Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, debt buyers, filed separate small claims actions to recover money damages against Defendants. Plaintiffs demanded judgment on affidavit, and Defendants filed notices of intention to defend. After a trial on the merits, the district courts entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. Defendants’ appeals were heard de novo in the circuit court, which entered judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. At issue on these appeals was whether the Rules of Evidence apply in debt buyer small claim proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in pursuing a judgment on affidavit involving a small or large claim, a debt buyer must product certain documents, as contemplated by Md. Rule 306(d), sufficient to pass muster under the business records exception to the hearsay rule; (2) once a small claim action is contested and proceeds to a trial on the merits, the parties are not constrained by the Rules of Evidence, as contemplated by Md. Rule 3-701; and (3) the judges that conducted trials de novo in these cases did not err or abuse their discretion in entering judgment in favor of Plaintiffs. View "Bartlett v. Portfolio Recovery Assocs." on Justia Law

In 2008, twenty-two days before his death, Decedent amended his 2007 Living Trust. Petitioner, Decedent’s daughter, filed a complaint for inspection of records questioning the validity of the 2008 Living Trust. Petitioner subsequently requested access to a copy of the 2007 Living Trust. The trial court denied the request, finding that the unamended trust was subject to the attorney-client privilege. Thereafter, trial court found that the revisions to Decedent’s 2007 Living Trust were fair and reasonable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred by failing to require that Decedent’s attorney produce the 2007 Living Trust pursuant to the testamentary exception to the attorney-client privilege, but the error was harmless. View "Zook v. Pesce" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of second degree assault in two cases. Petitioner, who was incarcerated at a correctional facility, appealed both convictions but was not transported to court on the date he was scheduled to appear for his appeals. Based solely on secondhand information from an unidentified source indicating that Petitioner refused to be transported, the circuit court dismissed Petitioner's appeals. Petitioner subsequently filed a motion to reinstate his appeal, indicating that he had not refused to be transported to court. The trial judge denied the motion. Petitioner then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the circuit court erred in dismissing Petitioner's motion to reinstate his appeal under the circumstances of this case. View "Mobuary v. State" on Justia Law

After Mr. Greenfield unsuccessfully filed criminal charges against Petitioner, Petitioner filed a complaint against Mr. and Mrs. Greenfield (Respondents) alleging, inter alia, defamation and false light/invasion of privacy. The circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents as to all claims. Respondents subsequently moved for an award of attorney's fees and costs while acknowledging that their attorney's fees and costs had been paid by their insurance carrier (Insurer). The circuit court denied the motion as to Mr. Greenfield but granted it as to Mrs. Greenfield, finding that she had been joined in the action without substantial justification and that she had "incurred" the costs of her defense within the meaning of Maryland Rule 1-341, even though Insurer had paid the costs of litigation on her behalf. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a party compelled to defend him or herself against abusive litigation may recover the costs associated with that litigation under Rule 1-341, regardless of the individual or entity that actually pays such expenses. View "Worsham v. Greenfield" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree murder and the use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. According to the State's theory of the case, Defendant was a hit man for the Black Guerilla Family gang (BGF) and was ordered by his gang boss to kill the victim. During trial, several witnesses testified that the murder was related to Defendant's affiliation with the BGF. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in allowing a "gang expert" to opine as to the nature of gangs in general, the BGF specifically, and the import of Defendant's tattoos towards establishing that he was a member of a gang, as the probative value of the expert's testimony was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice, and this error was not harmless.View "Burris v. State" on Justia Law

