Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner filed suit against Respondents in the circuit court, alleging tort and contract claims. Petitioner served the opposing parties with its complaint along with a completed Case Information Report (CIR). Petitioner checked the “yes” in the Jury Demand section of the CIR but filed no other pleadings or papers in the case asserting the right to a trial by jury. Defendants moved to confirm a bench trial, arguing that the manner in which the alleged jury demand had been elected by reference was procedurally defective. The motions judge granted the motion, concluding that a completed CIR is neither a “pleading” nor separate “paper” within the meaning of Maryland Rule 2-325(a), and therefore, Petitioner’s right to trial by jury had been waived because Petitioner did not comply with the Rule. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and a final judgment was entered in favor of Respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a CIR, whether served or unserved, does not constitute a separate “paper” within the meaning of Rule 2-325, and therefore, Petitioner’s failure to comply with the Rule resulted in a waiver of the right to a jury trial. View "Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co." on Justia Law

In 1996, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and related offenses. In 2008, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. (CP) 8-201, alleging that socks he had allegedly worn at the time of the murders that the State introduced into evidence at trial lacked his DNA. The State responded with documentation that the socks were destroyed along with other items seized in the case after Appellant’s conviction had been affirmed on direct appeal. In 2011, the circuit court closed the case. In 2013, Appellant sought to reopen the proceedings pursuant to CP 8-201, alleging that the State had improperly destroyed the socks. The pro bono counsel that had assisted Appellant in the earlier proceedings under CP 8-201 moved to strike their appearance. The circuit court granted counsels’ motion, denied Appellant’s request for new court-appointed counsel, and denied Appellant’s request to conduct further proceedings under CP 8-201. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) granted the motion of Appellant’s pro bono counsel to strike their appearance; (2) declined to appoint new counsel for Appellant; and (3) declined to order relief under CP 8-201. View "Simms v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, through his mother, filed this negligence suit against the landlord and owners (collectively, Respondents) of a rental dwelling where Petitioner had resided with his mother for alleged personal injuries resulting from lead-based paint poisoning. Petitioner identified two expert witnesses to testify both as to the source of his lead exposure, but only one of them as to the medical causation of the injuries suffered by Petitioner. Respondents filed a motion to exclude Petitioner’s experts and a companion motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Petitioner’s medical expert was not qualified to provide an expert opinion as to source of lead exposure or to medical causation, and that without the testimony of the medical expert, there was no dispute of material fact and Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the medical expert was competent to testify as a medical causation expert; and (2) with the presence of the second expert to speak to the source of lead, it was improper for the circuit court to grant summary judgment when it did. View "Roy v. Dackman" on Justia Law

Appellees’ farm was condemned by the Board of Education for the purpose of building a school. On Appellees’ behalf, the Board paid the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. Appellees requested from the County a refund of a portion of the County farmland transfer tax, arguing that the County, in calculating the County farmland transfer tax, was incorrect in concluding that the twenty-five percent State surcharge was not part of the combined transfer tax. The County denied the request for a refund. The Tax Court affirmed, concluding that the State surcharge was to be collected in addition to the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Special Appeals certified the case to the Court of Appeals to answer a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered (1) the agricultural land transfer tax, as set forth in Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-407(a)(2) and (3), includes the State surcharge imposed under Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-303(d), and the State surcharge must be calculated into the tax ceiling on a county’s agricultural land transfer tax; and (2) therefore, Appellees were entitled to a refund in the amount of the overcharge of the County farmland transfer tax. View "Montgomery County v. Phillips" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lender who takes possession of property but does not become the fee simple record owner of the property through foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is liable for homeowners’ association assessments. The resolution of the question was not addressed on appeal, however. Petitioner, a homeowners association, filed a complaint against Respondent, a bank, alleging that Respondent had failed to pay homeowners’ association dues since taking possession of property. The district court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner’s appeal from the district court to a circuit court was untimely. View "Brownstones at Park Potomac Homeowners Ass’n v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the constitutionality of a conviction based on a guilty verdict by a jury that was given an advisory only instruction. After a jury trial in 1976, Respondent was found guilty of two counts of first degree murder and a related larceny. In 1997, Respondent sought postconviction relief, alleging several claims. The postconviction court denied relief. In 2007, Respondent filed a motion to reopen the petition for postconviction relief, alleging that the trial court gave an erroneous jury instruction advising the jury that they were the judges of the law and the facts. The circuit court, citing the Court of Appeals’ recently filed opinion in Unger v. State, ultimately granted the motion. After a hearing the postconviction court granted Respondent postconviction relief and ordered that Respondent was entitled to a new trial. The Court of Appeals affirmed, thus upholding Unger as the law regarding advisory only jury instructions, holding that the postconviction court properly granted Respondent relief in the form of a new trial. View "State v. Waine" on Justia Law

