Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Victoria was declared a child in need of assistance after her father, George, would not allow her return to the home he shared with his wife, Kieran, and their two children, Lance and Evan. Victoria later sought visitation with Lance and Evan. An assigned master recommended supervised visitation. George and Kieran filed joint exceptions to recommendation in light of Koshko v. Haining because Victoria did not meet her burden of showing prima facie evidence of exceptional circumstances demonstrating detriment to the children absent visitation from Victoria. The circuit court then denied the exceptions and ordered supervised visitation. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Victoria had not proven exceptional circumstances within the analytical framework established by Koshko. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding (1) the master and circuit court relied on the incorrect applicable standard in determining whether exceptional circumstances existed to order visitation; and (2) therefore, the order should be reversed and remanded for consideration of whether jurisdiction actually existed to order sibling visitation and, if so, whether a deleterious effect on Lance and Evan could be proven. View "In re Victoria C." on Justia Law

Amafica Woodland lived in a residence owned and managed by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”) from her birth in 1995 until her mother and grandmother vacated the residence in 1997. In 2009, Woodland sued HABC, claiming injury from her exposure to lead paint at the residence and asserting compliance with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). The trial court allowed the case to proceed to trial, finding substantial compliance and good cause for Woodland’s failure to provide written notice of her intent to sue within 180 days of injury. A jury subsequently found in favor of Woodland. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in finding that Woodland had substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements, but the court’s alternate finding that Woodland had good cause for failing to comply made this error moot; and (2) erred in considering material not in evidence as part of its ruling that Woodland met the good cause exception for non-compliance with the LGTCA notice requirement, but this error was harmless. View "Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Woodland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an hourly employee of Safeway, Inc. In 2010, in response to two writs of garnishment issued by the district court, Safeway deducted an excess of $29.64 from Plaintiff’s wages. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit against Safeway on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, arguing that Safeway’s garnishment practice resulted in wrongfully excessive deductions. Ten days after the class action suit was filed, Safeway changed its payroll garnishment system to conform with the correct garnishment exemptions standards and tendered to Plaintiff the amounts that would have been paid to her had those standards been applied at the time. The circuit declined to certify the class and entered judgment in favor of Safeway. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) employees have a right of direct private action against their employer under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 3-507.2 for deducting from the employee’s wage more than is lawfully allowed; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case in denying class certification and in entering judgment for Safeway. View "Marshall v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of armed carjacking and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by giving an “anti-CSI effect” jury instruction. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in giving the “anti-CSI effect” jury instruction, as Defendant never misstated the law; but (2) the abuse of discretion in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was of no significance to the verdict. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Comptroller of Maryland issued assessments of tax and interest against Petitioners, two out-of-state subsidiary corporations, based on Petitioners’ relationship with their Maryland parent, Petitioners’ substance as corporations, and all of the entities’ activity in Maryland. The tax court affirmed. Petitioners appealed, arguing, among other things, that Maryland did not have the authority to tax Petitioners because they did not have a sufficient nexus with Maryland for the Comptroller’s assessment of taxes to be constitutional. The court of special appeals upheld the Comptroller’s assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court did not err in (1) concluding that the Comptroller had authority to tax Petitioners under the Court’s holding in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., which allows the Comptroller and tax court to find nexus when a subsidiary lacks economic substance, because Petitioners did not have economic substance as separate business entities; and (2) upholding the apportionment formula used by the Comptroller in its assessment of Petitioners. View "Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury" on Justia Law

In two separate cases, Petitioner was convicted of second-degree murder and two counts of solicitation to obstruct justice, among other offenses. The cases were consolidated for appeal, and the court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals, among other things, was whether the trial court abused its discretion in disqualifying one of Petitioner’s defense counsel, who had a previous attorney-client relationship with a key state’s witness, where the witness refused to waive the conflict of interest and Petitioner’s counsel had arranged for co-counsel to cross-examine the witness. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in disqualifying Petitioner’s attorney, as Petitioner’s waiver of the conflict was not sufficient to cure the conflict; and (2) merger was precluded for convictions of the two counts of solicitation, where the relevant statutes contained parallel anti-merger provisions. View "Alexis v. State" on Justia Law

Prince George’s County enacted a resolution creating the Victoria Falls Special Taxing District (District) under authority granted by a State enabling act (Act). Taxpayers challenged the resolution and sought tax refunds. The tax court denied the Taxpayers’ claims. The circuit court and intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the tax court properly upheld the County’s resolution creating the District, where changes in land ownership within the District occurred after the time of application for creation of the District but before final action on the application, as the State Legislature did not intend to require that the County determine whether any change in land ownership may have affected the super-majority landowner requirement expressed in the Act for applying for the District; and (2) the tax court properly ruled that the County’s approval of the request to create the District that did not include twenty-five of the 609 lots contained within the planned Victoria Falls community was lawful under the Act’s requirement that the District be used to finance infrastructure improvements in “any defined geographic region within the county.” View "Victoria Falls Comm. for Truth in Taxation, LLC v. Prince George's County" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with certain traffic offenses in the district court. The district court acquitted Petitioner as to the charge of disobeying a lawful order or direction of a police officer but convicted Petitioner of four counts of fleeing and eluding police. Petitioner filed notice of a de novo appeal. Prior to trial, Petitioner filed a motion to dismiss the fleeing and eluding counts, arguing that, because he was acquitted of disobeying a lawful order, prosecution of the fleeing and eluding charges would violate the state and federal prohibitions against double jeopardy. The circuit court denied the motion. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that prosecution of the fleeing and eluding charges did not violate the prohibitions against double jeopardy or the doctrine of collateral estoppel. View "Scriber v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of two counts of first-degree murder and related offenses. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to suppress the contents of a storage locker belonging to him, arguing that it was the tainted fruit of the consent he had given to police while he was unlawfully detained at the police station. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the police obtained Petitioner’s consent to search his locker during their lawful detention of him; and (2) therefore, the suppression court correctly ruled that Petitioner was not entitled to suppression of the evidence found in the locker. View "Barnes v. State" on Justia Law

Ember Buckley was a passenger in a motor vehicle driven by Harvey Betts when the vehicle was involved in an accident. Buckley, who sustained injuries in the accident, settled with GEICO, Betts’ insurer, for the full policy limits and signed a full release of all claims against Betts and a hold harmless agreement in favor of GEICO. Buckley then attempted to recover for the remainder of her outstanding medical bills under her uninsured/underinsured motorist (“UM”) policy with The Brethren Mutual Insurance Company (“Brethren”), which denied coverage. Buckley filed suit, alleging breach of contract and seeking the policy limit in compensatory damages. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Brethren, concluding that the release was a general release, and thus released all entities from future claims, regardless of whether they were a party to the release. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the general release did not prejudice Buckley’s claim against Brethren. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the broad, all-inclusive language of the release must be read with an eye toward the parties’ overall intent; and (2) that the court of special appeals correctly held that the release did not waive Buckley’s UM claim against Brethren. View "Brethren Mut. Ins. Co. v. Buckley" on Justia Law