Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In 2002, Petitioner was found guilty but not criminally responsible of robbery and use of a handgun in commission of a felony or a crime of violence. In 2006, the circuit court released Petitioner conditionally. In 2009, Petitioner was re-committed to inpatient medical treatment. In 2010, the circuit court released Petitioner conditionally for the remaining duration of the 2006 order. In 2011, five days before Petitioner’s conditional release was to expire, the Department filed an application seeking to extend the terms of the conditional release for an additional four years. The next month, the circuit court granted the Department’s application. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that the circuit court’s jurisdiction over him ended at the expiration of the 2006 order of conditional release, and therefore, the order extending his conditional release was invalid. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court retained jurisdiction for a reasonable time to decide the timely-filed application to extend the 2006 order of conditional release; and (2) the circuit court did not delay for an unreasonable time before ruling on the State’s application for an extension on Petitioner’s conditional release. View "Harrison-Solomon v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was involved in a fist-fight with another high school student, Dylan P., who suffered a broken nose and damaged sinuses. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner admitted involvement in the alleged affray. The juvenile court determined that Petitioner committed the offense of affray and placed him on probation. The circuit court subsequently amended Petitioner’s probation to require Petitioner to pay partial restitution for the medical offenses incurred by Dylan P. for treatment of his injuries suffered during the affray. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the order of restitution. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) trial courts are not statutorily authorized to order restitution in favor of a person who is a voluntary and willing participant in the crime or delinquent activity that caused his or her injury; and (2) because Dylan P. fought willingly with Petitioner, the circuit court erroneously required Petitioner to pay restitution to Dylan P. View "In re Tyrell A." on Justia Law

After voluntarily leaving his job with Employer, Respondent applied for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (DLLR) denied the claim for benefits, determining that Respondent quit his job without good cause. The hearing examiner upheld the DLLR’s findings. The DLLR Board of Appeals declined to hear Respondent’s appeal, thereby adopting the hearing examiner’s decision as its own decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed a petition for judicial review. Instead of filing an answering memorandum, the DLLR Board requested that the circuit court remand the case back to the Board before the court conducted its review. The circuit court granted the Board’s motion for remand. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Employer’s appeal, concluding that the remand order was was not a final judgment or otherwise appealable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the remand order was not a final, appealable judgment. View "Metro Maint. Sys. South, Inc. v. Milburn" on Justia Law

