Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. According to the State's theory of the case, Defendant was a hit man for the Black Guerilla Family gang (BGF) and was ordered by his gang boss to kill the victim. During trial, several witnesses testified that the murder was related to Defendant's affiliation with the BGF. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a "gang expert" to opine as to the nature of gangs in general, the BGF specifically, and the import of Defendant's tattoos towards establishing that he was a member of a gang, as the probative value of the expert's testimony was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and this error was not harmless.View "Burris v. State" on Justia Law

In separate cases, several defendants were arrested and detained. The initial appearance documents indicated that the defendants were in the country illegally or had an Immigration and Customers Enforcement (ICE) detainer filed against them. Appellant, Big Louie Bail Bonds, reviewed the initial appearance documents and posted bail bonds for the defendants. After the bail bonds were posted, the defendants were taken into federal custody by the ICE and deported. Because the defendants failed to appear for trial, the trial court forfeited the bail bonds. The circuit court denied Appellant's amended petitions to strike the forfeitures, determining that the posted bail bonds were properly forfeited because Appellant knew, or should have known, that the defendants were subject to deportation when it posted the bonds. At issue on appeal was Maryland Rule 2-417(i), which provides that the decision to strike a forfeiture is conditioned upon a showing by the defendant of "reasonable grounds" for the defendant's nonappearance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the act of deportation constitutes reasonable grounds under Rule 4-217(i)(2). View "Big Louie Bail Bonds, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the revocation by divorce statute, which provides that, "unless otherwise provided in the will or decree," a divorce revokes a pre-existing will's provisions "relating to" the spouse. Here Decedent and Respondent were divorced in 2006. Three years earlier, Decedent executed a will that devised property to Respondent. The circuit court held that the revocation by divorce provision applied in this case and that the exceptions did not apply, resulting in the revocation of the will's provision relating to Respondent. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that revocation was not triggered because the exceptions the statute recognized applied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) revocation of provisions in a pre-existing will relating to the divorced spouse is effective upon the subsequent divorce unless there is provided in the will or decree a statement that the decedent intended the bequest even after the parties divorced; and (2) in this case, Decedent did not clearly or unequivocally state his intent in his will or in the divorce decree that Respondent should receive the property at issue even after the divorce. View "Nichols v. Suiters" on Justia Law

Buyer purchased property located within a homeowners association. Buyer, who already owned other lots within the association, later canceled the contract with Sellers because he had not received mandatory disclosures from Sellers pursuant to the Maryland Homeowners Association Act, which requires that notice be given to "a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the lot for residential purposes." Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract, contending that Buyer was not a "member of the public" under the statute because Buyer, as a property owner in the association, already had access to the homeowners association policies and thus did not require disclosures making him aware of the relevant applicable rules and policies. The circuit court granted Buyer's motion to dismiss, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Buyer was a "member of the public" for purposes of the statute; but (2) the circuit court erred in granting Buyer's motion to dismiss because Sellers presented a justiciable issue of equitable estoppel based on Buyer's affirmative refusal to receive the requirement documents and information proffered to him by Sellers.View "Lipitz v. Hurwitz" on Justia Law

Substitute trustees initiated a foreclosure action against defaulting borrowers. The foreclosure sale was announced in a newspaper advertisement stating that if the purchaser failed to settle within ten days of the ratification, the purchaser would pay attorney fees of $750. Appellant subsequently purchased the property. Prior to any ratification by the circuit court of the foreclosure sale, the administrative judge for the circuit court issued a notice stating that because the $750 included in the advertisement was an impermissible fee under Maddox v. Cohn, the sale was invalid. A hearing judge deferred to the administrative judge's opinion and entered an order vacating the sale and ordering a resale. The Court of Appeals reversed the order vacating the foreclosure sale, holding (1) the hearing judge abused her discretion in yielding deference to the administrative judge's view of the matter; (2) the screening procedures utilized by the circuit court, pursuant to Md. Rule 14-207.1, were permissible in this case; and (3) Maddox was inapposite to this case because the fee here was contemplated by a Maryland rule. Remanded.View "101 Geneva LLC v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Decedent died from colorectal cancer that spread to her spine. Decedent had sought treatment for several years from Defendant, who failed to diagnose the cancer. Plaintiffs, Decedent's surviving husband and children, filed wrongful death claims against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded because Decedent had not brought a timely personal injury lawsuit against Defendant, nor could she have at the time of her death as it would have been barred by the statute of limitations applicable to medical negligence claims. The circuit court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a wrongful death beneficiary's right to file a lawsuit is not contingent upon the decedent's ability to bring a timely negligence claim on the date of her death; and (2) Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109 does not apply directly to a wrongful death action arising out of alleged medical malpractice, and thus it does not bar Appellants' wrongful death action. View "Mummert v. Alizadeh" on Justia Law

