Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In Powell I, Plaintiff sued Doctor and others for medical malpractice. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Appellees in 2007. The appellate court held that the appropriate remedy was to dismiss the suit. The Supreme Court affirmed, vacated the grant of summary judgment, and remanded for dismissal. By the time the complaint was dismissed in 2011, the statute of limitations had expired on the merits of the substantive claims. In Powell II, Plaintiff filed a second, identical statement of claim in 2007. The circuit court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment in 2008 under the doctrine of res judicata. In 2011, Plaintiff filed in Powell II a motion to reopen case and vacate judgment, arguing that the circuit court's reliance on the preclusive effect of the decision in Powell I was faulty. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court accepted certification and held (1) in Powell II, the judge did not err in granting summary judgment because, at the time, the doctrine of res judicata barred the maintenance of the litigation based on the 2007 grant of summary judgment in Powell I; and (2) the circuit court did not err in denying Plaintiff's motion to reopen case and vacate judgment. View "Powell v. Breslin" on Justia Law

On behalf of himself and a proposed class of others similarly situated, Plaintiff filed an action challenging the legality of Ticketmaster's collection of a service charge on a concert ticket he purchased for a concert in the city. The complaint was based on provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The Supreme Court accepted certification to answer questions of law and held (1) if a ticket agency is authorized in writing by a licensed exhibitor to sell tickets as an agent of the exhibitor, the ticket agency is not required to be licensed; (2) the Code prohibits the collection of a service charge, in addition to the established price printed on the ticket, in connection with the original sale of the ticket by the exhibitor, and is not limited to ticket resales; (3) the Code does not permit anyone other than a ticket agency licensed under the Code to collect anything more for a ticket than the established price printed on the ticket plus taxes; and (4) a common law action for money had and received will lie to recover money paid in excess of that allowed by statute if the agreement pursuant to which it has been paid has not been fully consummated. View "Bourgeois v. Live Nation Entm't, Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner, a Mexican immigrant who did not speak or comprehend English, was convicted of first degree murder and related offenses. Before trial, Petitioner sought suppression of a statement he made connecting him to the murder. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the State failed to prove that he was properly advised of, and validly waived, his Miranda rights. The court of special appeals concluded that the record developed at the suppression hearing sufficed to permit the court to rule that the Miranda warnings and Petitioner's waiver complied with constitutional dictates. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the suppression court reasonably could find, from the totality of the evidence offered by the State, that the State proved both that proper Miranda warnings were adequately conveyed to Petitioner and that he knowingly and voluntarily waived those rights before he was interrogated and made the statement he sought to suppress. View "Gonzalez v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an LLC, sought an exception from the Charles County Zoning Regulation to build an office building, gun range, and driving track on a parcel of land in a rural community in the County. The property was subject to zoning restrictions prohibiting such activity except as authorized through a special exception. In deciding Petitioner's application, the Board conducted one trip to the property in question. The Board allowed representatives from the LLC as well as two citizens to attend but prohibited any other members of the public from attending and kept no transcript or other record of that which transpired. The Board then granted Petitioner's application. Various individuals filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Board improperly conducted the visit to the property in a manner that was closed to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the site visit constituted a "meeting", which was required to be open to the public; and (2) because the Board violated the open meeting provisions of the Maryland Code, the Charles County Code, and its own Rules of Procedure, the matter should be remanded for a new hearing. View "WSG Holdings, LLC v. Bowie" on Justia Law

Defendant entered a plea of not criminally responsible to charges of first-degree attempted murder and was found incompetent to stand trial. Defendant was committed to the Perkins Hospital for several years waiting to become competent to stand trial. The charges against him were eventually dismissed pursuant to Md. Code Crim. Proc. 3-107(a), which requires dismissal of charges upon passage of certain time period. The State subsequently re-indicted Defendant, who was again found incompetent and placed at Perkins for another round of incompetency-to-stand-trial (IST) treatment. Defendant challenged his re-indictment, arguing that the State could not continue to confine him by re-indicting him on the same charges that were required to be dismissed. The appellate court reversed. The Supreme Court vacated the appellate court's ruling and remanded, holding (1) section 3-107 expressly provides that a dismissal of charges is without prejudice; but (2) nevertheless, Defendant's IST committment was improper, as (i) the passage of five years without Defendant's becoming competent and the resulting dismissal of his original charges under section 3-107 created the presumption that Defendant could not be restored to competency, and (ii) ordering Defendant in IST commitment, while the presumption that he was unrestorable was in place, was error. View "State v. Ray" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of transporting a handgun in a motor vehicle. A police officer found the handgun in a vehicle he suspected Petitioner had been using a short time earlier for "hacking," which is the provision of taxi services without a license. The police officer located the vehicle by pressing a car remote he had seized, along with a set of car keys, while frisking Petitioner. Before trial, Petitioner moved to suppress the car keys and remote on the ground that the officer seized those items from Petitioner's pants pocket by exceeding the proper scope of a lawful Terry frisk. Petitioner then argued the handgun must be suppressed as the tainted fruit of the earlier seizure of the keys and remote. The circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to suppress the physical evidence. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the officer violated Minnesota v. Dickerson by seizing the keys and car remote without the incriminating character of those items being "immediately apparent." The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court also affirmed, holding that, by application of the plain feel doctrine, the officer lawfully seized the keys and remote he touched while frisking Petitioner, and therefore, the seizure of the items in dispute was lawful. View "McCracken v. State" on Justia Law

