Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Respondents, a county, city, village, and other government officials, established speed cameras that recorded, among others, Petitioners traveling in their vehicles over the posted speed limit. Respondents issued citations to Petitioners. Petitioners subsequently filed a complaint in the circuit court, asserting claims sounding in tort and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief. Petitioners asserted that Respondents' contracts with their common speed monitoring contract, ACS State and Local Solutions, violated Md. Code Ann. Transp. 21-809(j), which prohibited the county from remunerating, on a per-citation basis, a contractor who operates a speed monitoring system on the county's behalf. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions for summary judgment on all counts. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding (1) section 21-809 does not provide an express or implied private cause of action in tort; and (2) Petitioners lacked the necessary taxpayer standing to pursue their injunctive and declaratory relief claims. View "Baker v. Montgomery Co." on Justia Law

Respondent recorded a deed he had altered. At a bench trial, Respondent was convicted of counterfeiting pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 8-601. The court of special appeals reversed based on its conclusion that the evidence was insufficient to show an intent to defraud another. The Court of Appeals reversed and reinstated Respondent's conviction, holding (1) the trial's finding that Respondent had committed a fraud on the system of recordation satisfied the specific intent element of section 8-601 that a defendant have acted with the "intent to defraud another" because the fact that Respondent acted with the intent to defraud the system of deed recordation inherently reflected the intent to defraud anyone who would later seek to rely on the accuracy of the deed; and (2) Respondent did not act in good faith. View "State v. Neger" on Justia Law

In 2008, the General Assembly enacted a statute to require that a foreclosing lender provide advance written notice to the borrower of its intention to foreclosure. Among the information to be provided in that notice is the identity of the "secured party," although the statute does not specifically define that phrase. In this case, there was more than one entity that qualified as a "secured party" under the commonly understood meaning of the phrase. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, in such a situation, a foreclosing party was obligated to identify all secured parties in the advance written notice to the borrower. The Court held (1) a foreclosing party should ordinarily identify, in the notice of intent to foreclose, each entity that is a "secured party" with respect to the deed of trust in question; (2) however, a failure to disclose every secured party is not a basis for dismissing a foreclosure action when certain conditions are met; and (3) under the circumstances of the instant case, because many of the enumerated conditions were met even though the notice failed to disclose every secured party, the dismissal of the foreclosure action was not required. View "Shepherd v. Burson" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35, Inc. (FOP) filed a grievance under its collective bargaining agreement (CBA) with Montgomery County following the County's unilateral decision to discontinue a long-standing practice of allowing shop stewards to sit in on disciplinary interrogations for training purposes. The County filed a motion to dismiss the grievance, arguing that arbitration of the issue was preempted by the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The arbitrator determined the grievance was not preempted and denied the motion to dismiss. Subsequently, the County filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award in the circuit court. The circuit court affirmed the arbitrator's decision and granted summary judgment on behalf of the FOP. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the LEOBR was not implicated by the steward training grievance and, therefore, did not preempt its arbitration under the CBA. View "Montgomery Co. v. FOP Lodge 35" on Justia Law

Tenant rented her residence from Landlord, who defaulted on the mortgage on that property. U.S. Bank National Association (USBNA), as trustee for a mortgage-backed security that owned that debt, foreclosed on Landlord's deed of trust and terminated Tenant's lease. In doing so, it sent conflicting notices to Tenant about her right under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA) to remain on the property temporarily and filed a premature motion for immediate possession of the property. The circuit court granted USBNA's motion for possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) misleading and contradictory notices concerning a tenant's right to remain in a residence temporarily are ineffective to satisfy the purchaser's obligation under the PTFA; and (2) a motion for possession is premature when it is filed prior to the expiration of the period that the PTFA permits a bona fide tenant to remain in a residential property subject to foreclosure. Remanded. View "Curtis v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