In separate cases, several defendants were arrested and detained. The initial appearance documents indicated that the defendants were in the country illegally or had an Immigration and Customers Enforcement (ICE) detainer filed against them. Appellant, Big Louie Bail Bonds, reviewed the initial appearance documents and posted bail bonds for the defendants. After the bail bonds were posted, the defendants were taken into federal custody by the ICE and deported. Because the defendants failed to appear for trial, the trial court forfeited the bail bonds. The circuit court denied Appellant's amended petitions to strike the forfeitures, determining that the posted bail bonds were properly forfeited because Appellant knew, or should have known, that the defendants were subject to deportation when it posted the bonds. At issue on appeal was Maryland Rule 2-417(i), which provides that the decision to strike a forfeiture is conditioned upon a showing by the defendant of "reasonable grounds" for the defendant's nonappearance. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the act of deportation constitutes reasonable grounds under Rule 4-217(i)(2). View "Big Louie Bail Bonds, LLC v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the revocation by divorce statute, which provides that, "unless otherwise provided in the will or decree," a divorce revokes a pre-existing will's provisions "relating to" the spouse. Here Decedent and Respondent were divorced in 2006. Three years earlier, Decedent executed a will that devised property to Respondent. The circuit court held that the revocation by divorce provision applied in this case and that the exceptions did not apply, resulting in the revocation of the will's provision relating to Respondent. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that revocation was not triggered because the exceptions the statute recognized applied. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) revocation of provisions in a pre-existing will relating to the divorced spouse is effective upon the subsequent divorce unless there is provided in the will or decree a statement that the decedent intended the bequest even after the parties divorced; and (2) in this case, Decedent did not clearly or unequivocally state his intent in his will or in the divorce decree that Respondent should receive the property at issue even after the divorce. View "Nichols v. Suiters" on Justia Law

Buyer purchased property located within a homeowners association. Buyer, who already owned other lots within the association, later canceled the contract with Sellers because he had not received mandatory disclosures from Sellers pursuant to the Maryland Homeowners Association Act, which requires that notice be given to "a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the lot for residential purposes." Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract, contending that Buyer was not a "member of the public" under the statute because Buyer, as a property owner in the association, already had access to the homeowners association policies and thus did not require disclosures making him aware of the relevant applicable rules and policies. The circuit court granted Buyer's motion to dismiss, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Buyer was a "member of the public" for purposes of the statute; but (2) the circuit court erred in granting Buyer's motion to dismiss because Sellers presented a justiciable issue of equitable estoppel based on Buyer's affirmative refusal to receive the requirement documents and information proffered to him by Sellers.View "Lipitz v. Hurwitz" on Justia Law

Substitute trustees initiated a foreclosure action against defaulting borrowers. The foreclosure sale was announced in a newspaper advertisement stating that if the purchaser failed to settle within ten days of the ratification, the purchaser would pay attorney fees of $750. Appellant subsequently purchased the property. Prior to any ratification by the circuit court of the foreclosure sale, the administrative judge for the circuit court issued a notice stating that because the $750 included in the advertisement was an impermissible fee under Maddox v. Cohn, the sale was invalid. A hearing judge deferred to the administrative judge's opinion and entered an order vacating the sale and ordering a resale. The Court of Appeals reversed the order vacating the foreclosure sale, holding (1) the hearing judge abused her discretion in yielding deference to the administrative judge's view of the matter; (2) the screening procedures utilized by the circuit court, pursuant to Md. Rule 14-207.1, were permissible in this case; and (3) Maddox was inapposite to this case because the fee here was contemplated by a Maryland rule. Remanded.View "101 Geneva LLC v. Wynn" on Justia Law

Decedent died from colorectal cancer that spread to her spine. Decedent had sought treatment for several years from Defendant, who failed to diagnose the cancer. Plaintiffs, Decedent's surviving husband and children, filed wrongful death claims against Defendant. Defendant filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Plaintiffs' claims were precluded because Decedent had not brought a timely personal injury lawsuit against Defendant, nor could she have at the time of her death as it would have been barred by the statute of limitations applicable to medical negligence claims. The circuit court granted the motion. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a wrongful death beneficiary's right to file a lawsuit is not contingent upon the decedent's ability to bring a timely negligence claim on the date of her death; and (2) Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-109 does not apply directly to a wrongful death action arising out of alleged medical malpractice, and thus it does not bar Appellants' wrongful death action. View "Mummert v. Alizadeh" on Justia Law