Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A collective-bargaining agreement between Baltimore County and Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge 4 (FOP) contained an arbitration clause and a retiree health-insurance provision. FOP believed the provision locked in place the health-insurance subsidy as it existed at the time of an officer's retirement. After the agreement expired and the County decreased the health-insurance subsidy, FOP initiated arbitration. The County protested, arguing (1) it had no duty to arbitrate because the collective-bargaining agreement had expired, and (2) the health-insurance subsidy was not locked in place but was subject to change from year to year. FOP was successful in arbitration and on appeal before the circuit court, but the court of special appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an arbitration clause may survive the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement when it concerns rights that vested during the life of the agreement; and (2) when deciding the issue of arbitrability requires interpretation of the underlying agreement and consideration of the merits of the dispute, the issue of arbitrability should initially be determined by the arbitrator. View "Baltimore County Fraternal Order of Police Lodge v. Baltimore County" on Justia Law

This consolidated opinion resolved two cases heard by the Court of Appeals concerning the appropriate scope of the Washington Metropolitan Area Transit Authority's (WMATA) immunity from suit. In both cases, Veronica Tinsley and Kim Hodge, Petitioners, slipped, fell, and were injured at WMATA operated metrorail stations. Petitioners presented a common question of whether their claims were barred by Section 80 of the WMATA Compact, and Hodge presented an additional question of whether Section 75 of the Compact limited the scope of WMATA's immunity, such that its alleged failure to abide by various County code sections rendered an immunity defense unavailable. The Court upheld WMATA's immunity from suit, concluding (1) WMATA was immune because its underlying decision regarding proper maintenance procedures was grounded in concerns of economic and public policy; and (2) Hodge's contention that Section 75 waived WMATA's immunity in her case was without merit. View "Tinsley v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth." on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with one count of sexually abusing a minor, two counts of second degree rape, and six counts of second degree sexual offense. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to suppress statements he had made to police, arguing that he had not been given Miranda warnings at the time he arrived at the police station. The circuit court agreed and suppressed the statements. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that Petitioner was not in custody at the time he gave the statements at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a belief held by a suspect that police may have probable cause to arrest him or her is not sufficient to render the individual in custody for Miranda purposes; and (2) the motion to suppress Petitioner's statements should have been denied because, given the totality of the circumstances, Petitioner was not in custody at the time he made the statements. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

In this case the Court of Appeals was asked to decide on the existence and possible means of locating a general easement that provided a right-of-way from a major road. The easement in question crossed the property of USA Cartage Leasing, LLC as an access route for neighboring property owned by Todd Baer. Maryland's recording statute for deeds requires that a deed contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it with reasonable certainty. This case presented the novel question of whether this requirement, in the context of a grant of land that includes an easement, applied to the description of the easement itself or merely to that of the servient property. The court of special appeals determined that the correct answer was the latter and instructed the circuit court to locate the easement according to the principles set forth in section 4.8 in the Restatement 3d of Property: Servitudes. The Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the Restatement's approach for locating a valid general easement that is not precisely defined in the deed or by custom or usage. View "USA Cartage Leasing, LLC v. Baer" on Justia Law

This was the latest in a series of opinions by the Court of Appeals involving the constitutional provision and the implementing legislation authorizing a limited number of slot machines at specified Maryland facilities, including facilities in the area of Anne Arundel County (County). A County zoning ordinance authorized slot machines in certain areas of the County. The circuit court determined that the ordinance was not subject to referendum under the County charter. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (1) held the circuit court's judgment was appealable, as (i) the Legislature no no intention of applying the non-appealability principle of Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-302(a) to cases under the Election Article, and (ii) where the Election Article authorizes judicial review but is silent regarding an appeal, Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc.12-301 authorizes an appeal; and (2) reversed the circuit court's judgment and remanded with instructions to order that the ordinance be placed on the ballot at the general election in accordance with the referendum provisions of the County charter, holding that the ordinance was simply a local ordinance re-zoning an area, and as such, it was not exempt from a referendum. View "Citizens Against Slots At The Mall v. PPE Casino Resorts Md., LLC" on Justia Law

