Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Zimmer Development Company wished to construct on a parcel of property in Prince George’s County a small retail center and filed a proposed Comprehensive Design Plan (CDP) and Specific Design Plan (SDP) for the development of the property. The Planning Board approved the CDP and SDP subject to conditions. The District Council elected to review the approval and remanded the CDP and SDP to the Planning Board to consider specific areas of concern. On remand, the Planning Board again approved the CDP and SDP. The District Council elected again to review the Board’s revised decision and, after oral arguments, denied the CDP and SDP. The circuit court reversed and remanded to the District Council with directions to approve the CDP and SDP as approved by the Planning Board. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the District council was authorized to reverse the Planning Board’s decision regarding the CDP and SDP only if it was not supported by substantial evidence, was arbitrary, capricious, or illegal otherwise; (2) the District Council’s ultimate consideration of the Planning Board’s approvals was limited to the issues remanded to the Planning Board; and (3) the circuit court’s order reversing the decision of the District Council denying the CPD and SDP was appropriate. View "County Council of Prince George's County v. Zimmer Dev. Co." on Justia Law

Community College of Baltimore County (CCBC) entered into an agreement with Patient First Corporation, a medical provider, under which student medical technicians gained experience doing blood draws at Patient First. In the agreement, CCBC agreed to indemnify Patient First for any liability that Patient First might occur, including attorneys’ fees, arising from a negligent act or omission of a student. As a result of an incident involving a failed blood draw by a student, Patient First was sued. The parties in the suit reached a settlement agreement. CCBC challenged its obligation to indemnify Patient First for the settlement payment and attorneys’ fees, asserting that the liability arose from the Patient First’s own negligence. The circuit court ruled that Patient First was entitled to indemnification. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and vacated in part, holding (1) the circuit court was not clearly erroneous in concluding that Patient First bore its burden of proving its entitlement to indemnification and that CCBC did not bear its burden of proving, as an affirmative defense, that Patient First was itself negligent and that the liability arose from that negligence; and (2) there was insufficient evidence to support a conclusion that the requested attorneys’ fee award was reasonable. Remanded. View "Bd. of Trs., Cmty. Coll. of Baltimore County v. Patient First Corp." on Justia Law

In 2012, Petitioner voluntarily consented to a search of his person in the form of saliva and penile swabs for the purpose of furnishing DNA evidence to the police department to use in the investigation of a rape allegation. The DNA profile created from the extraction of Petitioner’s DNA excluded Defendant as a suspect of the alleged rape. Defendant’s DNA profile was subsequently uploaded to the local DNA database. Later, an automatic search resulted in a match between Defendant’s DNA profile and a DNA profile associated with an unsolved burglary committed in 2008. Based on that DNA evidence, Defendant was charged with burglary and related charges. Defendant moved to suppress the State’s DNA match evidence on the grounds that the subsequent use of his DNA to conduct a comparison search of the DNA databank exceeded the scope of his consent and therefore constituted an unlawful search under the Fourth Amendment. The suppression hearing judge denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, where Defendant’s consent to search was not expressly limited by him, the State, or the law, the Fourth Amendment did not preclude the police from retaining and using Defendant’s DNA profile created from his voluntarily provided DNA sample for additional, unrelated criminal investigations. View "Varriale v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a former employee and a minority shareholder in Quotient Inc., filed this action alleging that he had been oppressed by Clark Lare, whose shares together with those owned by his wife, Jodi Lare, were the majority interest in Quotient. The trial court found that Clark oppressed Petitioner by firing him for refusing to sell his shares. The court ordered an accounting and awarded Petitioner damages, unpaid corporate distributions, and attorneys’ fees. The court, however, declined to dissolve Quotient, to require Quotient to reinstate Petitioner as an employee, or to award other employment-related relief. The court also found that Petitioner failed to meet his burden of proving that Clark’s actions were fraudulent and accordingly declined to award punitive damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in deciding on appropriate relief. View "Bontempo v. Lare" on Justia Law

