Justia Law

Deputy Erick Gindlesperger of the county sheriff's office filed a subpoena request seeking to compel Sheriff Darren Popkin to produce documents prior to a disciplinary hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The hearing board denied the request, and Gindlesperger field a motion for show cause order. The circuit court determined that Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 3-107(d) entitled Gindlesperger to pre-hearing production of various enumerated documents. Sheriff Popkin appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error when it ordered the pre-LEOBR hearing production of the enumerated documents, as section 3-107(d)(1) does not provide for compelling production of records and documents by subpoena in advance of an LEOBR disciplinary hearing. View "Popkin v. Gindlesperger" on Justia Law

In December 2008, State Employee was notified that her employment was terminated. Employee submitted a timely written appeal of her termination to the secretary of her agency. In August 2009, when Employee received no response to her repeated requests for a decision, Employee sought to have the matter appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). The Secretary forwarded the appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ dismissed the appeal pursuant to several provisions of the State Personnel Management System. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was how the provisions of the State Personnel Management System are to be implemented when, as here, a terminated employee notes a timely appeal to the head of the principal unit and the head of the principal unit fails within fifteen days thereafter to issue a written decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a state employee in this circumstance must assume at the end of the fifteen-day period that the appeal has been denied and take any further appeal within ten days thereafter. View "Fisher v. E. Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Lynne Swartzbaugh purchased motor vehicle insurance with Encompass Insurance Company. The policy named Lynne, her husband, and their daughter Kelly (Petitioners) as drivers. Lynne executed a waiver of higher uninsured motorist (UM) coverage on the standard Maryland Insurance Administration form. Immediately beneath the signature line below the waiver appeared the legend: "Signature of First Named Insured." By its terms, consistent with Maryland law, the waiver remained in effect until withdrawn, and the waiver was never withdrawn. Later, Kelly was injured in an accident involving an under-insured driver. Kelly was unable to collect further damages from Encompass under that policy's UM coverage. Petitioners sought a declaration that the waiver was ineffective because Lynne was not in fact the "first named insured" on the policy. The circuit court ruled that the waiver signed by Lynne was valid and enforceable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in the context of a motor vehicle insurance policy, the phrase "first named insured" refers to a person insured under the policy and specifically named in the policy who acts on behalf of the other insured parties and is designated as "first named insured" in the policy documents. View "Swartzbaugh v. Encompass Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Johnette Cosby requested an administrative hearing to challenge a determination by the Department of Social Services that she was responsible for "indicated child neglect." Prior to the hearing, Cosby's son was adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Assistance based on the same allegations of neglect presented in the administrative action. As a result, the administrative law judge granted the Department's motion to dismiss Cosby's administrative appeal based on collateral estoppel. Cosby filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that amendments to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1 precluded application of the common law defense of collateral estoppel. The circuit court reinstated Cosby's administrative appeal, but the court of special appeals reversed that determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 5-706.1 was not amended so as to preclude the common law defense of collateral estoppel when the elements are otherwise satisfied, and therefore, the dismissal of the administrative appeal was proper. View "Cosby v. Dep't of Human Res." on Justia Law