A stray bullet, fired at a fleeing drug buyer, killed an innocent bystander. Petitioner was convicted by a jury of second-degree felony murder, distribution of marijuana, and related offenses in connection with the death of that bystander and the failed drug transaction that preceded it. The court of special appeals affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court of special appeals did not err in (1) determining that the trial judge's error in admitting hearsay evidence that Petitioner admitted committing the shooting was harmless; (2) adopting the res gestae theory of second-degree felony murder in affirming that conviction; and (3) declining to exercise plain error review of a jury instruction. View "Yates v. State" on Justia Law

Following the passage of Maryland's latest congressional redistricting law, SB 1, Intervenor employed a website-based initiative to gather the signatures necessary to petition SB 1 to referendum on the general election ballot in November 2012. The State Board of Elections certified the petition for referendum after determining that Intervenor had gathered the required number of valid signatures. Petitioners subsequently challenged the State's Board's certification of the petition on the grounds that Intervenor failed to submit a sufficient number of valid signatures, objecting to two classes of signatures validated by the State Board. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding (1) petition signatures obtained through the use of a third-party website do not violate the statutory requirement that an individual "include" or "provide" his or her identifying information; and (2) an individual can "self-circulate" a petition by signing both as the voter and as the circulator. View "Whitley v. State Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner of distribution of a controlled dangerous substance. The court of special appeals affirmed, reasoning that a witness's prior consistent statements are admissible even if the witness had multiple motives to fabricate, so long as the witness made the statements before any one of the motivates to fabricate. Alternatively, the court held that the witness's prior consistent statements were admissible as rehabilitative evidence under Maryland Rule 5-616(c). The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the prior consistent statements were not admissible under Maryland Rule 5-802.1(b) because they were made after the declarant had an expressed or implied motive to fabricate the statements, and the alleged motives were presented as such at trial before the trial judge made a determination as to the statements' admissibility; and (2) the prior consistent statements were inadmissible as hearsay and were neither relevant nor admissible under Rule 5-616(c) to rehabilitate a witness. View "Thomas v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Respondents, a property management company, law firm, and mortgage servicer, committed an impermissible forcible entry when they enforced, through lock-out, the foreclosure purchaser's lawful possessory interest in a dwelling by the means of the common law remedy of self-help, as opposed to receiving first the issuance of a statutory writ of possession from the circuit court. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the common law right of peaceable self-help permits a foreclosure purchaser to surreptitiously enter a residential property and change the locks while the resident is out; and (2) the court of special appeals erred in dismissing Plaintiff's conversion claim and in holding that Plaintiff had abandoned all personal property in the residence, as there was no adequate basis from which to conclude that Plaintiff abandoned his personalty or that Respondents acted reasonably in disposing of his belongings. View "Nickens v. Mt. Vernon Realty" on Justia Law

In 2002, county voters adopted an amendment to the county charter relating to the resolution by binding arbitration of collective bargaining impasses with the county's law enforcement employees and uniformed firefighters. In 2003, the county council adopted an ordinance implementing that charter provision. In 2011, the county council amended the 2003 ordinance to provide that binding arbitration did not require the council to appropriate funds or enact legislation necessary to implement a final written award in arbitration. An uncodified section of the 2011 council bill also provided that, if any part of the 2011 ordinance were held invalid, the entire county code section enacted by the 2003 ordinance, as amended through the 2011 ordinance, would be deemed repealed by operation of law, with the result that impasses would be addressed by a code section that did not authorize binding arbitration. Petitioners sought a declaratory judgment that the 2011 ordinance violated the 2002 charter amendment. The circuit court held the 2002 charter amendment violated the Maryland Constitution. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the 2002 charter amendment bound the county council; and (2) portions of the 2011 ordinance, as well as its uncodified section 3, violated the charter and were invalid. Remanded. View "Atkinson v. Anne Arundel County" on Justia Law