Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Board of County Commissioners of Frederick County (BOCC) appointed a nine-member charter board in 2011. The Maryland Constitution provides that the BOCC shall hold a special election for consideration of additional nominated charter board members under certain circumstances. Petitioners, individuals who sought membership on the charter board, circulated a petition in support of nominating candidates for consideration at a special election. The Frederick County Board of Elections (the Board) determined that Petitioners did not satisfy the statutory and constitutional requirements necessary for the BOCC to call a special election. The circuit court judge affirmed the determination made by the Board that the petition contained an insufficient number of valid signatures to require the BOCC to hold a special election. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and held (1) the Board applied the correct standard for reviewing and validating petition signatures under Md. Code An. Elec. Law 6-203(a), as interpreted by the Court in recent opinions; (2) the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not applicable to the circumstances of this case; and (3) the mandatory petition signature requirements in 6-203(a) and COMAR 33.06.03.06B(1) were not unconstitutional. View "Burruss v. Bd. of County Comm'rs" on Justia Law

Petitioner Jerome Pinkney was convicted of second degree assault and sentenced to eighteen months imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, claiming that the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4-215(e) by failing to inform him of his right to discharge counsel and proceed to trial pro se. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, concluding that the trial judge was not required under the plain language and meaning of Rule 4-215(e) to inform Petitioner of the right to conduct his trial pro se in the absence of a statement by Petitioner reasonably indicating a desire to represent himself at trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial judge was not required to inform Petitioner of his right to pro se representation in a situation where the trial court denied Petitioner's unmeritorious request to discharge trial counsel and petitioner made no statement that reasonably could be understood as indicating a desire to invoke the right to self-representation. View "Pinkney v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this appeal was whether the Maryland Credit Services Businesses Act (CSBA) applies to a tax preparer who receives payment from a lending bank for facilitating a consumer's obtention of a refund anticipation loan (RAL) where the tax preparer receives no direct payment from the consumer for this service. In this case, the circuit court dismissed Consumer's CSBA claim for failure to state a claim, concluding that the General Assembly enacted the CSBA to regulate credit repair agencies and not RAL facilitators. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the plain language of the CSBA most logically is understood as reflecting the legislative intent that the "payment of money or other valuable consideration" in return for credit services flow directly from the consumer to the credit service business; and (2) therefore, under the CSBA, Tax Preparer in this case was not a "credit services business" nor a "consumer"; and (3) accordingly, the CSBA did not apply in this case. View "Gomez v. Jackson Hewitt, Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant Angelia Anderson brought a medical malpractice action in the U.S. District Court against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). The FTCA contains a two-year statute of limitations regarding the timeliness of bringing claims against the government. However, if there is substantive law in the state where the claim arose governing the timeliness of a similar claim, the state provision controls over the FTCA's statute of limitations. A state statute of repose is considered substantive law and prevails over the procedural FTCA statute of limitations. The district court granted the government's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jursidiction. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals certified a question of law to the Maryland Supreme Court. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109(a)(1), which provides that the time period allowed for bringing a medical malpractice action is five years from the time the injury was committed, was a statute of limitation or a statute of repose. The Court held that the plain language of section 5-109(a)(1), confirmed by its legislative history, demonstrates that the statute is a statute of limitations, rather than repose. View "Anderson v. United States" on Justia Law

In 1976, Petitioner Merle Unger was indicted for felony murder, armed robbery, and using a handgun in the commission of the felony. During the trial, the trial judge told the jury that all of the judge's instructions as to the law were advisory. In 1996, Unger filed a petition for postconviction relief, arguing that the judge's instructions at his 1976 trial violated his right to due process of law because they empowered jurors to ignore the law. The post-conviction trial court granted a new trial. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that because Unger did not object to the advisory instructions given in his case, he waived his right to receive postconviction relief. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and affirmed the circuit court's judgment, holding that the trial judge's instructions at Unger's trial, telling the jury that all of the court's instructions on legal matters were "merely advisory" were clearly in error, at least as applied to matters implicating federal constitutional rights. View "Unger v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a man who claimed to be the father of a child conceived while the mother was married to another man, but born after the mother and her husband divorced, had an unconditional right to genetic testing to determine whether he was the biological father. The circuit court denied Respondent's request for paternity testing after applying the best interest of the child standard employed in two cases from the Court of Appeals, Kamp v. Department of Human Services and Monroe v. Monroe. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-1002(c), Respondent was entitled to a blood test. The court of appeals reversed, holding that, under the facts of this case, the circuit court did not err by considering the best interests of the subject child when rejecting the requested blood testing. View "Mulligan v. Corbett" on Justia Law

Appellants, a power plant limited partnership and a power plant, leased from the City of Baltimore two adjoining pieces of real estate. After the properties were valued by the City's supervisor of assessments, Appellants challenged the valuations. The property tax assessment appeals board and tax court affirmed. In both cases, Appellant introduced appraisals and testimony that valued the properties at a lower figure based in part on the existence of ground leases owned by the City. The leases, however, were not introduced into evidence during the proceedings. The circuit court affirmed the valuation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tax court did not err in its decision to disregard the effect of the ground leases because Appellants did not establish that the leases in issue restricted its use of the properties. View "Cordish Power Plant Ltd. P'ship v. Supervisor of Assessment" on Justia Law

Respondents in this case were an instructional aid and teacher employed by the public school system. Petitioner, the Department of Human Resources, received reports accusing Respondents of committing child abuse and later issued a finding of "child physical abuse - unsubstantiated." As a result, neither Respondent was named as the alleged abuser, but Respondents' names were entered into the central registry of child abuse investigations. Respondents requested an appeal regarding the decision of 'unsubstantiated' child physical abuse, but the Department denied the requests. Respondents subsequently filed mandamus actions, which the circuit court dismissed. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Department failed to interpret Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1(c) properly, and that individuals who are investigated by a local department, with a resultant finding of "unsubstantiated," have a right to appeal regardless of any additional findings of actual responsibility. View "Baltimore City Dep't of Social Servs." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the scope of authority of the Attorney General's Consumer Protection Division to issue administrative subpoenas in aid of its investigation into potential unfair and deceptive trade practices. The Division in this case sought documents it claimed were relevant to its investigation of Washington Home Remodelers (WHR). WHR demurred, asserting that the Division overreached by seeking discovery into matters in which the regulatory authority resided exclusively with either the Commissioner of Financial Regulation of the Department of Labor, Licensing and Regulation (DLLR) or the Maryland Home Improvement Commission under their respective enabling statutes. The circuit court ordered the subpoena's enforcement. WHR appealed, insisting that the Division subpoena was not authorized by law. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Division's subpoena was authorized by the Consumer Protection Act, and therefore, the Court did not need to delve into conflicting investigatory prerogatives of separate administrative agencies. View "Wash. Home Remodelers, Inc. v. Attorney Gen., Consumer Prot. Div." on Justia Law

Appellant Nancy Forster was terminated from the position of state public defender by the board of trustees of the state office of public defender. Forster subsequently filed a wrongful discharge action against the office of the public defender without first appealing administratively her termination. The circuit court dismissed Forster's complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Forster appealed, arguing that the circuit court erroneously granted the State's motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals affirmed without reaching the merits of Forster's claim, holding that Forster failed to exhaust the available and primary administrative remedy provided to at-will, executive service State employees under Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 11-305, even though she was not given written notice by the board of trustees of the availability of that avenue of appeal, as section 11-305 does not require the appointing authority to provide notice of the available administrative appeal. View "Forster v. Office of Public Defender " on Justia Law