Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A holding company, whose subsidiaries owned power-generating facilities, filed a complaint against multiple insurers regarding the terms of liability policies the company purchased in the 1970s and 1980s. At issue in this case was whether New York or Pennsylvania law applied to the interpretation of the policies. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the holding company, determining that Pennsylvania law governed the interpretation of the policies. One of the insurers, TIG Insurance Company (“TIG”), appealed. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that there was no genuine dispute of material fact that the insurance contracts were made in Pennsylvania, and therefore, Pennsylvania law applied to the policies at issue. The Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the opinion of the court of special appeals with the exception of the court’s discussion addressing TIG’s argument that the place of countersigning a policy determines the applicable state law because that argument was not preserved for appeal. View "TIG Ins. Co. v. Monongahela Power Co." on Justia Law

Appellant financed the purchase of a car over time pursuant to a loan contract. The car dealer assigned the contract to Appellee, a financial services company. Because Appellant stopped making payments before the loan was paid off, Appellee repossessed and sold the car. Appellant sued Appellee, alleging that the repossession and sale of the car did not comply with the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Law (CLEC). The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding (1) Appellant’s statutory claims were untimely under the Maryland Equal Credit Opportunity Act’s one-year statute of limitations, and (2) Appellant’s complaint did not state a cause of action for breach of contract because the requirements of CLEC were not incorporated into the contract as to Appellee. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) an action alleging a violation of CLEC must be brought no later than six months after the loan is satisfied pursuant to the CLEC’s statute of limitations, and therefore, Appellant’s claims under CLEC on limitations grounds were improperly dismissed; and (2) Appellant may assert a contract claim against Appellee because the loan contract adequately incorporated CLEC as part of the contractual obligations, and Appellee voluntarily accepted that provision in taking the assignment. View "Patton v. Wells Fargo Fin. Md., Inc." on Justia Law

Wife and Husband married in 2003. In 2005 and 2008, Wife and Husband executed marital settlement agreements. In 2009, Husband filed a complaint for divorce, alleging that the separation agreements were voidable at his demand. In support of his demand, Husband argued that the attorney, who earlier assisted the Wife in obtaining permanent resident status and in the United States and largely served as scrivener to the settlement agreements, violated the Maryland Lawyers’ Rules of Professional Conduct by failing to obtain Husband’s informed consent to her representation of Wife in connection with the two settlement agreements. The circuit court held that the separation agreements were not voidable and entered a judgment of absolute divorce in which the separation agreements were incorporated. The intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that sufficient grounds to render the agreements voidable were not present in this case. View "Li v. Lee" on Justia Law

The State charged Petitioner with various drug-related crimes. Petitioner’s co-defendant filed three proposed voir dire questions asking whether any prospective juror had ever been the victim of a crime or a member of a law enforcement agency. The circuit court declined to ask any of the proposed voir dire questions. The jury ultimately convicted Petitioner of drug-related crimes. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a trial court need not ask during voir dire whether any prospective juror has ever been the victim of a crime, but, on request, a trial court must ask whether any of the prospective jurors have strong feelings about the crime with which the defendant is charged; and (2) where all of the State’s witnesses are members of law enforcement agencies and/or where the basis for a conviction is reasonably likely to be the testimony of members of law enforcement agencies, on request, a trial court must ask during voir dire whether any of the prospective jurors have ever been a member of a law enforcement agency. View "Pearson v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of second degree murder, two counts of attempted second degree murder, and related weapons offenses. The court of special appeals affirmed. During the trial, defense counsel informed the trial court that he had trouble communicating with Petitioner, mentioned that there was “something wrong” with Petitioner, and requested that Petitioner be evaluated. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer the question of whether defense counsel triggered the competency statute, requiring the trial court to order a competency evaluation and make a competency determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that defense counsel did not trigger the trial judge’s duty to make a competency determination under the circumstances. View "Kennedy v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of distribution of cocaine and conspiracy to distribute cocaine. The sentencing judge imposed a twenty-five-year mandatory enhanced sentence without the possibility of parole based on Petitioner’s prior drug convictions. Petitioner appealed, alleging that his sentence was illegal under Maryland Rule 4-345(a). The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner waived any challenge to the imposition of his sentence because he failed to object during the sentencing proceeding; and (2) even if the Court were to determine that the issue was preserved, the trial court did not err in imposing an enhanced sentence where the evidence was sufficient for the sentencing judge to conclude that Petitioner committed the qualifying predicate offenses beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Bryant v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was a paid firefighter employed by Respondent, Montgomery County. Petitioner filed a claim pursuant to the Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming that he sustained injuries in an accident that occurred when he was traveling to work on his motorcycle after leaving physical training. The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Commission disallowed Petitioner’s claim, finding that Petitioner did not sustain an injury arising out of and in the course of employment. The circuit court upheld the Commission’s decision, ruling that Petitioner was not entitled to workers’ compensation because the injury occurred while “he was coming and going” to work. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that Petitioner’s injury arose out of and in the course of his employment and was covered by the Workers’ Compensation Act because (1) Petitioner’s travel was incidental to his employment, which travel cannot be excluded from coverage by application of the going and coming rule; and (2) “but for” his travel between work-related sites Petitioner would not have been injured. View "Roberts v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of conspiracy to commit first degree burglary and sentenced to ten years’ incarceration. On appeal, Petitioner argued, among other things, that the trial court erred by offering, over objection, an “investigative or scientific techniques” jury instruction. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether the trial court violated the standards set forth in Atkins v. State and Stabb v. State that an “anti-CSI effect” instruction, limited only to curative administration, shall not be entertained without proof that a “CSI effect” exists and is only triggered when a material misstatement of the law occurs. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court in this case erred by giving the contested instruction, as the instruction was given preemptively and defense counsel did not misstate the law or the State’s burden. Remanded for a new trial. View "Robinson v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were employees of a State psychiatric hospital who had been laid off and were not rehired in order of seniority when the hospital later filled vacancies for positions comparable to those previously occupied by Plaintiffs. An administrative law judge denied Plaintiffs’ grievance, concluding that Plaintiffs were not entitled to be rehired under a reinstatement process. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals remanded the case for further factfinding, concluding (1) there is no statutory preference for reinstatement, as opposed to recruitment, in the State Personnel Management System, but if an agency decides to fill vacancies through recruitment, it must follow statutory procedures, including public notice and transparency as to the selection criteria; and (2) it was not clear whether the agency in this case complied with those criteria. The Court of Appeals affirmed by adopting the opinion of the court of special appeals and adding an endorsement to the court of special appeal’s opinion to remove any doubt as to the standing of that decision as the law of the State. View "Sturdivant v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of theft of property valued in excess of $100,000 and related offenses stemming from his unauthorized occupancy of a home for approximately seven months. Defendant appealed the sufficiency of the evidence supporting his convictions for theft, theft of property valued in excess of $100,000, and first-degree burglary. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft; (2) the evidence was insufficient to support a conviction for theft of property valued in excess of $100,000 but was sufficient to support a conviction for theft of property having a value of at least $10,000 but less than $100,000; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for first-degree burglary. View "Hobby v. State" on Justia Law