Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 1995, Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder and the use of a firearm in the commission of a felony. In 2006, the Supreme Court determined in Clemons v. State that, under the Frye-Reed standard, Comparative Bullet Lead Analysis (CBLA) evidence was not generally accepted by the scientific community. Within a few years of his conviction, Petitioner sought post-conviction relief, arguing that the admission of “unreliable” CBLA evidence during his trial in the form of testimony from Agent Ernest Peele of the Federal Bureau of Investigation constituted a due process violation and that his attorneys provided ineffective assistance for failing adequately to cross-examine Agent Peele. The circuit judge denied relief, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed Petitioner’s conviction and remanded for a new trial, holding that Petitioner’s attorneys rendered ineffective assistance when they failed to investigate a report Peele co-authored in 1991 that presaged the flaws in CBLA evidence and to challenge the State’s scientific evidence on cross-examination at trial. View "Kulbicki v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of one count each of first degree rape, second degree rape, second degree assault, and false imprisonment. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not err when it excluded from evidence a police report that contained a prior allegedly inconsistent statement of the complaining witness; (2) even if the trial court erred in failing to strike testimony of an expert forensic nurse, the error was harmless; and (3) under the facts of this case, Petitioner’s conviction for false imprisonment should be merged into his conviction for first degree rape. Remanded. View "Brooks v. State" on Justia Law

Nordstrom, Inc. created several subsidiary corporations, including NIHC, Inc., which engaged in a series of transactions, with each other and with Nordstrom, involving the licensing rights to Nordstrom’s trademarks. The rights to use Nordstrom’s trademarks eventually ended up back with Nordstrom. In the process, Nordstrom’s Maryland taxable income was significantly reduced, and Nordstrom realized a significant gain. The Comptroller of the Treasury issued tax assessments against the subsidiaries’ income, determining that the transactions were an effort to shift income from Nordstrom, where a portion of the income would be taxable by Maryland, to the subsidiaries, where the income would escape Maryland taxation, as the subsidiaries had arguably no nexus to Maryland. The tax court affirmed the assessments against the two subsidiaries, concluding that the activities of the subsidiaries must be considered the activities of Nordstrom, which had a nexus with Maryland, and therefore, the subsidiaries’ income was taxable by Maryland. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that NIHC did not carry its burden of showing that the Comptroller’s assessment was wrong. View "NIHC, Inc. v. Comptroller of the Treasury" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two of Maryland’s wage enforcement laws: the Wage and Hour Law (WHL) and the Wage Payment and Collection Law (WPCL). Following her departure from her place of employment Plaintiff sued her Employer claiming that her Employer wrongfully withheld her overtime wages. On remand, Plaintiff filed an unopposed memorandum asserting a claim under the WHL and the WPCL, requesting unpaid overtime and treble damages under the WPCL. The circuit court awarded Plaintiff $6,201 in unpaid overtime wages but denied her request for enhanced damages. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded, holding that the trial court erred when it failed to make an explicit finding regarding whether Employer withheld overtime wages as a result of a bona fide dispute, and the evidence did not support a finding that Employer withheld Plaintiff’s wages pursuant to a bona fide dispute. View "Peters v. Early Healthcare Giver, Inc." on Justia Law

In 2000, DCW Dutchship Island, LLC (DCW), a corporation wholly owned by Daryl Wagner, purchased the Little Island in the Magothy River. At that time, the Island measured approximately 1.92 acres in area and was improved by a single-family house and related structures built in the 1920s. Wagner demolished the house and built a new one. In November 2004, the County authorities discovered the construction activities on the Island and notified DCW of numerous violations. In December, DCW sought variances from the unobserved requirements of the Critical Area Law for each of the structures and improvements on the Island. DCW sought also an amendment to the critical area buffer map, which prohibited most development activity within 100 feet of the shoreline. A County Administrative Hearing Officer heard the evidence for and against the requests for variances. The Magothy River Association (MRA) appeared at the variance hearings to oppose DCW’s requests. The Hearing Officer granted some of the variances. Wagner administratively appealed the denials, and the MRA, the Chesapeake Bay Foundation (CBF), and the Maryland Critical Area Commission for the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays appealed the decision to grant the variances, all to the County Board of Appeals. At the Anne Arundel County Board of Appeals (the “Board”) hearing, Wagner moved to dismiss MRA and CBF as parties to the administrative proceedings. The Board ultimately concluded that CBF did not have standing to appeal the granted variances because it did not participate in the hearing before the Administrative Hearing Officer (“AHO”). After 24 evenings of hearings on the subject, the Board revised the decision of the AHO to include certain conditions on the variances.The Maryland Critical Area Commission for the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays (the Commission), MRA, CBF, and Wagner all sought judicial review of the Board’s decision at the Circuit Court. In addition, CBF filed a Motion for Summary Judgment limited to the issue of whether the Board improperly excluded CBF from the variance portion of the proceedings. The court denied all motions relevant to the variance matter. The Circuit Court then affirmed the decision of the Board. The Commission and CBF appealed the Circuit Court’s decision to the Court of Special Appeals, arguing that the Critical Area Act applied to the variance proceedings, that the Board erred in refusing to allow CBF to participate as a party in the administrative process, and that the Board did not base its decision on substantial evidence in the record. In an unreported opinion, the Court of Special Appeals rejected these arguments and affirmed the Circuit Court. MRA and CBF then petitioned the Court of Appeals for certiorari. The issues this case presented for the Court's review were: (1) whether CBF had standing to participate in the variance proceedings before the Board of Appeals on the grounds that MRA, which advocated the same position, had standing; (2) whether AACC 3-1-104(a) violated the Express Powers Act, thus making the Board’s denial of standing to CBF on the basis of it erroneous; (3) whether the Board of Appeals violated its own rules when it held that CBF could not cross-examine witnesses, resulting in CBF being denied due process; and (4) whether the Board of Appeals erred in granting Wagner after-the-fact variances. The Court answered the first three questions in the negative and the fourth in the affirmative, but only in part. View "Chesapeake Bay Found. v. DCW Dutchship" on Justia Law

