Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellees in this case were seventeen-year-olds who would have been eighteen by the 2008 general election. After exhausting their administrative remedies, Plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the circuit court against the Maryland State Boar of Elections (MSBE), alleging that the MSBE violated several provisions of the Election Law Article by prohibiting seventeen-year-olds who would be eighteen by the next general election from casting any votes in non-partisan primary elections for county school boards. The circuit court concluded that the voter eligibility requirements of the Maryland Constitution did not apply to non-partisan elections for Boards of Education, municipal elections, and local ballot questions not mandated by the Constitution. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court and held that seventeen-year-olds who will turn eighteen by close of voter registration before the next general election were constitutionally and statutorily entitled to vote in primary elections, whether partisan or non-partisan, subject to all other provisions of the Constitution and statutory election law. Remanded.View "State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder" on Justia Law

Respondents each suffered on-the-job accidents, resulting in permanent partial disability. In both cases, at least one of the Respondent's injuries was a "scheduled injury" and the other was an "unscheduled injury." The Workers' Compensation Commission awarded Respondents benefits at the "second tier" rate. In making the awards pursuant to Md. Stat. Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-629, the Commission combined, in each case, the awards for the scheduled and unscheduled injuries. Both Robinson's and Anderson's employers appealed. The circuit court reversed the Commission's awards. The court of special appeals reversed the circuit court's judgments, holding that the Commission could combine awards for scheduled injuries with awards for other cases to determine whether the second tier compensation rate was applicable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that it is permissible under the Workers' Compensation Act to combine compensation awards in order to determine which of the three levels of compensation prescribed by Md. Stat. Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-628 through 9-630 is appropriate. View "Montgomery County v. Robinson" on Justia Law

The supervisory employee exception to the handgun law allows such an employee to carry a handgun, with the employer's permission, within the enclosed premises of the business in which the employee works. Petitioner, the head of security for a nightclub, was arrested by the county police for carrying a handgun without a permit in the open parking lot of the nightclub. Petitioner filed a lawsuit against the county and three of the police officers involved in his arrest for a violation of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, false arrest and imprisonment, and malicious prosecution, contending that his arrest was illegal because the parking lot should be considered to be "within the confines" of the nightclub. A jury found in favor of Petitioner on his state constitutional claim and on the false arrest and imprisonment claim. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the parking lot of the club was not "within the confines of the business establishment." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when Petitioner left the "confines" of the nightclub and took his handgun into the parking lot, he was no longer with the supervisory employee exception to the handgun law.View "Blue v. Prince George's County" on Justia Law

In 2011, the Montgomery County Council adopted Resolution No. 17-149 (Resolution), which “changed” three contract provisions for fiscal year 2012 in the pre-existing collectively-bargained agreement (CBA) with members of the County’s police force. Specifically, the Resolution changed certain employment benefits of the CBA. The Fraternal Order of the Police, Montgomery County Lodge 35 filed suit against the County and the Council, challenging the legality of the Council’s actions in adopting the Resolution and the actions of the Council and the County in implementing the changes in the resolution. The circuit court declared that the Council’s actions were permissible under the Police Labor Relations Act (PLRA), the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and the CBA. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Council acted within its authority under the PLRA in deciding not to fund fully - and thereby, to change - certain benefits in the CBA, where the changes were fiscal in nature and the County Executive and the FOP did not submit a re-negotiated agreement to the Council. View "Fraternal Order of Police Lodge 35 v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

Victoria was declared a child in need of assistance after her father, George, would not allow her return to the home he shared with his wife, Kieran, and their two children, Lance and Evan. Victoria later sought visitation with Lance and Evan. An assigned master recommended supervised visitation. George and Kieran filed joint exceptions to recommendation in light of Koshko v. Haining because Victoria did not meet her burden of showing prima facie evidence of exceptional circumstances demonstrating detriment to the children absent visitation from Victoria. The circuit court then denied the exceptions and ordered supervised visitation. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Victoria had not proven exceptional circumstances within the analytical framework established by Koshko. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding (1) the master and circuit court relied on the incorrect applicable standard in determining whether exceptional circumstances existed to order visitation; and (2) therefore, the order should be reversed and remanded for consideration of whether jurisdiction actually existed to order sibling visitation and, if so, whether a deleterious effect on Lance and Evan could be proven. View "In re Victoria C." on Justia Law

Amafica Woodland lived in a residence owned and managed by the Housing Authority of Baltimore City (“HABC”) from her birth in 1995 until her mother and grandmother vacated the residence in 1997. In 2009, Woodland sued HABC, claiming injury from her exposure to lead paint at the residence and asserting compliance with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (“LGTCA”). The trial court allowed the case to proceed to trial, finding substantial compliance and good cause for Woodland’s failure to provide written notice of her intent to sue within 180 days of injury. A jury subsequently found in favor of Woodland. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court (1) erred in finding that Woodland had substantially complied with the LGTCA’s notice requirements, but the court’s alternate finding that Woodland had good cause for failing to comply made this error moot; and (2) erred in considering material not in evidence as part of its ruling that Woodland met the good cause exception for non-compliance with the LGTCA notice requirement, but this error was harmless. View "Housing Auth. of Baltimore City v. Woodland" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was an hourly employee of Safeway, Inc. In 2010, in response to two writs of garnishment issued by the district court, Safeway deducted an excess of $29.64 from Plaintiff’s wages. Plaintiff subsequently filed a lawsuit against Safeway on behalf of herself and all other persons similarly situated, arguing that Safeway’s garnishment practice resulted in wrongfully excessive deductions. Ten days after the class action suit was filed, Safeway changed its payroll garnishment system to conform with the correct garnishment exemptions standards and tendered to Plaintiff the amounts that would have been paid to her had those standards been applied at the time. The circuit declined to certify the class and entered judgment in favor of Safeway. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) employees have a right of direct private action against their employer under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 3-507.2 for deducting from the employee’s wage more than is lawfully allowed; and (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion under the circumstances of this case in denying class certification and in entering judgment for Safeway. View "Marshall v. Safeway, Inc." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of armed carjacking and other crimes. On appeal, Defendant argued that the circuit court abused its discretion by giving an “anti-CSI effect” jury instruction. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court abused its discretion in giving the “anti-CSI effect” jury instruction, as Defendant never misstated the law; but (2) the abuse of discretion in this case was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt because it was of no significance to the verdict. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

In 2006, the Comptroller of Maryland issued assessments of tax and interest against Petitioners, two out-of-state subsidiary corporations, based on Petitioners’ relationship with their Maryland parent, Petitioners’ substance as corporations, and all of the entities’ activity in Maryland. The tax court affirmed. Petitioners appealed, arguing, among other things, that Maryland did not have the authority to tax Petitioners because they did not have a sufficient nexus with Maryland for the Comptroller’s assessment of taxes to be constitutional. The court of special appeals upheld the Comptroller’s assessments. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the tax court did not err in (1) concluding that the Comptroller had authority to tax Petitioners under the Court’s holding in Comptroller of the Treasury v. SYL, Inc., which allows the Comptroller and tax court to find nexus when a subsidiary lacks economic substance, because Petitioners did not have economic substance as separate business entities; and (2) upholding the apportionment formula used by the Comptroller in its assessment of Petitioners. View "Gore Enter. Holdings, Inc. v. Comptroller of Treasury" on Justia Law