Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Claudia Natalie Cabrera sought the nomination of the Maryland Democratic Party for the office of delegate in the June 2014 gubernatorial primary election, but when she tendered for filing a certificate of candidacy she was a registered member of the Republican Party. A registered voter in the legislative district that Cabrera sought to represent filed a petition in the circuit court challenging Cabrera’s candidacy. Meanwhile, the Maryland State Board of elections informed Cabrera of its intention to exclude Cabrera’s name from the primary election ballot. The circuit court declared Cabrera’s candidacy invalid and ordered Appellant’s name to be excluded from the primary election ballot. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that a registered member of one political party may not file a valid certificate of candidacy declaring the intent to run in the primary election of another political party. View "Cabrera v. Penate" on Justia Law

Jai Medical Systems Managed Care Organization, Inc. (JaiMCO) is an entity that contracts with health care providers to provide health care services to patients enrolled in the State Medicaid program. Dr. Steven Bennett participated as a specialty care provider in the network of JaiMCO. Petitioner chose Dr. Bennett to treat a bunion on her foot that was causing her pain. After Dr. Bennett performed surgery to remove the bunion Petitioner developed gangrene, and her foot had to be partially amputated. Petitioner sought to hold JaiMCO liable for Dr. Bennett’s negligence on a theory of apparent agency, asserting that JaiMCO created the appearance that Dr. Bennett was its agent and that she reasonably relied on that appearance. A jury returned a verdict in Petitioner’s favor. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdict. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) a managed care organization may be vicariously liable for the negligence of a network physician under a theory of apparent agency; but (2) even if Petitioner subjectively believed Dr. Bennett was an employee of JaiMCO, the belief was not reasonable under the facts of this case. View "Bradford v. Jai Med. Sys. Managed Care Org., Inc." on Justia Law

This case centered on the implied consent, administrative per se law (“Law”), under which a suspected drunk driver may choose either to take or to refuse a breath test to measure blood alcohol concentration. A test refusal or a particular test result both result in an automatic suspension of the driver’s license. At issue was whether a detained driver has a right to consult with legal counsel before making the decision of whether to take the breath test. The driver in this case (“Driver”) asked the arresting officer if she could call an attorney before making that choice. Driver's request was refused. Driver subsequently took the test, which indicated she had an elevated blood alcohol concentration. In accordance with the Law, Driver’s license was suspended for ninety days. An administrative law judge upheld Driver’s suspension. The circuit court reversed, concluding that the denial of Driver’s request to contact her attorney violated her right to due process. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, even if a suspected drunk driver is denied the opportunity to consult counsel before deciding whether to take a breath test, the driver remains subject to the administrative license suspension that the test assigns to the test refusal or test result. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Deering" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native of Ghana who arrived in the United States four years prior to his conviction, was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor, second degree rape, and third degree sexual offense. On appeal, Petitioner argued that the trial judge abused his discretion in denying him an interpreter for his criminal trial. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) appellate review of a trial court’s decision whether to appoint an interpreter is a process in which the reviewing court must first determine whether the trial judge’s factual findings were clearly erroneous and then, if the findings were not clearly erroneous, consider whether the trial judge abused her discretion in making the determination regarding whether to appoint an interpreter; and (2) in this case, after applying the relevant standard, the trial judge acted within his discretion in denying Petitioner’s request for an interpreter. View "Kusi v. State" on Justia Law

In 2009, Trans Healthcare, Inc. (THI) filed a petition requesting that an individual and his firm be appointed as receiver over THI and forty-three related entities. THI’s petition was granted. Approximately eighteen months after the appointment, the receiver requested that a substitute receiver be appointed. The motion was granted. Almost six months later, Francina Spivery-Jones, a creditor, filed a motion to vacate the receivership, challenging the subject matter jurisdiction of the circuit court. The circuit court denied the motion. Spivery-Jones appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the order denying the motion to vacate the receivership was not a final judgment, nor was it appealable under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-303 or under the collateral order doctrine. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Spivery-Jones had no right of appeal pursuant to section 12-303(3)(iv) or the collateral order doctrine. View "Spivery-Jones v. Trans Healthcare, Inc." on Justia Law

Joy Friolo was hired by Douglas Frankel, a physician, to handle his billing and collections. After Friolo was discharged, she filed a complaint against Frankel and his practice, claiming that Frankel did not pay her for certain overtime and bonuses. A jury entered a verdict in favor of Friolo. The parties then began a protracted dispute over attorney fees. Ultimately, on the third appeal, the court of special appeals awarded fees for the trial stage of the litigation and for appellate work for a total of $45,041. In coming up with this figure, the court used an unprecedented mathematical formula for determining how attorneys’ fees in this case only should be calculated based on the arithmetic relationship among the amount of the claim, settlement demands and offers, and ultimate judgment. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that the lower appellate court erred in its approach. Remanded. View "Friolo v. Frankel" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, debt buyers, filed separate small claims actions to recover money damages against Defendants. Plaintiffs demanded judgment on affidavit, and Defendants filed notices of intention to defend. After a trial on the merits, the district courts entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendants’ appeals were heard de novo in the circuit court, which entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. At issue on these appeals was whether the Rules of Evidence apply in debt buyer small claim proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in pursuing a judgment on affidavit involving a small or large claim, a debt buyer must product certain documents, as contemplated by Md. Rule 306(d), sufficient to pass muster under the business records exception to the hearsay rule; (2) once a small claim action is contested and proceeds to a trial on the merits, the parties are not constrained by the Rules of Evidence, as contemplated by Md. Rule 3-701; and (3) the judges that conducted trials de novo in these cases did not err or abuse their discretion in entering judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Bartlett v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs." on Justia Law

In 2008, twenty-two days before his death, Decedent amended his 2007 Living Trust. Petitioner, Decedent’s daughter, filed a complaint for inspection of records questioning the validity of the 2008 Living Trust. Petitioner subsequently requested access to a copy of the 2007 Living Trust. The trial court denied the request, finding that the unamended trust was subject to the attorney-client privilege. Thereafter, trial court found that the revisions to Decedent’s 2007 Living Trust were fair and reasonable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to require that Decedent’s attorney produce the 2007 Living Trust pursuant to the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privilege, but the error was harmless. View "Zook v. Pesce" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree assault in two cases. Petitioner, who was incarcerated at a correctional facility, appealed both convictions but was not transported to court on the date he was scheduled to appear for his appeals. Based solely on secondhand information from an unidentified source indicating that Petitioner refused to be transported, the circuit court dismissed Petitioner's appeals. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reinstate his appeal, indicating that he had not refused to be transported to court. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's motion to reinstate his appeal under the circumstances of this case. View "Mobuary v. State" on Justia Law

After Mr. Greenfield unsuccessfully filed criminal charges against Petitioner, Petitioner filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Greenfield (Respondents) alleging, inter alia, defamation and false light/invasion of privacy. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. Respondents subsequently moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs while acknowledging that their attorney's fees and costs had been paid by their insurance carrier (Insurer). The circuit court denied the motion as to Mr. Greenfield but granted it as to Mrs. Greenfield, finding that she had been joined in the action without substantial justification and that she had "incurred" the costs of her defense within the meaning of Maryland Rule 1-341, even though Insurer had paid the costs of litigation on her behalf. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a party compelled to defend him or herself against abusive litigation may recover the costs associated with that litigation under Rule 1-341, regardless of the individual or entity that actually pays such expenses. View "Worsham v. Greenfield" on Justia Law