These petitions for certiorari pertained to contribution among joint tort-feasors and arose from a medical malpractice action in which Petitioners, the Spences, alleged wrongful death and survival claims against Petitioner Mercy Medical Center and Respondents, a medical doctor and his practices. The issue of contribution arose because the Spences and Mercy entered into a pre-trial settlement by which the Spences agreed to dismiss their claims against Mercy without exacting an admission of liability. After Mercy was dismissed as a party, the case proceeded to trial against Respondents, which resulted in a verdict in favor of the Spences. Respondents subsequently initiated a separate action against Mercy seeking contribution. The Spences contemporaneously brought suit against Respondents seeking a declaration that Respondents were not entitled to contribution. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the Spences' release extinguished any right Respondents had to seek contribution against Mercy because Respondents did not join Mercy as a third party defendant in the original action after it was dismissed as a party. The Court of Appeals held that Respondents were not prohibited from pursuing contribution from Mercy in a separate action because the release's conditional language did not fully relieve Mercy's contribution liability. View "Mercy Med. Ctr. v. Julian" on Justia Law

The owners of two properties leased them to developer-tenants for the purpose of building an apartment building on each. As construction was beginning, the landlords breached the leases by refusing to provide estoppel certificates and contesting the tenants' building permits. The landlords' breach prevented the tenants from obtaining financing, which ended the development project. The tenants sued for lost profits. Before trial, the circuit court ruled against the landlords on several motions, holding in part (1) the landlords could not introduce evidence of the 2008 crash in the real estate market to show that the tenants would not have made profits, and (2) the tenants could introduce evidence of the landlords' reasons for breaching, including communications with their former counsel. The jury awarded the tenants over $36 million in damages, holding the landlords jointly and severally liable. The court of special appeals held the landlords could not be held jointly and severally liable but otherwise affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did nor err in excluding all evidence of post-breach market data in measuring damages; and (2) the landlord waived the attorney-client privilege as to communications relevant to the subject matter of the claim of bad faith. View "CR-RSC Tower I, LLC v. RSC Tower I, LLC" on Justia Law

Here the trial judge denied a defense motion for judgment of acquittal on three charges against Defendant. The district court then terminated the prosecution of those charges for a purely procedural reason - non-compliance with the rule on service of process - that the court made clear was unrelated to guilt or innocence. The court, however, recorded its action on the docket sheet as "not guilty," a label that denoted an acquittal. This case raised the question whether the protection against double jeopardy precluded the State from pursuing an appeal of that decision. The circuit court held that, in these circumstances, the trial court's action was tantamount to a preliminary motion to dismiss and that the State could therefore appeal the trial court's decision concerning service of process. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a mis-labeled dismissal of charges for a purely procedural reason unrelated to guilt or innocence does not trigger the protection against double jeopardy. View "Kendall v. State" on Justia Law

Following a bench trial, Respondent was convicted of theft for cashing a counterfeit check and not returning the money in violation of Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 7-104(d). Respondent appealed the conviction, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to sustain her conviction because the State did not prove that she obtained control over the proceeds of the check knowing the money was delivered by mistake. The court of special appeals agreed and reversed the conviction. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) section 7-104(d) applies to someone who obtains property knowing that the property is lost, mislaid, or delivered by mistake and has a concurrent, or later formed, intent to steal it; (2) the statute, however, does not apply to someone who obtains property not knowing at that time that the property is lost, mislaid, or mistakenly delivered; and (3) therefore, the requirements of section 7-104(d) are not met when there is no evidence upon which the factfinder reasonably could find, or when, as here, the judge at a bench trial expressly finds that the State failed to prove the defendant knew at the time she obtained the property that it had been delivered under a mistake. View "State v. Weems" on Justia Law