Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of child abuse, second degree rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest. As charged, any of the three sexual offenses could have provided the basis for the child abuse conviction. The court imposed consecutive sentences for rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest, and a suspended sentence for child abuse, for a total of forty years’ incarceration. At issue on appeal was whether all, or only one, of the sexual offenses merge for sentencing purposes with the sentence for child abuse and whether Maryland law permits a remand to afford the trial court the opportunity to consider resentencing on the child abuse conviction. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that Petitioner was entitled to have all three sexual offenses vacated and that the case may be remanded to the trial court for resentencing on Petitioner’s sexual child abuse conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) only the sentence Petitioner received for second degree rape must be vacated, by application of State v. Johnson; and (2) Maryland Rule 8-604(d) authorizes a remand for a new sentence hearing at which the sentencing court has the discretion to resentence Petitioner to a term of active incarceration on the child abuse conviction. View "Twigg v. State" on Justia Law

Moran Perry was injured when he was struck by a dump truck operated by William Johnson and owned by Higher Power Trucking, LLC. Asphalt Concrete Services, Inc. (ACS) had hired High Power to perform services at the time of the accident. Perry filed suit against Higher Power, Johnson, and ACS, alleging negligence and negligent hiring. ACS sought to exclude evidence that Johnson had a suspended license and that the truck was uninsured at the time of the accident. The circuit court allowed into evidence witness testimony regarding Johnson’s lack of liability insurance coverage at the time of the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perry. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of Johnson’s lack of insurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s admission into evidence of irrelevant evidence of lack of insurance was error, and the admission of this evidence prejudiced the jury’s verdict. Remanded for a new trial. View "Perry v. Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Maryland Underground Damage Prevention Authority cited Reliable Contracting Company for violating Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Cos. 12-101, under which advance notice must be given to the one-call system of certain types of excavation, and imposed a civil monetary penalty. Reliable Contracting petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Authority’s enabling statute conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body in violation of separation of powers principles. Reliable Contracting also contended that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance to the Authority for the assessment of such penalties. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the Authority is an administrative agency in the executive branch of State government that exercises quasi-judicial powers subject to judicial review, and therefore, its enabling law is not contrary to the State Constitution’s Judicial Vesting Clause or Separation of Powers Clause; and (2) because the Authority is an administrative agency, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-1001 provides guidelines for the exercise of its discretion in assessing civil penalties. View "Reliable Contracting Co. v. Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Auth." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child sexual abuse, third-degree sex offense, and second-degree sex offense. Defendant appealed, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a recorded telephone conversation with the victim during which Defendant made multiple incriminating statements. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the victim, a West Virginia resident, was sufficiently supervised by a Maryland law enforcement officer so as to make the recording a permissible interception under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CP) 10-402(c)(2). CP 10-402(c)(2) provides an exception to the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act’s general prohibition on the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the taped telephone call between the victim and Defendant because the victim was not acting “under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer” as required by CP 10-402(c)(2) where the officer simply set up the recording equipment, instructed the victim on how handle the equipment, and gave the victim the equipment to conduct the recording on his own in West Virginia. View "Seal v. State" on Justia Law

Plaintiff alleged that she was injured as a child by lead-based paint at a property owned and managed by Defendant. By the time that Plaintiff filed the complaint, the property at issue had been demolished, and there was no direct evidence that the property contained lead-based paint. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to both Plaintiff’s negligence claim and Maryland Consumer Protection Act claim. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as to negligence, concluding that there was sufficient admissible circumstantial evidence to show the presence of lead-based paint at the subject property while Plaintiff was residing there. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was sufficient admissible circumstantial evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the property was a reasonable probable source of Plaintiff’s lead exposure and that there were no other reasonably probable sources of lead exposure. View "Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and the weapon charge. The circuit court imposed a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years for the first-degree assault conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in considering during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his argument for appellate review; and (2) the circuit court did not err at the sentencing proceeding, as there was no indication that the circuit court was influenced by the the fact that Defendant had declined to plead guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that the circuit court might have been motivated during sentencing by the impermissible consideration of Defendant’s decision not to plead guilty. View "Sharp v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were municipal separate storm sewer system discharge permits the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) most recently issued to several counties and one city (collectively, the Counties). Multiple organizations challenged the permits in several respects, including (1) the requirement to restore impervious surface area, (2) the requirement to submit plans for total maximum daily loads (TMDLs), (3) the monitoring requirements, and (4) the public’s ability to participate in the development of the permits. The Supreme Court upheld the MDE’s decision to issue the permits on all grounds, holding (1) the MDE’s decision to include a twenty percent restoration requirement in the permits was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; (2) the MDE’s requirement that the Counties submit plans for all Environmental Protection Agency-approved TMDLs one year after the issuance of the permits complied with 40 C.F.R. 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(B); (3) the MDE’s monitoring scheme is sufficient to comply with the applicable federal regulations; and (4) the permits satisfy public participation requirements. View "Dep’t of Env’t v. Anacostia Riverkeeper" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who operated a dairy farm and maintained a herd of nearly 100 head of cattle, filed suit against Respondents, alleging that a church-sponsored fireworks display that took place on property adjacent to his dairy operation caused a stampede inside his dairy barn, resulting in the death of four dairy cows. Petitioner filed claims for negligence, nuisance, and strict liability. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondents, and the circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the doctrine of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity does not apply to the noise of a fireworks discharge based on the facts of this case. View "Toms v. Calvary Assembly of God, Inc." on Justia Law

While living in Maryland, Petitioner opened a personal line of credit and a credit card account with Respondent. Respondent later filed two complaints against Petitioner in a Maryland district court, one for the outstanding balance on the credit card account and the other for the amount owed on the line of credit. At the time of the filings, Petitioner was living and working in Texas. Respondent was awarded default judgments. Respondent subsequently secured two writs of garnishment in the same actions from the district court. The writs were served on the resident agent of Petitioner’s employer. Petitioner moved to quash the writs, arguing that his wages earned solely for work he performed in Texas were not subject to garnishment in Maryland. The district court denied the motions to quash. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court in its continuing and ancillary jurisdiction properly ordered Petitioner’s wages earned in Texas to be subject to garnishment served upon Petitioner’s employer because of the employer’s continuous and systematic business in Maryland. View "Mensah v. MCT Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

The complaint in this case was brought both individually and as a class action. Plaintiffs, a police union and others, asserted that Montgomery County, a charter county, was not authorized to use its fiscal and human resources to urge approval of a law enacted by the County Council that limited bargaining rights and that had been petitioned to referendum. The circuit court concluded that the government speech doctrine does not constitute an affirmative authority for government to advocate and spend money on political campaigns. The Court of Special Appeals, however, concluded that the County had inherent power to use properly appropriated funds for a governmental purpose and that advocacy on the non-partisan ballot measure was a governmental purpose. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a charter county is authorized to use its resources to encourage the electorate of the County to support or opposed a measure that may have a significant impact on the operations of the County government. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law