Following his arrest at age sixteen, Petitioner was convicted of assault with intent to murder and other crimes even though the indictment returned by the Grand Jury did not charge assault with intent to murder. Petitioner did not raise this issue at trial, at sentencing, or on direct appeal. Not until sixteen years after his conviction did Petitioner file a motion to correct an illegal sentence, claiming that the trial court lacked the power to convict and sentence him for assault with intent to murder because that charge was not contained in the indictment. The circuit court denied the petition, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed the court of special appeals and vacated Petitioner's conviction and sentence for assault with intent to murder, holding (1) Petitioner's sentence for assault with intent to murder was illegal because that crime was not contained in the indictment returned by the Grand Jury; and (2) Petitioner's motion to correct and illegal sentence was timely because Maryland Rule 4-345(a) allows the trial court to correct an illegal sentence at any time. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

Michael Barclay was injured in a collision with a car driven by Christopher Richardson, a longshoreman, who had fallen asleep at the wheel while traveling home after a twenty-two hour shift at his job site located at the Port of Baltimore. Barclay and his wife filed a complaint against several parties, including Richardson's employer, Ports America Baltimore, Inc., alleging that Ports was liable for Barclay's injuries under the theory of respondeat superior and primary negligence. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Ports, finding (1) respondeat superior was inapplicable because Richardson was not acting within the scope of his employment was commuting home from work; and (2) Ports could not be held primarily liable for the injuries because it owed no duty to the public to ensure that an employee was fit to drive his personal vehicle home. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) under the circumstances, Ports may not be held vicariously liable for Richardson's motor vehicle tort; and (2) Ports had no duty to Barclay based solely on the fact that Richardon's fatigue was a foreseeable consequence of the employment. View "Barclay v. Briscoe" on Justia Law

This matter stemmed from an order of the circuit court granting Petitioner postconviction relief by vacating his conviction for first degree premeditated murder and leaving in place Petitioner's related convictions for felony murder and first degree rape. The court of special appeals reversed that order and reinstated Petitioner's conviction for first degree premeditated murder. The Court of Appeals granted Petitioner's writ for certiorari and the State's conditional cross-petition, holding (1) the court of appeals properly exercised jurisdiction when it decided the State's appeal; (2) Petitioner was not entitled to postconviction relief; and (3) the term-of-years Petitioner received for first degree premeditated murder, but not the sentence for first degree rape, was illegal and must be corrected on remand. Remanded. View "Greco v. State" on Justia Law

In the recent decision in Bates v. Cohn, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a borrower challenging a foreclosure action must ordinarily assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of the foreclosure sale in advance of the sale. After the sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregulatories in the conduct of the sale, although the Court left open the possibility that a borrower could assert a post-sale exception that the deed of trust was itself the product of fraud. This case arose out of the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the residence of Darnella and Charles Thomas by Jeffrey Nadel and others. In apparent hope of fitting their post-sale exceptions within the question left open in Bates, the Thomases alleged certain defects in the chain of title of the note evidencing their debt and characterized them as a "fraud on the judicial system." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged defects did not establish that the Thomases' deed of trust was the product of fraud. View "Thomas v. Nadel" on Justia Law

After a sheriff's deputy pulled Ronald Lipella over for swerving outside the proper travel lane on a county highway, the deputy administered to Lipella three standard field sobriety tests, all of which Lipella failed. An ALJ subsequently suspended Lipella's driver's license was subsequently for driving while intoxicated. The circuit court held that the ALJ's suspension of Lipella's license was unsupported by substantial evidence, concluding that the deputy failed to indicate adequately on the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA) Form DR-15A the reasonable grounds for the underlying traffic stop that led to the license suspension. The Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court, holding (1) the Implied Consent Statute does not require the officer to supply the grounds for the underlying traffic stop, but rather, the officer is required to provide on the DR-15A form the reasonable grounds for the suspect's intoxication; and (2) thus, the ALJ concluded properly that the MVA mounted successfully a prima facie case, which was unrebutted, supporting the suspension of Lipella's license. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Lipella" on Justia Law