Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with armed robbery. During trial, a DNA expert testified regarding the work of another DNA analyst. The expert was a supervisor in the same lab, reviewed the work of the other analyst, and came to his own conclusion that was consistent with the conclusion of the other analyst. The analyst herself, however, did not testify. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that the admission of the DNA case report without the analyst’s testimony violated Defendant’s ability to confront his accuser. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the language “within a reasonable degree of scientific certainty” in the DNA report rendered the report testimonial within Williams v. Illinois. View "State v. Norton" on Justia Law

Petitioners purchased and financed an automobile from Respondent. Petitioners averred that Respondent failed properly to disclose the vehicle’s history. At issue in this case was the extent to which multiple documents executed on the same day during the course of the purchase and financing could be read together as constituting the entire agreement between the parties. The issue arose in the context of whether Petitioners’ claims against Respondent were subject to a mandatory arbitration provision in the Buyer’s Order, which set forth the purchase price. A Retail Installment Sales Contract (RISC), which contained the financing terms of the purchase, did not include an agreement to arbitrate. The circuit court granted Respondent’s motion to compel arbitration, thus disagreeing with Petitioners that the language of the Buyer’s Order was superseded by the RISC. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, for the purposes of the instant case, the Buyer’s Order may be construed together with the RISC as evincing the entire agreement between the parties. View "Ford v. Antwerpen Motorcars Ltd." on Justia Law

Respondent filed a complaint against a sergeant of the Maryland State Police that was “sustained.” Respondent subsequently sought records of the internal investigation conducted by the State Police in response to her complaint, but the State Police denied the request. Respondent subsequently filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief under the Maryland Public Information Act. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State Police, concluding that the records were mandatorily exempt from disclosure as “personnel records.” The Court of Special Appeals vacated the judgment, concluding that the circuit court erred in failing to require the State Police to create an index of the withheld documents and, in addition, by not conducting an in camera review of the documents to determine whether the documents could be redacted. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded to the circuit court for the entry of a declaratory judgment, holding that the internal affairs records of an investigation into the conduct of a specifically identified state trooper is a “personnel record” under the Act, and, in this case, not capable sufficiently of redaction were disclosure necessary. View "Dep’t of State Police v. Dashiell" on Justia Law

Respondents, three married couples, obtained home equity lines of credit from Petitioners, a bank and its loan officer. Approximately four years later, Petitioners filed a putative class action alleging that these transactions were part of an elaborate “buy-first-sell-later” mortgage fraud arrangement carried out by Petitioners and other defendants. Petitioners alleged numerous causes of action, including fraud, conspiracy, and violations of Maryland consumer protection statutes. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Petitioners, concluding that the statute of limitations barred several of Respondents’ claims and that no Petitioner violated the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law as a matter of law. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the Court of Special Appeals (1) erred in concluding that Respondents stated a claim upon which relief could be granted under the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law; and (2) erred in concluding that it was a question of fact to be decided by the jury as to whether Respondents’ claims against Petitioners were barred by the relevant statute of limitations. View "Windesheim v. Larocca" on Justia Law

At the center of this case was the report of a Baltimore Sun reporter that a high-ranking Maryland law enforcement ballistic expert named Joseph Kopera had lied, as an expert witness for the prosecution, about his credentials and qualifications in Maryland trials for more than twenty years. Kopera testified in the trials of Ronnie Hunt and Kevin Hardy (together, Respondents). Respondents, both incarcerated, filed petitions for writ of actual innocence in their related cases, alleging that the questions about Kopera’s qualifications were newly discovered evidence that created a substantial or significant possibility that the outcomes in their trials may have been different had Kopera not lied. Respondents also asserted that the newly discovered evidence could not have been discovered in time to move for a new trial under Maryland Rule 4-331. The circuit court denied the petitions without a hearing. The Court of Special Appeals reversed in both instances and remanded for further proceedings. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that because the petitions filed by Respondents satisfied the pleading standards established by Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-301 and evaluated in Douglas v. State, Respondents were entitled to hearings on their petitions. View "State v. Hunt" on Justia Law

