Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

William Lovelace was a member of Amalgamated Transit Union, Local 1300 (Local 1300). For three years, Lovelace and David McClure (together with Local 1300, “the Union”) served together as officers on Local 1300’s executive board. When the men ran for reelection, Lovelace was defeated. Lovelace filed a defamation action against the Union, claiming that his defeat was due to allegedly false and defamatory statements McClure made during the campaign. Lovelace sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The Union filed motions to dismiss, asserting that Lovelace was required to exhaust Local 1300’s internal remedies before filing suit. The circuit court denied the motions. The jury ultimately rendered a verdict in Lovelace’s favor. The Union appealed, challenging the trial court’s denial of their motions to dismiss. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that Local 1300’s internal remedies were inadequate because they could not provide the monetary damages that Lovelace sought. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that when a union member claims that his union and a fellow union member were liable for defamation and seeks monetary damages and the union's internal remedies do not provide monetary damages, the union’s internal remedies are inadequate and the union member is not required to exhaust them. View "Amalgamated Transit Union v. Lovelace" on Justia Law

Petitioners owned properties located along Farm Road and a ten-foot right-of-way (collectively, the Farm Road), which provided the only means of access to Petitioners’ properties. Petitioners filed suit in the circuit court against the Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the Commission) and several other defendants, alleging several claims based on the Commission’s refusal to recognize Farm Road and to issue addresses to Petitioners. The circuit court dismissed the action. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the dismissal. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in part, holding that the Court of Special Appeals (1) properly upheld the circuit court’s dismissal of Petitioners’ state constitutional claims for Petitioners’ failure to comply with the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act; (2) properly upheld the trial court’s dismissal of Petitioners’ easement claims for failure to join necessary parties, i.e., adjacent property owners; but (3) erred in determining that Petitioners failed to file their slander of title claim within the statute of limitations. View "Rounds v. Maryland-Nat’l Capital Park & Planning Comm’n" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Duvall died, having been predeceased by her son, Dennis Kelly, only weeks earlier. Respondents, Duvall’s surviving sons, filed a petition for construction of Duvall’s will, asserting that the will left the assets of Duvall’s estate to her living children only. The orphans’ court ruled in favor of Respondents. Petitioner, Kelly’s heir, appealed. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Petitioner was permitted to inherit, as (1) the will does not express an intent to create a survivorship requirement as a condition precedent to inheritance; and (2) Duvall did not express an intent to negate Maryland’s anti-lapse statute, and therefore, the anti-lapse statute protected the devise from lapse. View "Kelly v. Duvall" on Justia Law

This appeal concerned a dispute over ownership of parking spaces situated between The Falls Homeowners Association (“The Falls”) and Falls Garden Condominium Association (“Falls Garden”). The Falls and Falls Garden executed a letter of intent in settlement of litigation. After problems arose between the parties, The Falls filed a motion to enforce settlement agreement to implement the letter of intent. The circuit court judge granted The Falls’s motion. The court ordered The Falls to prepare a settlement agreement and a release of all claims and ordered Falls Garden to execute the settlement agreement. On appeal, Falls Garden argued that the Letter of Intent was not binding because the parties did not intend to be bound and because the letter did not contain all material terms. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the letter of intent was an enforceable contract to which the parties intended to be bound; and (2) because the letter of intent was unambiguous and constituted an enforceable contract, the trial judge did not err in failing to hold a plenary hearing on the merits of the motion to enforce settlement agreement. View "Falls Garden Condo. Ass’n v. Falls Homeowners Ass’n" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, a young lawyer associate, filed a complaint against Defendants, his former Virginia-based law firm employer and its principal, claiming a violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law (“MWPCL”) and seeking $1,974 in unpaid wages, treble damages, and attorney’s fees and costs. The trial judge concluded that the employment contract was a “Virginia” contract, and therefore, Plaintiff could not bring a suit in Maryland under the MWPCL. The circuit court reversed the dismissal of Plaintiff’s MWPCL claim. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the mere fact that the parties in this case entered into a “Virginia” employment contract did not prohibit maintenance of Plaintiff’s claims under the MWPCL. Remanded. View "Cunningham v. Feinberg" on Justia Law

Appellant pled guilty to kidnapping and third-degree sexual offense. Defendant was sentenced to terms of imprisonment. Defendant also signed an order of probation, in which he agreed to the condition of obeying the probation agent’s lawful instructions. When Defendant was released under mandatory supervision, he agreed to comply “as directed” by his parole/probation agent with a sexual offender management program, which “may include…polygraph testing[.]” Defendant’s probation agent instructed Defendant to report for a polygraph examination, but Defendant did not report for the polygraph examination. The circuit court subsequently determined that Defendant violated the order of probation. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the probation agent’s instruction to report for a polygraph examination created a more onerous condition of probation that was outside the ambit of the conditions laid down by the sentencing court in violation of the separation of powers doctrine. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that a probation agent’s instruction to comply with a condition of mandatory supervision is consistent with the separation of powers doctrine. View "State v. Callahan" on Justia Law

The State charged Petitioner with several crimes, including violating Maryland’s trademark counterfeiting statute, Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law (CR) 8-611. Petitioner field a motion to dismiss the charges for violating CR 8-611 on the ground that the statute is constitutional. Specifically, Petitioner contended that CR 8-611 is facially overbroad because it criminalizes conduct that the First Amendment protects and is facially void for vagueness because it does not clearly define “intellectual property.” The circuit court denied the motion to dismiss, and a jury convicted Petitioner of violating CR 8-611. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that CR 8-611 is not facially overbroad or void for vagueness. View "McCree v. State" on Justia Law

Joseph Payne and Jason Bond were convicted in a joint trial of first degree murder and kidnapping. The Supreme Court vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) the trial court erred in admitting the testimony of a police officer, without the officer having been qualified as an expert witness under Maryland Rule 5-702, regarding his process for determining the communication path of Defendants’ cell phones and his conclusion that two particular cell towers were the most pertinent to the case; and (2) wiretap statements made by Bond but not Payne could not be admitted against Payne as statements by a party opponent. View "State v. Payne" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Petitioners Traimne Allen and Howard Diggs were convicted of attempted first degree murder and related offenses stemming from a home invasion and robbery. Petitioners appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in excluding certain DNA “match” evidence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the DNA match evidence was properly excluded. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 2-510 prohibits the introduction at trial by a criminal defense of evidence of a DNA match to prove the identity of another individual without first establishing additional confirmatory testing and does not infringe upon a criminal defendant’s constitutional right to present a defense. View "Allen v. State" on Justia Law

In 2009, Charles Williams, who had been suffering with suicidal ideation and auditory and visual hallucinations, went to a hospital emergency room. Health care providers examined and evaluated Williams, decided not to admit him, and discharged him to the care of his mother. That same night, Williams broke into a residence and invited the responding law enforcement officers to shoot him. When Williams rushed the officers, they fired their weapons at him, killing him. Williams’ family (collectively, Plaintiffs) brought a wrongful death and survivorship action against the health care providers alleging negligence in their decision to release rather than involuntarily admit Williams to the hospital. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the health care providers were protected from liability by statutory immunity. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Maryland’s involuntary admission immunity statute applies to health care providers who evaluate an individual and decide in good faith not to involuntarily admit him. View "Williams v. Peninsula Reg’l Med. Ctr." on Justia Law