Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Three-year-old Christopher Paul suffered severe injuries after nearly drowning in a pool at an apartment complex near his parents’ home. Christopher’s mother filed a complaint against the owner and manager of the apartments and the operator of the pool (collectively, Petitioners), alleging that Petitioners breached a duty to maintain the pool in a reasonably safe condition and breached statutory and regulatory duties by failing to comply with pool regulations set forth in state and county codes. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Petitioners based in part on Christopher’s status as a trespasser when he entered the pool area. The court of special appeals reversed, holding (1) Petitioners were required to comply with the relevant regulations and statutory provisions concerning pool barriers, which were “designed to create a cause of action in tort for the protection of the swimming public”; and (2) a defendant need not owe a common-law duty to a plaintiff before violation of a statute can be used as evidence of negligence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ alleged violation of the Code of Maryland Regulations, if proven, would demonstrate the breach of a duty from Petitioners to Christopher; and (2) such a duty, derived from statute, would apply irrespective of Christopher’s legal status on the property when the incident occurred. View "Blackburn Ltd. P'ship v. Paul" on Justia Law

Respondents, the estate of Anthony Fusco and Anthony's surviving children and widow, filed survival and wrongful death actions against Petitioners, Dr. Kevin Shannon and his medical practice (together, “Dr. Shannon”) for failing to obtain informed consent for the administration of radiation therapy and a drug, Amifostine, to Anthony, Dr. Shannon’s patient. After a jury trial, judgment was entered in favor of Dr. Shannon. The court of special appeals reversed, determining that the trial judge erred in excluding that testimony of Dr. James Trovato, a pharmacist, as Dr. Trovato may have been qualified to offer an opinion due to his substantial experience studying and advising patients regarding oncology medications, including Amifostine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial judge did not err in excluding Dr. Trovato’s testimony because, in his written proffer, Dr. Trovato simply enumerated the risks associated with Amifostine and did not opine about the likelihood and severity of the risks implicated in the administration of the drug. View "Shannon v. Fusco" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a homicide detective with the Baltimore City Police Department, was involved in an incident with the Baltimore City Police, which resulted in Petitioner being charged with seven violations of four administrative rules. A hearing board found Petitioner guilty of two of the charges. Petitioner sought judicial review, alleging that his hearing was unfair because the Department failed to disclose certain exculpatory evidence in violation of section 3-104(n)(ii) of the Law Enforcement Officers’ Bill of Rights (“LEOBR”). The circuit court reversed the Police Commissioner’s final order imposing the hearing board’s recommended sanction because the Department failed to disclose the information. The intermediate appellate court reversed, determining that because the information would not have tended to exonerate Petitioner of the administrative charges, it did not fall within the definition of “exculpatory.” The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Legislature did not intend to import Brady v. Maryland and its progeny into the administrative LEOBR process by including the term “exculpatory” in section 3-104(n). View "Ellsworth v. Baltimore Police Dep’t" on Justia Law

