Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Druid Ridge Cemetery Company entered into a contract to sell thirty-six acres of the approximately 200 acres it owned and were a part of its cemetery operation. The intended purchaser entered into the contract to construct residences on portions of the land immediately adjacent to Park Heights Avenue. The Dumbarton Improvement and Long Meadow Neighborhood Associations challenged the sale, claiming that the residential development violated a restrictive covenant contained in the deed conveying the cemetery property to Druid Ridge. The circuit court determined (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was ambiguous, and (2) alternatively, there were radically changed circumstances in the area rendering the restrictive covenant ineffective and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was unambiguous; and (2) the nexus between the changed circumstances and the purpose of the covenant was not sufficient to render the restrictive covenant unenforceable. Remanded. View "Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of multiple sexual offenses relating to an attack and rape of a woman. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to sustain Defendant's conviction; (2) Defendant's constitutional confrontation rights were not violated when the State's expert witness presented the results of forensic tests as the basis for her conclusion that Defendant was the source of the DNA found on vaginal swabs taken from the rape victim; (3) Defendant's rights to discovery were not violated by the trial court's refusal to order the State to conduct a search for coincidental matches in the FBI's Combined DNA Index System; and (4) the trial court did not err in refusing to include Defendant's proposed jury instruction on the definition of "reasonable degree of scientific certainty." View "Derr v. State" on Justia Law

After a trial trial, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder. During the trial, a DNA testified that she could not exclude Petitioner as being the source of DNA recovered from the truck in which the victim was shot. In closing argument, however, the prosecutor told jurors that Petitioner's DNA was present in the victim's truck and that the DNA analyst's statistical analysis supported the State's theory of the case. Petitioner objected to the prosecutor's argument as misstating the DNA evidence and unsuccessfully asked for a mistrial. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying Petitioner's motion for a mistrial after the State mischaracterized the statistical significance of the DNA evidence in rebuttal closing argument. Remanded for a new trial. View "Whack v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, the Webbs, believing they held title to a quarter-acre tract of land, contended that the land was part of three parcels they acquired in 2000. The land abutted and shared its western boundary with property owned by Respondents, the Nowaks, who claimed title to the disputed land. The parties' disagreement stemmed from conflicting interpretations of a 1928 recorded deed (the Wolf deed), which described a fence in a certain location as constituting the western boundary line of the property conveyed in the deed. The Nowaks asserted that an existing fence was the same fence described in the Wolf deed. The Webbs contended that their property extended beyond the existing fence and that the existing fence did not exist in 1928. The circuit court entered judgment for the Nowaks. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the lower court did not clearly err in its factual determination as to the correct boundary line. View "Webb v. Nowak" on Justia Law

After a jury trial in 1986, Petitioner was convicted of attempted first degree rape and related charges. Petitioner subsequently pled guilty to two counts of first degree rape, one count of second degree rape, and related charges. In 2005, Petitioner filed a post-conviction petition covering both cases, alleging, among other things, ineffective assistance of counsel. In 2008, the State argued that Petitioner's petition should be denied on the ground of laches. The circuit court held that laches was available to the State as a defense and denied the petition on that basis. The court of appeals agreed that laches was applicable in post-conviction proceedings but found the record was insufficiently developed for a finding that laches barred the petition in this case. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the intermediate appellate court and remanded with directions to vacate the circuit court's decision, holding that laches does not bar an individual from pursuing post-conviction remedies. View "Lopez v. State" on Justia Law

The district court convicted Petitioner of second-degree assault and reckless endangerment. Petitioner exercised his right to have his case tried do novo in the circuit court. After a jury-waived trial, the circuit court acquitted Petitioner of reckless endangerment and convicted him of second-degree assault. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals, which the Court issued. The Court then affirmed Petitioner's conviction, holding (1) Petitioner's right to a de novo appeal of his district court conviction was not violated when his testimony from the district court trial was admitted into evidence in his circuit court trial; and (2) Petitioner's Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination was not violated when his testimony from the district court trial was admitted into evidence in his circuit court trial. View "Oku v. State" on Justia Law

CareFirst, Inc., a nonstock, nonprofit Maryland corporation, is a holding company with two subsidiaries that provides health insurance for millions of Maryland residents. State law confers broad authority on the Maryland Insurance Commissioner to oversee its operation and adherence to its mission. This case arose from the termination of Leon Kaplan, a former executive of CareFirst. CareFirst declined to pay part of the post-termination compensation set forth in Kaplan's employment contract, reasoning that the compensation was not for "work actually performed," as that standard had been interpreted by the Commissioner. The Commissioner affirmed the decision not to pay the benefits, concluding that the payments would violate Md. Code Ann. Ins. 14-139. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Commissioner's determination was not preempted by ERISA; (2) the Commissioner's construction of the insurance code was legally correct; and (3) there was substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's determination in this case. View "Md. Ins. Comm'r. v. Kaplan" on Justia Law

Petitioner, which operated an animal crematory, filed an action against Respondent, a planning and engineering firm, alleging breach of contract and professional negligence. The complaint failed to attribute Respondent's alleged failings to a licensed engineer and was not accompanied by a certificate of a qualified expert. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to file a certificate within the required time period. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that where the allegations of Petitioner's complaint did not fault a licensed engineer, it was premature to conclude that an expert certificate was required, as the certificate requirement applies only to a cause of action based on a licensed engineer's negligent act or omission in rendering engineering services within the scope of the engineer's license. View "Heavenly Days Crematorium, LLC v. Harris, Smariga & Assocs." on Justia Law

Dorothy Urban's estate (Estate) filed suit against Robert Street, asking the circuit court to declare null and void a deed executed by Urban to Street for a residential property on the grounds that the execution of the deed was procured through fraud. Street subsequently executed a deed of trust for a loan that was secured by the property. The majority of the loan was used to pay off a mortgage on the property placed by Urban. Later, the circuit court directed that the property be conveyed in Street's name to the Estate. The court created a constructive trust on the property without expressly declaring the Urban-to-Street deed void ab initio. Street subsequently defaulted on the deed of trust and Petitioners filed a foreclosure action on the property. The Estate filed a motion to dismiss the foreclosure proceedings, which the circuit court denied. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that although Petitioners were not bona fide purchasers of the property, under the doctrine of equitable subrogation, Petitioners were entitled to priority for the amount loaned to Street used to pay off the balance owed on the preexisting Urban mortgage. View "Fishman v. Murphy" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were the parents of a daughter who died and another daughter who received injuries after Michael Eaton struck the Plaintiffs' car. Plaintiffs filed suit against the owner of the Dogfish Head Alehouse (Dogfish Head), claiming that Dogfish Head had served alcohol to Eaton while he was "clearly intoxicated" and thus breached its duty to them not to furnish alcohol to intoxicated persons. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Dogfish Head, concluding that the court was bound by the Supreme Court's decisions in State v. Hatfield and Fedler v. Butler in which dram shop liability was not recognized as a cause of action in the state. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether it should recognize dram shop liability. The Court affirmed the judgment, holding (1) Maryland does not recognize a cause of action against a tavern for harm caused off premises by an intoxicated person in the absence of a special relationship between the tavern and the person harmed or the actor who caused the harm; and (2) absent such a relationship in this case, Dogfish Head did not owe a duty to Plaintiffs, as members of the general public, to prevent the harm caused by Eaton. View "Warr v. JMGM Group, LLC" on Justia Law