Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs, husband and wife, were struck by a motor vehicle being driven by Adam Pond while they were on a walk. At the time of the accident, the Connors owned a vehicle insured by Government Employees Insurance Co. (GEICO). The terms of the policy included underinsured motorist (UIM) coverage of $300,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. Pond maintained automobile liability insurance with Allstate Insurance Co. limited to $100,000 per person/$300,000 per accident. Plaintiffs settled with Allstate. Pursuant to the settlement, Allstate paid $100,000 to each plaintiff. Plaintiffs then submitted claims for underinsured motorist coverage to GEICO under the terms of the policy, seeking $300,000 total from GEICO. GEICO paid Plaintiffs $100,000. Plaintiffs then filed a complaint for declaratory judgment against GEICO as to the $200,000 in dispute. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of GEICO. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the unambiguous terms of the policy, the total damages due to Plaintiffs as a couple were capped at $300,000, and because Allstate already paid each Plaintiff $100,000, which amounts were deducted from the amount that GEICO would be required otherwise to pay Plaintiffs, GEICO was responsible for the remaining $100,000. View "Connors v. Gov't Employees Ins. Co." on Justia Law

The State charged Petitioner with first-degree murder and other crimes. Petitioner moved to suppress a pretrial identification on the grounds that the identification was hearsay and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The identification was made by the victim (“declarant”) two years before his death. The circuit court granted the motion to suppress, determining that the declarant’s identification of Defendant fell under the “dying declaration” exception to the rule against hearsay but was testimonial and inadmissible under the Confrontation Clause. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the declarant made a dying declaration and that the Confrontation Clause does not apply to dying declarations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the State may appeal from a trial court’s exclusion of intangible evidence based on a determination that the evidence’s admission would be a constitutional violation; (2) the circuit court was correct in determining that the declarant’s identification of Defendant was a dying declaration; and (3) the Confrontation Clause is not applicable to dying declarations, and therefore, the Court need not address whether the declarant’s identification of Defendant was testimonial or non-testimonial. View "Hailes v. State" on Justia Law

After a retrial, Petitioner was found guilty of attempted second degree arson. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the prosecutor’s opening statement violated his privilege against self-incrimination guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, Article 22 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, and Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 9-107. Specifically, Petitioner asserted that the prosecutor violated his right to protection from adverse comment on his decision not to testify at trial by referring in opening statement to what Petitioner “will tell” the jury. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s remarks ran afoul of the prohibition against making an adverse comment upon a defendant’s failure to testify, and the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "Simpson v. State" on Justia Law

After a bench trial, Defendant was convicted of five counts of theft by deception and two counts of conspiracy to commit theft by deception. The convictions arose from various construction and remodeling contracts Defendant entered into in a two-year period with several homeowners. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the evidence concerning Defendant’s intent to deprive the homeowners of their property was insufficient to sustain a conviction for theft by deception. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence to support a reasonable inference that Defendant had the specific intent to deprive each homeowner of their property by deception. View "State v. Manion" on Justia Law

This case arose out of the fatal shooting of Manuel Espina by Prince George’s County police officer Steven Jackson. Petitioners, Espina’s estate and family, filed suit against Respondents, Jackson and the County, alleging survival and wrongful death claims, as well as a claim on behalf of Espina’s son for a violation of his constitutional rights arising out of his treatment and arrest following Espina’s death. A jury returned a verdict against Respondents in the amount of $11,505,000. The trial court, looking to the Local Government Tort Claims Act’s (LGTCA) limits on liability, reduced the judgment entered against the County to $405,000 but left intact the full jury award as to Jackson. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the judgment in part and reduced the award entered against the County to $400,000. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the LGTCA, where applicable, limits the damages recoverable against a local government for violations of the state constitution; (2) applying the LGTCA damages cap to Petitioners’ constitutional tort claims violated neither Article 19 nor the supremacy of the state Constitution; and (3) the Court of Appeals correctly reduced Petitioners’ wrongful death and survivorship actions to an “individual claim” under the LGTCA. View "Espina v. Jackson" on Justia Law