Defendant, who was indigent and whose mental competency was questioned by the court and counsel at several junctures, appeared before a series of judges concerning his dissatisfaction with appointed counsel, an assistant public defender. The circuit court advised Defendant about his right to, and the merits of, having counsel, but, upon finding that good cause existed to discharge the assistant public defender, the court treated Defendant’s decision to discharge that counsel as a waiver of counsel, despite Defendant’s clear requests for counsel. Defendant represented himself at trial and was convicted. The Court of Appeals reversed Defendant’s conviction, holding that the trial court erred in failing to appoint counsel for Defendant and in stating that it lacked the authority to appoint counsel for Defendant after finding a meritorious reason to discharge Defendant’s assistant public defender. Remanded for appointment of counsel and a new trial. View "Dykes v. State" on Justia Law

Defendant was indicted on multiple counts of burglary, theft, and related offenses. Defendant was found to be indigent, and an assistant public defender was assigned to represent him. Before trial, Defendant discharged his attorney. Defendant then filed a motion asking the circuit court to help him obtain “pro bono counsel.” The circuit court denied the motion. Defendant represented himself at trial and was found guilty on twenty-one counts. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to determine and announce on the record that Defendant was knowingly and voluntarily waiving the right to counsel. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) to the extent Defendant asserts that the court’s “waiver inquiry” was deficient because the court did not make an explicit finding on the record that Defendant was acting knowingly and voluntarily by waiving counsel, Defendant failed to preserve the issue by making a contemporaneous objection; and (2) the trial court did not abuse its discretion in declining to appoint counsel for Defendant when Defendant lacked good cause for discharging his assigned assistant public defender. View "State v. Westray" on Justia Law

Petitioners, registered Republican voters and duly elected members of the Republican Central Committee of Carroll County (Committee), filed a complaint for mandamus, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the Committee from submitting more than one name to the Governor to fill a vacancy in the House of Delegates. Thereafter, Petitioners filed an amended complaint along with a motion for a temporary restraining order. The circuit court denied all relief sought. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Md. Const. art. III, 13 does not impose a duty on a party central committee to submit any fixed number of names to the Governor to fill a vacancy. Instead, a party central committee may submit multiple names to fill a vacancy, and the Governor must appoint a person from among those whose names were submitted. View "Fuller v. Republican Cent. Comm’n" on Justia Law

Respondent lived in his home for nearly ten years before razing the existing house in order to build a new house on the lot. Respondent benefitted from the application of the homestead tax credit with respect to increases in the value of the prior structure while he lived in it. The new construction increased the value of the property by approximately $500,000. The tax assessor, while retaining Respondent’s existing credit, included the full value of the renovation in the value to be taxed. The Maryland Tax Court affirmed the assessor’s interpretation. The circuit court reversed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the “taxable assessment” used to compute the homestead tax credit under Md. Code Tax-Property (TP) 9-105 should include the value of renovations when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and circuit court affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that, when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home, the homeowner may retain existing homestead tax credit if the homeowner satisfies certain criteria and the tax credit computation for the property with the rebuilt house is to be done in accordance with TP 9-105(c)(5) and TP 9-105(e)(1). View "Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Andrecs" on Justia Law