Three-year-old Christopher Paul suffered severe injuries after nearly drowning in a pool at an apartment complex near his parents’ home. Christopher’s mother filed a complaint against the owner and manager of the apartments and the operator of the pool (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that Petitioners breached a duty to maintain the pool in a reasonably safe condition and breached statutory and regulatory duties by failing to comply with pool regulations set forth in state and county codes. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Petitioners based in part on Christopher’s status as a trespasser when he entered the pool area. The court of special appeals reversed, holding (1) Petitioners were required to comply with the relevant regulations and statutory provisions concerning pool barriers, which were “designed to create a cause of action in tort for the protection of the swimming public”; and (2) a defendant need not owe a common-law duty to a plaintiff before violation of a statute can be used as evidence of negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ alleged violation of the Code of Maryland Regulations, if proven, would demonstrate the breach of a duty from Petitioners to Christopher; and (2) such a duty, derived from statute, would apply irrespective of Christopher’s legal status on the property when the incident occurred. View "Blackburn Ltd. P'ship v. Paul" on Justia Law

Respondents, the estate of Anthony Fusco and Anthony's surviving children and widow, filed survival and wrongful death actions against Petitioners, Dr. Kevin Shannon and his medical practice (together, “Dr. Shannon”) for failing to obtain informed consent for the administration of radiation therapy and a drug, Amifostine, to Anthony, Dr. Shannon’s patient. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Shannon. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the trial judge erred in excluding that testimony of Dr. James Trovato, a pharmacist, as Dr. Trovato may have been qualified to offer an opinion due to his substantial experience studying and advising patients regarding oncology medications, including Amifostine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge did not err in excluding Dr. Trovato’s testimony because, in his written proffer, Dr. Trovato simply enumerated the risks associated with Amifostine and did not opine about the likelihood and severity of the risks implicated in the administration of the drug. View "Shannon v. Fusco" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a homicide detective with the Baltimore City Police Department, was involved in an incident with the Baltimore City Police, which resulted in Petitioner being charged with seven violations of four administrative rules. A hearing board found Petitioner guilty of two of the charges. Petitioner sought judicial review, alleging that his hearing was unfair because the Department failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of section 3-104(n)(ii) of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”). The circuit court reversed the Police Commissioner’s final order imposing the hearing board’s recommended sanction because the Department failed to disclose the information. The intermediate appellate court reversed, determining that because the information would not have tended to exonerate Petitioner of the administrative charges, it did not fall within the definition of “exculpatory.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not intend to import Brady v. Maryland and its progeny into the administrative LEOBR process by including the term “exculpatory” in section 3-104(n). View "Ellsworth v. Baltimore Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were charged with criminal offenses, and both defendants waived their right to a jury trial. After bench trials, Defendants were found guilty and sentenced. Each defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. Relevant to this consolidated appeal, the courts of special appeals held that the trial courts sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) so long as a trial judge determines that a jury trial waiver is made both “knowingly” and “voluntarily,” or uses synonyms that represent the same concepts, the court will have complied fully with Rule 4-246(b); (2) in both cases under review, the trial judges failed to comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (3) to the extent that Valonis v. State could be read to hold that a trial judge’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 4-246(b) is reviewable by the appellate courts despite the failure to object at trial, that interpretation is disavowed. Remanded for new trials. View "Nalls v. State" on Justia Law