In 2002, Petitioner was found guilty but not criminally responsible of robbery and use of a handgun in commission of a felony or a crime of violence. In 2006, the circuit court released Petitioner conditionally. In 2009, Petitioner was re-committed to inpatient medical treatment. In 2010, the circuit court released Petitioner conditionally for the remaining duration of the 2006 order. In 2011, five days before Petitioner’s conditional release was to expire, the Department filed an application seeking to extend the terms of the conditional release for an additional four years. The next month, the circuit court granted the Department’s application. Petitioner filed a motion to alter or amend, asserting that the circuit court’s jurisdiction over him ended at the expiration of the 2006 order of conditional release, and therefore, the order extending his conditional release was invalid. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the circuit court retained jurisdiction for a reasonable time to decide the timely-filed application to extend the 2006 order of conditional release; and (2) the circuit court did not delay for an unreasonable time before ruling on the State’s application for an extension on Petitioner’s conditional release. View "Harrison-Solomon v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was involved in a fist-fight with another high school student, Dylan P., who suffered a broken nose and damaged sinuses. Pursuant to a plea agreement, Petitioner admitted involvement in the alleged affray. The juvenile court determined that Petitioner committed the offense of affray and placed him on probation. The circuit court subsequently amended Petitioner’s probation to require Petitioner to pay partial restitution for the medical offenses incurred by Dylan P. for treatment of his injuries suffered during the affray. The intermediate appellate court affirmed the order of restitution. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) trial courts are not statutorily authorized to order restitution in favor of a person who is a voluntary and willing participant in the crime or delinquent activity that caused his or her injury; and (2) because Dylan P. fought willingly with Petitioner, the circuit court erroneously required Petitioner to pay restitution to Dylan P. View "In re Tyrell A." on Justia Law

After voluntarily leaving his job with Employer, Respondent applied for unemployment benefits. The Department of Labor, Licensing, and Regulation (DLLR) denied the claim for benefits, determining that Respondent quit his job without good cause. The hearing examiner upheld the DLLR’s findings. The DLLR Board of Appeals declined to hear Respondent’s appeal, thereby adopting the hearing examiner’s decision as its own decision. Thereafter, Respondent filed a petition for judicial review. Instead of filing an answering memorandum, the DLLR Board requested that the circuit court remand the case back to the Board before the court conducted its review. The circuit court granted the Board’s motion for remand. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Employer’s appeal, concluding that the remand order was was not a final judgment or otherwise appealable. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the remand order was not a final, appealable judgment. View "Metro Maint. Sys. South, Inc. v. Milburn" on Justia Law

Karen Dwyer was the primary driver of a vehicle owned by her father, Alan Dwyer. Alan had forbidden Ameen Abdulkhalek, the father of Karen’s children, to drive the car. The vehicle was insured by a policy in Alan’s name with Erie Insurance Exchange. When Karen gave the car keys to Abdulkhalek and asked him to retrieve the children, Abdulkhalek was involved in an accident after first making a trip to a gas station. The circuit court determined that Abdulkhalek’s use of the vehicle was not covered under an omnibus clause in the policy. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) an omnibus clause in an automobile policy that extends liability coverage to a permissive owner of an insured vehicle also encompasses a driver who operates the car for the benefit of an individual who has permission from the named insured to use the vehicle; (2) coverage does not extend to that driver, however, if he deviates from the purpose for which he was authorized to drive the car for the benefit of the first permittee; and (3) because Abdulkhalek operated the car for a purpose other than that requested by the Karen, the omnibus clause did not extend coverage to Abdulkhalek. View "Payne v. Erie Ins. Exch." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of, among other charges, attempted first-degree murder, attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, and two convictions for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) the circuit court correctly sentenced Defendant to separate consecutive sentences for the two convictions for use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and (2) the sentence was not illegal even where the sentencing court was required to impose a minimum sentence of five years’ imprisonment but only imposed a one-year sentence in this case. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) imposition of separate consecutive sentences for two convictions of use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence or any felony is permissible where a defendant uses one handgun to commit two separate crimes of violence or felonies against one victim in one criminal action; and (2) this case should be remanded for re-sentencing because the trial court did not impose a sentence that was consistent with Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 4-204. View "Garner v. State" on Justia Law