The Fraternal Order of Police, Lodge No. 4 (the FOP), the bargaining agent for covered Baltimore County police employees, submitted to the Baltimore County’s Director of Human Resources (Director) an unfair labor practice complaint based on a unilateral change made by the County to a policy included in the County’s personnel manual but which was not part of the memorandum of understanding between the County and the FOP and was not subject to collective bargaining negotiation. The Director refused to designate an independent third party agency to consider the FOP’s unfair labor practice complaint. The FOP sought a writ of mandamus, claiming that the Director had a ministerial duty pursuant to section 4-5-204(a)(1)(i) of the Employee Relations Act (Act) of the Baltimore County Code (BCC) to designate a third party agency to investigate and determine whether an unfair labor practice charge had been committed. The circuit granted the writ compelling the Director to designate an independent third party to investigate the FOP’s unfair labor practice complaint. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that nothing in the Act or the BCC imposes an undisputable, non-discretionary duty on the Director to refer every unfair labor practice complaint to an independent third party agency. View "Baltimore County v. Fraternal Order of Police Lodge No. 4" on Justia Law

The question before the Court of Appeals in these three consolidated cases was the appropriate method for crediting payments made under a workers’ compensation award when that award is increased on appeal. At issue was whether the credits should be computed on the basis of the number of weeks paid or the amount of money expended. The Court of Appeals resolved the issue in favor of the workers in each case by relying on legislation passed specifically to supersede earlier decisions of the Court, holding that, when crediting an employer/insurer for payments made under a workers’ compensation award that is subsequently amended, credit should be given for the total amount of dollars paid under the initial award. View "W.R. Grace & Co. v. Swedo" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, the owner and operator of a used car business, filed an action against two Baltimore City police officers, claiming that the two officers, along with several other officers, had entered private property without a warrant or court order and towed Plaintiff’s vehicles. Plaintiff alleged that the warrantless towing of the vehicles without a prior hearing violated the Maryland Declaration of Rights as well as 42 U.S.C. 1983. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Defendants, concluding that the State constitutional claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that, in regard to the federal constitutional claims, the two officers had qualified immunity because they were acting pursuant to various provisions of the Baltimore City Code. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff’s state law claims were barred by the Local Government Tort Claims Act and that the two officers were entitled to qualified immunity on Plaintiff’s federal constitutional claims. View "Dehn Motor Sales v. Schultz" on Justia Law

Appellant used NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. to apply for a mortgage and paid NVR Mortgage a broker fee. More than three but fewer than twelve years later, Appelalnt sued NVR Mortgage and NVR, Inc. (collectively, NVR) for allegedly violating Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-805(d) by failing to make certain disclosures to Appellant and similarly situated homebuyers before collecting finder’s fees for brokering mortgages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-102(a)(6), which is subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question of law in the negative, holding that an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to the default three-year statute of limitations. View "NVR Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen" on Justia Law

The Driver License Compact is an interstate agreement that requires party states to report all convictions of an out-of-state driver to the state that issued the driver a license to operate a motor vehicle. For certain offenses, the home state gives the same effect to the conduct underlying the conviction as it would if such conduct had occurred in the home state. Respondent in this case paid a fine for speeding in Delaware, which is a party state to the Compact. The Delaware Division of Motor Vehicles (DMV) reported to the Maryland Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA), that Respondent had been convicted of speeding. The MVA subsequently recorded a speeding conviction on Respondent’s Maryland driving record and suspended Respondent’s license. Respondent contested the suspension, arguing that payment of the speeding ticket did not constitute a conviction under Delaware law. The Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH) refused to consider the argument. The circuit court reversed. The Supreme Court reversed the judgment of the circuit court with direction to reinstate the decision of the OAH, holding that Respondent’s grievance was with the Delaware DMV for reporting his payment of a fine as a conviction and that Respondent’s redress should be sought in Delaware. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Salop" on Justia Law