Karen Dwyer was the primary driver of a vehicle owned by her father, Alan Dwyer. Alan had forbidden Ameen Abdulkhalek, the father of Karen’s children, to drive the car. The vehicle was insured by a policy in Alan’s name with Erie Insurance Exchange. When Karen gave the car keys to Abdulkhalek and asked him to retrieve the children, Abdulkhalek was involved in an accident after first making a trip to a gas station. The circuit court determined that Abdulkhalek’s use of the vehicle was not covered under an omnibus clause in the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) an omnibus clause in an automobile policy that extends liability coverage to a permissive owner of an insured vehicle also encompasses a driver who operates the car for the benefit of an individual who has permission from the named insured to use the vehicle; (2) coverage does not extend to that driver, however, if he deviates from the purpose for which he was authorized to drive the car for the benefit of the first permittee; and (3) because Abdulkhalek operated the car for a purpose other than that requested by the Karen, the omnibus clause did not extend coverage to Abdulkhalek. View "Payne v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, among other charges, attempted first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two convictions for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) the circuit court correctly sentenced Defendant to separate consecutive sentences for the two convictions for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and (2) the sentence was not illegal even where the sentencing court was required to impose a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment but only imposed a one-year sentence in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) imposition of separate consecutive sentences for two convictions of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence or any felony is permissible where a defendant uses one handgun to commit two separate crimes of violence or felonies against one victim in one criminal action; and (2) this case should be remanded for re-sentencing because the trial court did not impose a sentence that was consistent with Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 4-204. View "Garner v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of felony murder, kidnapping, and robbery, among other crimes. The circuit court court sentenced Defendant to life imprisonment for felony murder, a term of twenty years concurrent for kidnapping, and a term of ten years concurrent for robbery. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentences for the convictions for kidnapping and robbery, concluding that the rule of lenity required merger for sentencing purposes of those convictions with the felony murder conviction because it was unclear which felony was the predicate felony for the felony murder conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed insofar as the Court of Special Appeals vacated the sentence for robbery and otherwise affirmed, holding (1) a conviction for only one predicate felony merges for sentencing purposes with the felony murder conviction, and applying the rule of lenity does not result in merger of additional convictions for predicate felonies; (2) the predicate felony with the greatest maximum sentences merges for sentencing purposes with the felony murder conviction, and the defendant may be separately sentenced for any remaining predicate felonies; and (3) because the kidnapping offense carries the greater maximum sentence, that conviction merges for sentencing purposes with the felony murder conviction, and the sentence for robbery shall remain as imposed by the circuit court. View "State v. Johnson" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged in a seventeen-count indictment with crimes stemming from an incident in which Defendant allegedly shot at Travis Green. Defendant filed a motion to suppress Green’s identification of him, arguing that the identification was blighted by an impermissibly suggestive photographic array as a result of the elongated appearance of the other men in four of the six photographs presented to Green. The trial judge denied the motion. During trial, the trial judge admitted the recorded statement of Elmer Duffy, a witness to the shooting who was later murdered, about seeing Defendant shoot Green, even though another man had been charged for Duffy’s murder. After a trial, Defendant was convicted of attempted first degree murder and other crimes and sentenced to life imprisonment plus ten years. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the elongation of the face and torso of four of the photographs did not render the photo array impermissibly suggestive; (2) the Court’s jurisprudence provides suitable means to assay an extrajudicial eyewitness identification; and (3) Duffy’s statement was properly admitted under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-901 and Maryland Rule 5-805(b)(5)(B) because there was substantial evidence connecting Defendant to Duffy’s killing. View "Smiley v. State" on Justia Law

Two security guards employed by SSA Security, Inc. and four of their confederates carried out a conspiracy to set fire to several homes. The resulting fires destroyed ten homes and damaged twelve others. Appellants asserted various civil claims against SSA and the five convicted arsonists, contending that the Maryland Security Guards Act (“Act”) section 19-501 established a basis for SSA’s strict liability for its employees’ intentional torts and civil rights violations. A federal district judge granted summary judgment in SSA’s favor as to the negligence claims and the claims premised on strict liability under section 19-501, concluding (1) section 19-501 was merely a codification of the common law and did not expand the doctrine of respondeat superior; and (2) any intentional acts of SSA’s employees were outside the scope of employment. Appellants appealed, arguing that the Act extends the vicarious liability of security guard agencies beyond the state common law doctrine of respondent superior. The federal appellate court certified a question of law to the Court of Appeals regarding the meaning of section 19-501. The Court answered that section 19-501 has the same meaning as Maryland’s common law doctrine of respondent superior. View "Antonio v. SSA Sec., Inc." on Justia Law

Appellant was charged with and convicted of possession of a regulated firearm by a person with a disqualifying drug conviction. The statute under which Appellant was convicted carries a mandatory minimum sentence of five years incarceration. Following his sentencing under that statute, Appellant appealed, arguing that his sentence was illegal because, on the same facts, he could have been charged and convicted under a different statute that carries a more lenient sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the State’s Attorney had discretion to charge Appellant with a violation of either statute at issue in this case, and the decision was not subject to judicial oversight as to whether the statute carrying the mandatory minimum sentence or the statute with the more lenient penalty should have been charged; and (2) there was no need to apply the rule of lenity in these circumstances because there was no unresolvable ambiguity in the statute in question. View "Oglesby v. State" on Justia Law

The United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland submitted to the Supreme Court a certified question of law. The Court reformulated the question to be this: “Under Maryland law, where there is no allegation of common law fraud, may a court disregard the corporate entity and establish personal liability to enforce a paramount equity?” The Supreme Court answered the question in the affirmative, holding that the corporate veil may be disregarded when necessary and personal liability established to prevent fraud or to enforce a paramount equity. View "Schlossberg v. Bell Builders Remodeling, Inc." on Justia Law