Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff alleged that she was injured as a child by lead-based paint at a property owned and managed by Defendant. By the time that Plaintiff filed the complaint, the property at issue had been demolished, and there was no direct evidence that the property contained lead-based paint. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendant as to both Plaintiff’s negligence claim and Maryland Consumer Protection Act claim. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment as to negligence, concluding that there was sufficient admissible circumstantial evidence to show the presence of lead-based paint at the subject property while Plaintiff was residing there. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was sufficient admissible circumstantial evidence from which a trier of fact could conclude that the property was a reasonable probable source of Plaintiff’s lead exposure and that there were no other reasonably probable sources of lead exposure. View "Rowhouses, Inc. v. Smith" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with attempted first-degree murder, first-degree assault, and openly wearing and carrying a dangerous weapon with the intent to injure. After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of first-degree assault, second-degree assault, and the weapon charge. The circuit court imposed a term of imprisonment of twenty-five years for the first-degree assault conviction. Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in considering during sentencing his decision not to plead guilty. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding (1) Defendant failed to preserve his argument for appellate review; and (2) the circuit court did not err at the sentencing proceeding, as there was no indication that the circuit court was influenced by the the fact that Defendant had declined to plead guilty. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no evidence that the circuit court might have been motivated during sentencing by the impermissible consideration of Defendant’s decision not to plead guilty. View "Sharp v. State" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were municipal separate storm sewer system discharge permits the Maryland Department of the Environment (MDE) most recently issued to several counties and one city (collectively, the Counties). Multiple organizations challenged the permits in several respects, including (1) the requirement to restore impervious surface area, (2) the requirement to submit plans for total maximum daily loads (TMDLs), (3) the monitoring requirements, and (4) the public’s ability to participate in the development of the permits. The Supreme Court upheld the MDE’s decision to issue the permits on all grounds, holding (1) the MDE’s decision to include a twenty percent restoration requirement in the permits was supported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary and capricious; (2) the MDE’s requirement that the Counties submit plans for all Environmental Protection Agency-approved TMDLs one year after the issuance of the permits complied with 40 C.F.R. 122.44(d)(1)(vii)(B); (3) the MDE’s monitoring scheme is sufficient to comply with the applicable federal regulations; and (4) the permits satisfy public participation requirements. View "Dep’t of Env’t v. Anacostia Riverkeeper" on Justia Law

Petitioner, who operated a dairy farm and maintained a herd of nearly 100 head of cattle, filed suit against Respondents, alleging that a church-sponsored fireworks display that took place on property adjacent to his dairy operation caused a stampede inside his dairy barn, resulting in the death of four dairy cows. Petitioner filed claims for negligence, nuisance, and strict liability. The district court entered judgment in favor of Respondents, and the circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the doctrine of strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity does not apply to the noise of a fireworks discharge based on the facts of this case. View "Toms v. Calvary Assembly of God, Inc." on Justia Law

While living in Maryland, Petitioner opened a personal line of credit and a credit card account with Respondent. Respondent later filed two complaints against Petitioner in a Maryland district court, one for the outstanding balance on the credit card account and the other for the amount owed on the line of credit. At the time of the filings, Petitioner was living and working in Texas. Respondent was awarded default judgments. Respondent subsequently secured two writs of garnishment in the same actions from the district court. The writs were served on the resident agent of Petitioner’s employer. Petitioner moved to quash the writs, arguing that his wages earned solely for work he performed in Texas were not subject to garnishment in Maryland. The district court denied the motions to quash. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the district court in its continuing and ancillary jurisdiction properly ordered Petitioner’s wages earned in Texas to be subject to garnishment served upon Petitioner’s employer because of the employer’s continuous and systematic business in Maryland. View "Mensah v. MCT Fed. Credit Union" on Justia Law

The complaint in this case was brought both individually and as a class action. Plaintiffs, a police union and others, asserted that Montgomery County, a charter county, was not authorized to use its fiscal and human resources to urge approval of a law enacted by the County Council that limited bargaining rights and that had been petitioned to referendum. The circuit court concluded that the government speech doctrine does not constitute an affirmative authority for government to advocate and spend money on political campaigns. The Court of Special Appeals, however, concluded that the County had inherent power to use properly appropriated funds for a governmental purpose and that advocacy on the non-partisan ballot measure was a governmental purpose. The Court of Appeals agreed, holding that a charter county is authorized to use its resources to encourage the electorate of the County to support or opposed a measure that may have a significant impact on the operations of the County government. View "Fraternal Order of Police v. Montgomery County" on Justia Law

Defendant was charged with first degree murder and attempted first degree murder. While there was no dispute that Defendant shot the victim, his defense was that he acted in self-defense and did not intend to hit anyone. During jury deliberations, the trial judge gave a supplemental jury instruction on transferred intent after the jury asked, “We are confused on the term ‘intent.’ Does it mean to kill a person or the specific person. Can you please clarify? Thank you.” The jury convicted Defendant of the charges. Defendant appealed, arguing that the supplemental instruction on transferred intent was not generated by the evidence and introduced an entirely new theory of the case that was prejudicial to him. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the circuit court, holding that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in giving the supplemental instruction because the evidence generated the instruction, and the instruction did not prejudice Defendant. View "State v. Bircher" on Justia Law

After a joint jury trial, Petitioner was found guilty of second degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. The court of special appeals affirmed. Petitioners filed a petition for writ of certiorari, arguing that the prosecutor’s response to an allegation of racial and gender discrimination in the exercise of a peremptory challenge did not satisfy the requirement of Batson v. Kentucky that the State provide a specific explanation for each challenged strike which is racially, and with respect to gender, neutral. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the prosecutor’s explanation for striking the juror at issue, in addition to lacking the requisite specificity, violated Batson because the explanation was neither race- nor gender-neutral. Remanded for a new trial. View "Ray-Simmons v. State" on Justia Law

In 2012, the Maryland Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) adopted new procedures regarding the application process for surgical abortion facilities, including the requirement that individuals and other entities obtain a license from the Secretary of DHMH before establishing or operating such a facility. In 2013, Petitioner, pursuant to the Public Information Act, requested the records of all applications submitted for a license under these regulations. DHMH responded by providing copies of the applications but with certain information redacted. DMHM filed a petition seeking judicial confirmation for its continued denial of the information. The circuit court granted the petition, indicating that DHMH’s decision to redact was made on the basis of public safety concerns for those individuals who proposed to operate the facilities. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that redaction and denial of the relevant information in this case was necessary to protect the public interest from a substantial injury. View "Glenn v. Dep’t of Health & Mental Hygiene" on Justia Law

Respondent decided not to renew the lease of Petitioner, a tenant in an apartment building, and filed a tenant holding over action. Petitioner argued that the non-renewal and tenant holding over action were in retaliation for her advocation on behalf of the apartment building’s tenants association. The circuit court ruled in Petitioner’s favor on the question of retaliation but awarded damages for only one of the two alleged acts of retaliation. Specifically, the court found that Petitioner failed to prove that she was current on the rent at the time that she filed her tenant holding over action. The circuit court also declined to award attorneys’ fees to Petitioner. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioner was not ineligible for relief as to the second alleged act of retaliation, as Petitioner’s debts to Respondent other than her fixed monthly amount specified as “rent” in her lease did not factor into whether she was current on the rent for purposes of the anti-retaliation statute; and (2) the circuit court erred in refusing to grant attorney fees without permitting Petitioner an opportunity to submit evidence concerning her entitlement to attorneys’ fees and without explaining how it chose to exercise its discretion. View "Lockett v. Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC" on Justia Law