Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was a paid firefighter employed by Respondent, Montgomery County. Petitioner filed a claim pursuant to the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming that he sustained injuries in an accident that occurred when he was traveling to work on his motorcycle after leaving physical training. The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission disallowed Petitioner’s claim, finding that Petitioner did not sustain an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The circuit court upheld the Commission’s decision, ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to workers’ compensation because the injury occurred while “he was coming and going” to work. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that Petitioner’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act because (1) Petitioner’s travel was incidental to his employment, which travel cannot be excluded from coverage by application of the going and coming rule; and (2) “but for” his travel between work-related sites Petitioner would not have been injured. View "Roberts v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree burglary and sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. On appeal, Petitioner argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by offering, over objection, an “investigative or scientific techniques” jury instruction. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial court violated the standards set forth in Atkins v. State and Stabb v. State that an “anti-CSI effect” instruction, limited only to curative administration, shall not be entertained without proof that a “CSI effect” exists and is only triggered when a material misstatement of the law occurs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court in this case erred by giving the contested instruction, as the instruction was given preemptively and defense counsel did not misstate the law or the State’s burden. Remanded for a new trial. View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of a State psychiatric hospital who had been laid off and were not rehired in order of seniority when the hospital later filled vacancies for positions comparable to those previously occupied by Plaintiffs. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiffs’ grievance, concluding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to be rehired under a reinstatement process. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals remanded the case for further factfinding, concluding (1) there is no statutory preference for reinstatement, as opposed to recruitment, in the State Personnel Management System, but if an agency decides to fill vacancies through recruitment, it must follow statutory procedures, including public notice and transparency as to the selection criteria; and (2) it was not clear whether the agency in this case complied with those criteria. The Court of Appeals affirmed by adopting the opinion of the court of special appeals and adding an endorsement to the court of special appeal’s opinion to remove any doubt as to the standing of that decision as the law of the State. View "Sturdivant v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of theft of property valued in excess of $100,000 and related offenses stemming from his unauthorized occupancy of a home for approximately seven months. Defendant appealed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for theft, theft of property valued in excess of $100,000, and first-degree burglary. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for theft of property valued in excess of $100,000 but was sufficient to support a conviction for theft of property having a value of at least $10,000 but less than $100,000; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree burglary. View "Hobby v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with various offenses, including reckless endangerment. Because the indictment did not set out the elements of the charged offense or the factual basis for that offense, Petitioner requested that the State provide him with a bill of particulars. Rather than answer each question Petitioner asked in his request, the State simply directed Petitioner to discovery. The trial court overruled Petitioner’s exceptions, finding that the State’s responses satisfied the statutory requirement that the State’s response “furnish the particulars sought.” A jury found Petitioner guilty of reckless endangerment. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by denying his exceptions to the State’s non-specific responses to the questions posed in his request for a bill of particulars. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the State’s responses to the questions posed in Petitioner’s demand for a bill of particulars were inadequate; and (2) therefore, the trial court abused its discretion when it overruled Petitioner’s exceptions to those responses. View "Dzikowski v. State" on Justia Law

Respondents filed a complaint for accounting against Petitioner, their employer, after a dispute over the terms of their employment agreement. In response, Petitioner filed a petition to compel arbitration, asserting that, because Respondents’ claims arose out of their employment agreements, the circuit court was required to compel arbitration under an arbitration clause contained in the employment agreement. The circuit court denied Petitioner’s petition. The intermediate appellate court dismissed Petitioner's appeal, concluding that the denial of Petitioner’s motion to compel arbitration did not constitute a final judgment. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that an order denying a request to compel arbitration filed in an existing action is not a final judgment because the denial of the petition does not put the parties out of court or otherwise terminate the proceedings and does not deny the party requesting arbitration the means of further prosecuting or defending rights and interests in the subject matter of the proceeding. View "Am. Bank Holdings, Inc. v. Kavanaugh" on Justia Law

In two cases, Montgomery County took a portion of properties owned by Respondents. Because the parties disputed the value paid for either taking the County filed a complaint for condemnation. During the proceedings, the circuit court imposed discovery violation sanctions precluding Respondents from introducing evidence as to the fair market value of the taken properties. Respondents were therefore unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact concerning the County's appraisal valuations. As a result, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the County on the issue of just compensation. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that summary judgment on the question of just compensation is not available in condemnation proceedings because a property owner cannot be deprived of the constitutional right to have a jury determine just compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) permitting summary judgment does not violate the constitutional right to have the opportunity for a jury trial to ascertain just compensation in compensation actions provided the landowner litigates the case according to the Maryland Rules; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted in each case because there was no genuine dispute of material fact and the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Montgomery County v. Soleimanzadeh" on Justia Law

A state trooper pulled over Respondent's vehicle for failing to obey a traffic control device. When the trooper approached the vehicle, he detected a "moderate odor" of an alcoholic beverage on Respondent's breath. The trooper placed Respondent under arrest and, after Respondent refused to take an alcohol content test, Respondent was subjected to a suspension of his driver's license. An administrative law judge affirmed the suspension. The circuit court reversed, holding that the record was "deplete of any sufficient indicia of alcohol use" to establish reasonable grounds for a request to take an alcohol content test. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a moderate odor of alcohol emanating from the person of a motorist, alone, constitutes reasonable grounds to request the motorist to take an alcohol test. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Spies" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged in two cases with second-degree burglary, theft, and malicious destruction of property. Petitioner moved to suppress all evidence obtained as the result of law enforcement's global positioning system (GPS) tracking of his vehicle. The motions were denied, and Petitioner was convicted of various charges arising out of the two cases. While Petitioner's appeal of the convictions was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided United States v. Jones, which held that GPS tracking of a vehicle constitutes a search under the Fourth Amendment. The court of special appeals affirmed the consolidated appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner was not entitled to the suppression of evidence where (1) before Jones, binding appellate precedent in Maryland authorized the GPS tracking of a vehicle on public roads; (2) law enforcement officers acted in objectively reasonable reliance on that authority when they conducted their GPS tracking of Petitioner's vehicle; and (3) the Davis v. United States good-faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied in this case. View "Kelly v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was assigned the serving rights to Plaintiff's mortgage on a piece of property. Plaintiff sued Defendant, claiming that Defendant attempted to collect more than was due on the loan. The parties settled. Plaintiff then filed this action against Defendant, alleging breach of the settlement agreement, defamation, and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. An order of default was later entered against Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, requesting that the default judgments be set aside because Plaintiff's claims were legally deficient. The trial court denied the motion. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a defaulting party who does not file a motion to vacate the order of default after a default judgment has been entered cannot file a Maryland Rule 2-534 motion to alter or amend a judgment to contest liability, and the defaulting party cannot appeal that judgment in order to contest liability. View "Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nefflen" on Justia Law