Shyquille Griffin was indicted on charges related to the shooting of Andrew Lindsey. Pursuant to a plea agreement with the State, Griffin pleaded guilty to attempted robbery. The agreement did not mention restitution. Upon sentencing, the State advised the court that Lindsey was seeking $9,700 in restitution. The circuit court concluded that it could not order restitution because it would violate the agreement by adding to the penalty. Invoking Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 11-103(e), Lindsey filed a motion for reconsideration of restitution and request for hearing (“CP 11-103(e) motion”), arguing that the hearing court improperly denied his request for restitution. The circuit court denied the CP 11-103(e) motion. Lindsey appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court had discretion to order restitution as a condition of Griffin’s probation without violating the agreement or Griffin’s double jeopardy rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Lindsey’s appeal was untimely because Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 11-103(b) does not permit a crime victim to file an application for leave to appeal the denial of a CP 11-103(e) motion. View "Griffin v. Lindsey" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged in a five-count indictment with burglary and related crimes. On the morning of trial, the prosecutor asked the court to amend Count Four from theft of less than $1,000 to theft of at least $1,000 but less than $10,000. The amendment of Count Four substituted felony theft for misdemeanor theft. The court allowed the amendment of the indictment. After a trial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of fourth degree burglary, theft of goods having a value of at least $1,000, and theft of good valued under $100. The Court of Appeals reversed the conviction, holding (1) the amendment of Count Four of the indictment changed the character of the offense charged, and therefore, the trial court violated Maryland Rule 4-204 in permitting the State, over Petitioner’s objection, to amend the charging document; and (2) that violation was prejudicial per se, entitling Petitioner to a remand for entry of a judgment of conviction and imposition of sentence on the originally charged misdemeanor of theft of property valued at less than $1,000. View "Counts v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury-waived trial, Petitioner was convicted of possession of oxycodone with intent to distribute. Petitioner appealed, arguing that he was entitled, by application of the rule established in Riley v. California, decided by the Supreme Court, to suppression of the evidence obtained as the result of the search of his cell phone incident to his lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the officer who searched Petitioner’s cell phone acted in good faith on then-controlling authority in Maryland in searching Petitioner’s cell phone, and therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to have the cell phone data excluded at trial. View "Demby v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of possession with intent to distribute marijuana, possession of marijuana, and possession of drug paraphernalia. Petitioner appealed the denial of his motion to suppress text messages that the police obtained during the warrantless search of his cell phone incident to his lawful arrest. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court properly denied Petitioner’s motion to suppress the data obtained from his cell phone, as (1) in light of the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. California, officers must generally secure a warrant before conducting searches of data on cell phones; but (2) the police in this case acted in good faith on then-controlling authority in Maryland in searching Petitioner’s cell phone, and therefore, Petitioner was not entitled to suppression of the data obtained from his cell phone. View "Spence v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and wearing, carrying, and transporting a handgun. Defendant was sentenced to life imprisonment for the murder. Defendant appealed, arguing that a witness’s placement in protective housing for several months leading up to the murder trial constituted a “benefit” that would compel the trial judge to give a particularized jury instruction - called the “Witness Promised Benefit” instruction - pertaining to the witness’s credibility. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give the jury instruction. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that protective housing provided to a witness in a first degree murder case is not the type of “benefit” contemplated by the “Witness Promised Benefit” pattern instruction, and therefore, the trial court did not err in not giving the instruction. View "Preston v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first degree felony murder and related charges. On appeal, Defendant argued, inter alia, that the trial court erred when it declined, on the basis of attorney-client privilege, to allow defense counsel to call to the stand the Assistant Public Defender, who represented Defendant’s co-defendant, and question that attorney about a proffer session that her client had with the Assistant State’s Attorney and police prior to entering into the plea agreement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, arguing (1) the limitations the trial judge placed on counsel’s cross-examination of two prosecution witnesses were within the discretion of the trial judge and did not violate Defendant’s right under the federal and state constitutions to confront witnesses against him; and (2) while the attorney-client privilege did not apply to the discussion at the proffer session, the proposed testimony was of minimal relevance, cumulative, and the potential for straying into privileged areas outweighed any probative value. View "Peterson v. State" on Justia Law