Lafarge North America, Inc., the operator of a ready-mix concrete plant, sought a refund from the Washington Suburban Sanitary Commission (WSSC) for allegedly improperly assessed and paid water and sewer service charges for operation of the plant. Large’s claim was deemed denied because of the WSSC’s failure to render a timely decision. The circuit court reversed the WSSC’s deemed denial of Lafarge’s claim and remanded the matter to the WSSC with directions to determine and issue an appropriate refund, concluding that the deemed denial was not supported by substantial evidence in the record and was arbitrary and capricious. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, given the legislative intent to provide for refunds when charges are erroneously assessed, it is appropriate to remand the case to the WSSC for calculation of the amount of the refund due. View "Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n v. Lafarge N.A., Inc." on Justia Law

Mark Hranicka filed a workers’ compensation claim as a result of an injury he sustained during a motor vehicle accident. The workers’ compensation claim was withdrawn. Thereafter, Hranicka submitted to the Workers’ Compensation Commission a second claim. The claim was electronically submitted to the Commission before expiration of the two-year statute of limitations but not filed on paper until after the expiration of the two-year period. Respondents contested the claim, arguing that it was time-barred under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-709(b)(3). The Commissioner determined that the claim was not time-barred. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that electronic submission of a claim does not constitute “filing” pursuant to Code of Maryland Regulations, and therefore, the Commission erred in ruling that the filing date of a claim could be the date of the claim’s electronic submission for purposes of the statute of limitations. View "Hranicka v. Chesapeake Surgical, Ltd." on Justia Law

These proceedings involved a development project spearheaded by K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC (Appellee). Appellee obtained all of the necessary permits and approvals from state and local agencies, except one. At issue in these proceedings was Appellee’s application for a State wetlands license. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a writ of mandamus against the Board of Public Works seeking an order compelling the Board to vote promptly on Appellee’s long-outstanding application for the wetlands permit following delays resulting from a perceived appearance of impropriety. The circuit court granted the requested relief and ordered the Board to vote promptly on the application. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court’s order was improper for want of a prior final administrative decision and because mandamus was unavailable under the circumstances. View "Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian's Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a medical malpractice complaint against Respondent-doctor alleging that Respondent was negligent in failing to diagnose and treat her post-surgical infection. Because Plaintiff failed to file the required expert report to prosecute her first claim against Respondent, Plaintiff voluntarily dismissed the complaint. Plaintiff later filed a three-count complaint that was similar to her first complaint and that included a new claim of negligence related to her initial surgery. The circuit court dismissed the complaint because the claim was filed after the expiration of the relevant period of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff could not rely on the saving provision of Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-119(b) to refile her untimely claim because she voluntarily dismissed her previous claim. View "Wilcox v. Orellano" on Justia Law

Petitioners purchased real property comprised of two lots in a community of single family homes in Hampton. Petitioners later purported to subdivide their property to create an additional undeveloped parcel, which Petitioners offered for sale as separate and buildable. The Hampton Improvement Association (HIA) responded that the restrictive covenants prohibited property owners from erecting more than one house per deeded lot. Petitioners filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that their property consisted of two separate buildable lots and that the restrictive covenants did not prohibit the building of a home on the second lot. The circuit court denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the circuit court (1) correctly denied the Shaders’s attempted use of offensive non-collateral estoppel, and (2) properly found that the restriction prohibiting the construction of more than one dwelling on a single lot was not abandoned by the HIA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that (1) the HIA was barred from relitigating the enforcement of the restrictive covenants due to a prior judgment entered against the HIA, and (2) the HIA did waive by abandonment the restrictions allowing the construction of numerous buildings. View "Shader v. Hampton Improvement Ass'n" on Justia Law