Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2003, Appellant was convicted of rape. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Maryland DNA Collection Act, which permits law enforcement authorities to collect DNA samples from individuals arrested for certain crimes, violated the Fourth Amendment as applied to Appellant. The U.S. Supreme Court reversed, holding that the DNA search of Appellant did not violate his Fourth Amendment rights. On remand, Appellant asked the Court to consider the issues left unresolved by King I. The Court of Appeals held (1) the Maryland DNA Collection Act does not violate Article 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights; and (2) the trial judge did not improperly shift the burden of proof to the defense to demonstrate how the State failed to comply with the Act, and even if a statutory violation were proven, there was no reversible error. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, each of whom was arrested for a crime and brought before a District Court Commissioner for an initial appearance, filed a complaint against the District Court of Maryland and several court officials alleging that they were denied public defender representation during their initial appearance proceedings. Plaintiffs contended that the initial appearance proceeding is a critical stage of the criminal proceeding requiring state-furnished counsel pursuant to the Public Defender Act (Act) and that the failure to provide counsel violated their due process rights. The Court of Appeals held that the Act required the public defender to represent indigent criminal defendants at the initial appearance proceedings. While motions for reconsideration of the Court's opinion were pending, the General Assembly passed statutes amending the Act to provide that representation was not required to be furnished to an indigent individual at an initial appearance before a district court commissioner. The Court proceeded to hold that, under the due process component of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, an indigent defendant has a right to state-furnished counsel at an initial appearance before a district court commissioner. Remanded. View "DeWolfe v. Richmond " on Justia Law

After Respondent resigned as executive director of the Chamber of Commerce, he filed a complaint against the Chamber, alleging violations of the Wage Payment and Collection Law, among other claims. After a jury trial, the court entered judgment against the Chamber. Respondent subsequently filed a motion for an award of attorneys' fees under the Wage Payment and Collection Law. The circuit court denied Respondent's motion on remand after applying a fee-shifting analysis from ERISA cases. The court of special appeals reversed the denial of the motion, holding that the circuit court erred in applying the ERISA factors. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because ERISA and the Wage Payment and Collection Law serve distinct purposes and because their fee-shifting provisions are based on different principles, a trial court should not employ the ERISA fee-shifting test in deciding whether to award attorneys' fees. View "Ocean City Chamber of Commerce v. Barufaldi" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Petitioner unsuccessfully filed a petition for post-conviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel, after which he unsuccessfully filed an application for leave to appeal. Thereafter, Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, which the intermediate appellate court granted. The appellate court then determined that the application lacked merit because Petitioner was not prejudiced by the alleged errors of his counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to object to approximately thirty instances during trial when the State admitted evidence that Petitioner had remained silent in the face of custodial police questioning after Petitioner had been issued Miranda warnings. Remanded. View "Coleman v. State" on Justia Law

This case arose when six employees of the Baltimore Washington Conference of the United Methodist Church filed workers' compensation claims, claiming they had sustained physical injury as a result of exposure to mold in the Conference's office. The employees profferred Dr. Ritchie Shoemaker as their expert to prove causation. Defendant moved to exclude Shoemaker under Frye-Reed on the grounds that his methodology to determine causation was not generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. On remand, after a Frye-Reed hearing, the circuit court determined that Shoemaker's methodology was generally accepted by the relevant scientific community and satisfied the Frye-Reed test. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Shoemaker's technique and theory were not shown to be generally accepted in the relevant scientific community. View "Chesson v. Montgomery Mut. Ins. Co." on Justia Law

Plaintiff worked for the Association of Maryland Pilots as a launch boat operator. Plaintiff was later promoted to assistant station manager. In 2008, Plaintiff was diagnosed with silicosis. Plaintiff sued the Association pursuant to the Jones Act, alleging negligence in regard to injuries he suffered from exposure to free silica during his employment. Whether Plaintiff's claim was properly made under the Jones Act depended on whether Plaintiff was a "seaman" at the time of the alleged negligence. To distinguish seamen from land-based workers, the U.S. Supreme Court has held that a seaman must ordinarily have spent at least thirty percent of work time in service of a vessel in navigation. The lower courts concluded Plaintiff was not a seaman at the time of his injury and therefore granted summary judgment for the Association. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff did not spend at least thirty percent of his work time performing sea-based duties, and therefore, Plaintiff was not a seaman for purposes of the Jones Act. View "Dize v. Ass'n of Md. Pilots" on Justia Law

Stillwell, admitted to the Maryland Bar in 1989, met the complainant, Akojie, a Maryland licensed real estate agent, in 2009 at a seminar he presented. In 2010 the two entered into a legal services agreement that involved formation of an LLC and transfer of assets from another business. Akojie gave Stillwell a personal check for $2,000, payable to him; Stillwell deposited the check in his personal checking account, rather than in his attorney trust account. Stillwell did not have an active attorney trust account. Stillwell’s communication with Akojie and work on the matters for which he was retained were “sporadic.” Akojie expressed her frustration with attempting to reach him and terminated the representation and requested a refund. He did not provide a refund until after he received notification of Akojie’s grievance. The Attorney Grievance Commission filed a petition for disciplinary or remedial action alleging violations of the Maryland Rules of Professional Conduct: 1.3, Diligence, 1.4, Communication, 1.15. The Maryland Supreme Court imposed a sanction of indefinite suspension fro the practice of law. View "Attorney Grievance v. Stillwell" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of second degree rape, second degree assault, and multiple counts of second, third, and fourth degree sexual offenses. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not err in allowing a DNA analyst to testify regarding the analysis of another DNA analyst, who did not testify at trial, and did not err in admitting the non-testifying analyst's report into evidence, as (i) the State met its burden of showing chain of custody of a napkin, from which DNA was found connecting Defendant to the victim, (ii) admitting the report of the non-testifying analyst did not violate the rule against hearsay, and (iii) admitting he report did not violate Defendant's right to confrontation; and (2) the trial judge did not err in admitting hearsay statements of the victim as excited utterances through the testimonies of the victim's roommate and the investigating officer. View "Cooper v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed in the Orphans' Court a petition to obtain legal guardianship of Tracy, her nephew. At the time of the filing of the petition, Tracy's mother (Mother) was deceased and Tracy was living with Petitioner. Also, no legal proceedings had occurred seeking to terminate Tracy's father's (Father) parental rights, nor was Tracy entitled to any disposition from Mother's estate. The court dismissed the petition on the ground that the Orphans' Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Orphans' Court lacks jurisdiction over petitions for guardianship of the person where at least one of the natural parents is alive, parental rights have not been terminated, and no testamentary appointment has been made. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Tracy K." on Justia Law

Petitioner was appointed the Police Commissioner of Baltimore City by the Mayor. Petitioner and the Mayor entered into a memorandum of understanding (MOU) that addressed the terms and conditions of Petitioner's employment, including his removal as Commissioner. The Mayor and City Council (Respondents) later relieved Petitioner of his command. Petitioner filed an amended complaint against Respondents seeking reinstatement and money damages. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents. The intermediate appellate court reversed, holding that the Mayor did not have the authority to remove a Police Commissioner pursuant to a contract providing for removal without cause, and therefore, the removal provisions of the MOU were invalid. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion for writ of mandamus or motion for injunction or reinstatement. The circuit court denied the motion and granted summary judgment to Respondents. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) because this Court did not decide the merits of Petitioner's claims for reinstatement and monetary damages, Petitioner was not entitled to reinstatement or judgment as a matter of law; and (2) the court of special appeals did not err in granting Respondents' summary judgment motion and denying Petitioner's motion for partial summary judgment. View "Clark v. O'Malley" on Justia Law