Defendants in this case were charged with criminal offenses, and both defendants waived their right to a jury trial. After bench trials, Defendants were found guilty and sentenced. Each defendant appealed, challenging the trial court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. Relevant to this consolidated appeal, the courts of special appeals held that the trial courts sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) so long as a trial judge determines that a jury trial waiver is made both “knowingly” and “voluntarily,” or uses synonyms that represent the same concepts, the court will have complied fully with Rule 4-246(b); (2) in both cases under review, the trial judges failed to comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (3) to the extent that Valonis v. State could be read to hold that a trial judge’s alleged noncompliance with Rule 4-246(b) is reviewable by the appellate courts despite the failure to object at trial, that interpretation is disavowed. Remanded for new trials. View "Nalls v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with two counts each of possession of cocaine and distribution of cocaine. On the day of trial, Petitioner waived his right to a jury. Petitioner then pled not guilty as to one of the distribution charges. After a plea colloquy, the trial court found the plea to be “knowing and voluntary.” Petitioner was found guilty of distribution of cocaine after a bench trial. Petitioner appealed, contesting the validity of the court’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court’s announcement after the plea colloquy that Petitioner’s actions were “knowing and voluntary” was sufficient to establish that the judge analyzed the disposition and appearance of Petitioner in order to determine Petitioner’s actual understanding and voluntariness for both the jury waiver and the plea. View "Morgan v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of first, third, and fourth degree burglary, theft under $1000, and malicious destruction of property having a value of less than $500. Defendant appealed, challenging the trial judge’s acceptance of his jury trial waiver. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial judge sufficiently satisfied the announcement requirement under Md. Rule 4-246(b). The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) because the trial judge’s announcement did not state that Defendant’s jury trial waiver was both knowing and voluntary, the judge did not comply with Rule 4-246(b); and (2) the appropriate sanction for the judge’s noncompliance with Rule 4-246 was reversal. View "Szwed v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner had health care insurance as a member of the United Healthcare Select HMO (the HMO) when he visited a healthcare provider (GCM) for an x-ray of his knee. After Petitioner paid a bill he received from GCM for the x-ray exam he filed a complaint alleging that the bills GCM sent Petitioner were an illegal attempt to "balance bill" an HMO member in violation of State law and that the bills constituted an unfair and deceptive practice in violation of the Consumer Protection Act (the Act). The circuit court dismissed the complaint. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the state HMO law prohibiting balance billing by health care providers as part of the legal foundation for the establishment of HMOs does not include a right of action by an HMO member against a healthcare provider for violation of that prohibition; but (2) an HMO member may bring an action under the Act against a healthcare provider who improperly bills the member in violation of the state HMO law in a way that also violates the prohibition against unfair or deceptive trade practices in the Act.View "Scull v. Groover, Christie, & Merritt, P.C." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioner, a dentist, was convicted of various sexual crimes against a minor patient. In the circuit court, while self-represented, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing, requesting that the clothes the victim wore on the day of her rape be tested. After a hearing, the circuit court denied the petition. Petitioner appealed, arguing that, under Maryland Rule 4-707(b), he was entitled to appointed counsel at the hearing on the petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Rule 4-707(b) does not entitle an indigent petitioner to be appointed counsel for the purposes of a petition under Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not considering whether to appoint counsel for Defendant for purposes of the petition under section 8-201; and (3) the circuit court applied the correct standard in ruling on the petition under section 8-201. View "Fuster v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with conspiracy to commit theft, making a false statement to the police while under arrest, and related offenses after the vehicle in which he was an occupant was stopped by police officers and the police discovered multiple fake credit cards in the wallet of a female passenger. The police then arrested all occupants of the vehicle. Petitioner filed a motion to suppress, contending that the evidence was obtained as a result of an illegal stop. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. Defendant appealed, contending that his Fourth Amendment rights were violated because the police lacked probable cause to arrest him. The court of special appeals held that police had probable cause to arrest Petitioner and therefore any evidence obtained by police as the fruit of that arrest was not subject to suppression. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Petitioner's claim was not properly before the appellate courts because Petitioner waived it by not raising it before the circuit court.View "Ray v. State" on Justia Law

Appellees in this case were seventeen-year-olds who would have been eighteen by the 2008 general election. After exhausting their administrative remedies, Plaintiffs filed separate complaints in the circuit court against the Maryland State Boar of Elections (MSBE), alleging that the MSBE violated several provisions of the Election Law Article by prohibiting seventeen-year-olds who would be eighteen by the next general election from casting any votes in non-partisan primary elections for county school boards. The circuit court concluded that the voter eligibility requirements of the Maryland Constitution did not apply to non-partisan elections for Boards of Education, municipal elections, and local ballot questions not mandated by the Constitution. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court and held that seventeen-year-olds who will turn eighteen by close of voter registration before the next general election were constitutionally and statutorily entitled to vote in primary elections, whether partisan or non-partisan, subject to all other provisions of the Constitution and statutory election law. Remanded.View "State Bd. of Elections v. Snyder" on Justia Law