Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Blackstone International, Ltd. was insured by Insurers for commercial general liability insurance. The policy included coverage for personal advertising injury liability. Blackstone was sued for breach of contract, among other causes of action, after disputes arose regarding a joint business venture to market and sell lighting products. Blackstone requested coverage and litigation defense under the personal and advertising injury provisions of the policy. Insurers filed a complaint for declaratory judgment seeking a judgment that they had no duty to defend the claims because the complaint did not allege that Blackstone had engaged in advertising, that the plaintiff had suffered an advertising injury, or that there was any causal connection between the plaintiff’s claimed damages and any advertising conducted by Blackstone. The circuit court entered summary judgment for Insurers. The intermediate appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Insurer had no duty to defend Blackstone where Blackstone did not show an advertising injury suffered by the plaintiff. View "Md. Cas. Co. v. Blackwell Int'l Ltd." on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with robbery with a dangerous weapon, conspiracy to commit robbery and first degree assault. During voir dire, the trial judge failed to accede to Defendant’s request that he be brought to the bench for conferences during voir dire. During one of those conferences, a juror who was questioned at the bench without Defendant’s presence was selected to serve on the jury. The Court of Special Appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction, concluding that his exclusion from bench conferences during voir dire was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the judge’s error in failing to bring Defendant to the bench for conferences during voir dire was not harmless where the juror who was questioned at the bench without Defendant’s presence was selected to serve. View "State v. Yancey" on Justia Law

In this companion case to Anne Arundel County v. Bell, Respondents challenged the adoption by the County Council for Anne Arundel County of a comprehensive zoning ordinance for a large portion of the County, but a different portion of the County than was involved in Bell. In Bell, the Court of Appeals held that the doctrine of property owner standing is not the appropriate test for a judicial challenge to a comprehensive zoning action, but rather, plaintiffs wishing to challenge a legislative action adopting a comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing. The plaintiffs in this case (“Respondents”), several non-profit community associations and individual property owners, filed suit challenging the ordinance. The circuit court dismissed the two complaints filed by Respondents, concluding that Respondents lacked standing. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that property owner standing principles apply to a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation, and Respondents satisfied those principles. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the holding in Bell answered the first two questions presented in this appeal; and (2) Respondents in this case did not sufficiently allege a basis for their standing to challenge the adoption of the ordinance. View "Anne Arundel County v. Harwood Civic Ass'n" on Justia Law

In 2011, the County Council for Anne Arundel County adopted a comprehensive zoning ordinance for a large portion of the County. County property owners and community associations (“Respondents”) filed suit challenging the rezoning of multiple parcels of land. Several County property owners and ground leaseholders whose properties had been rezoned to desired classifications (collectively, with the County, “Petitioners”) intervened. Petitioners moved to dismiss Respondents’ suit, claiming that Respondents lacked standing. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss, determining that Respondents lacked standing because they failed to meet their burden of proving special aggrievement. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded, concluding that property owner standing principles apply to a judicial challenge to comprehensive zoning legislation, and Respondents satisfied those principles. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) plaintiffs wishing to challenge a legislative action adopting a comprehensive zoning are required to demonstrate taxpayer standing; and (2) Respondents in this case did not allege facts sufficient to meet the correct standing requirement. View "Anne Arundel County v. Bell" on Justia Law

The Maryland Workers’ Compensation Act creates a presumption that certain disabling medical conditions are occupational diseases suffered in the line of duty and are therefore compensable. The statute caps those benefits, however. The retirement benefits at issue in this case derived in part from an optional retirement program offered by Baltimore County. The program provided that senior employees who opted to remain on the job be compensated with enhanced retirement benefits that could be taken in a lump sum upon retirement or in higher recurring retirement payments. The two retired firefighters in these cases participated in the program and also qualified for workers’ compensation benefits as a result of the special presumption for public safety employees. At issue in these cases was how the lump sum retirement payment was to be included in the formula for capping the retirees’ workers’ compensation benefits. The Court of Appeals rejected the methods proposed both by the retirees and by the County and adopted the approach by the Workers’ Compensation Commission in the Thiergartner case for converting the lump sum portion of the retirement benefits to a weekly figure. View "Baltimore Co. v. Thiergartner" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, were struck by a motor vehicle being driven by Adam Pond while they were on a walk. At the time of the accident, the Connors owned a vehicle insured by Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO). The terms of the policy included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage of $300,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. Pond maintained automobile liability insurance with Allstate Insurance Co. limited to $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. Plaintiffs settled with Allstate. Pursuant to the settlement, Allstate paid $100,000 to each plaintiff. Plaintiffs then submitted claims for underinsured motorist coverage to GEICO under the terms of the policy, seeking $300,000 total from GEICO. GEICO paid Plaintiffs $100,000. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against GEICO as to the $200,000 in dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the unambiguous terms of the policy, the total damages due to Plaintiffs as a couple were capped at $300,000, and because Allstate already paid each Plaintiff $100,000, which amounts were deducted from the amount that GEICO would be required otherwise to pay Plaintiffs, GEICO was responsible for the remaining $100,000. View "Connors v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The State charged Petitioner with first-degree murder and other crimes. Petitioner moved to suppress a pretrial identification on the grounds that the identification was hearsay and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The identification was made by the victim (“declarant”) two years before his death. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress, determining that the declarant’s identification of Defendant fell under the “dying declaration” exception to the rule against hearsay but was testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the declarant made a dying declaration and that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to dying declarations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the State may appeal from a trial court’s exclusion of intangible evidence based on a determination that the evidence’s admission would be a constitutional violation; (2) the circuit court was correct in determining that the declarant’s identification of Defendant was a dying declaration; and (3) the Confrontation Clause is not applicable to dying declarations, and therefore, the Court need not address whether the declarant’s identification of Defendant was testimonial or non-testimonial. View "Hailes v. State" on Justia Law

After a retrial, Petitioner was found guilty of attempted second degree arson. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s opening statement violated his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 9-107. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that the prosecutor violated his right to protection from adverse comment on his decision not to testify at trial by referring in opening statement to what Petitioner “will tell” the jury. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s remarks ran afoul of the prohibition against making an adverse comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify, and the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "Simpson v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of theft by deception and two counts of conspiracy to commit theft by deception. The convictions arose from various construction and remodeling contracts Defendant entered into in a two-year period with several homeowners. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence concerning Defendant’s intent to deprive the homeowners of their property was insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft by deception. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that Defendant had the specific intent to deprive each homeowner of their property by deception. View "State v. Manion" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the fatal shooting of Manuel Espina by Prince George’s County police officer Steven Jackson. Petitioners, Espina’s estate and family, filed suit against Respondents, Jackson and the County, alleging survival and wrongful death claims, as well as a claim on behalf of Espina’s son for a violation of his constitutional rights arising out of his treatment and arrest following Espina’s death. A jury returned a verdict against Respondents in the amount of $11,505,000. The trial court, looking to the Local Government Tort Claims Act’s (LGTCA) limits on liability, reduced the judgment entered against the County to $405,000 but left intact the full jury award as to Jackson. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in part and reduced the award entered against the County to $400,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the LGTCA, where applicable, limits the damages recoverable against a local government for violations of the state constitution; (2) applying the LGTCA damages cap to Petitioners’ constitutional tort claims violated neither Article 19 nor the supremacy of the state Constitution; and (3) the Court of Appeals correctly reduced Petitioners’ wrongful death and survivorship actions to an “individual claim” under the LGTCA. View "Espina v. Jackson" on Justia Law