Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Consumer Protection Division of Maryland’s Office of the Attorney General (CPD) concluded that Petitioner and his companies engaged in unfair and deceptive trade practices in violation of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (CPA). The CPD issued sanctions, imposed civil penalties, and assessed costs. Thereafter, the Maryland State Board of Plumbing (the Board) opened a complaint against Petitioner alleging that Petitioner had violated the Maryland Plumbing act (MPA). The Board’s case largely consisted of the CPD’s findings and conclusions. The Board, by application of the doctrine of collateral estoppel, adopted the findings of fact made by the CPD and concluded that Petitioner violated the MPA. The Board revoked Petitioner’s master plumber license and imposed a civil penalty. The circuit court ruled that the Board properly invoked collateral estoppel in adopting the CPD’s findings of fact. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of offensive non-mutual collateral estoppel is permissible in this State and can be invoked to grant preclusive effect to an administrative order; and (2) Petitioner’s double jeopardy protections were not violated when the Board and the CPD both fined him for the same conduct. View "Garrity v. State Bd. of Plumbing" on Justia Law

A Guy Named Moe, LLC (Moe), a foreign limited liability company doing business in Maryland, and Chipotle Mexican Grill of Colorado, LLC both operate a chain of restaurants. In 2012, Chipotle applied for a special exception to build a restaurant approximately 425 feet from Moe’s Southwest Grill. The City of Annapolis’s Board of Appeals unanimously approved Chipotle’s request. Thereafter, Moe filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court dismissed Moe’s petition, finding that Moe lacked standing because it was not a taxpayer under Md. Code Ann. Land Use 4-401(a). The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the petition was void ab initio because, at the time it was filed, Moe’s had lost its right to do business in Maryland because of its failure to register; and (2) Moe was not "a person aggrieved" for standing purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Moe can Maintain its suit; but (2) Moe was not aggrieved for standing purposes. View "Guy Named Moe, LLC v. Chipotle Mexican Grill of Colorado, LLC" on Justia Law

Following the birth of twin boys in 2009, Petitioner executed an affidavit of parentage attesting that he was the boys’ father. In 2011, the Wicomico County Bureau of Support Enforcement alleged that Petitioner was responsible for support. In response, Petitioner denied parentage of the children and requested a paternity test, alleging that his signature on the affidavit had been obtained through fraud or misrepresentation. The circuit court judge ordered Petitioner to pay child support and denied the request for a paternity test. Two years later, Petitioner against requested a paternity test. The circuit court judge denied the request, concluding that Petitioner had no absolute right to blood or genetic testing and, even if he did, he waived his right by failing to appeal the trial judge’s decision in 2011. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Petitioner was not entitled to a paternity test to contest the parentage he established after execution of his affidavit of parentage. View "Davis v. Wicomico County Bureau" on Justia Law

In two cases before the Workers’ Compensation Commission, the Commission concluded that under Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-806, the amount owed to the Subsequent Injury Fund (SIF) by the employers in these cases - the Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) and Baltimore County - is 6.5 percent of the Commission’s award of compensation prior to the deduction of any statutory offset. The circuit courts affirmed the decisions of the Commission. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The MTA and the County each filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari in both cases and consolidated them in this opinion to address the question of whether the SIF assessment under section 9-806 should be calculated based on the amount of an award prior to the statutory offsets granted by Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-610 and 9-503(e). The Court answered the question in the affirmative and affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals. View "Injured Workers' Ins. Fund v. Subsequent Injury Fund" on Justia Law

Prince George’s County terminated the employment of Marlon Ford, a member of the County Police Civilian Employees Association, after a criminal investigation during which Ford was questioned regarding alleged crimes. The Association filed a grievance on Ford’s behalf. An arbitrator vacated the termination of Ford’s employment, determining that the County had violated a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the County and the Association because officers of the county police department failed to advise Ford of his right to have a representative from the Association present during the criminal investigative interview. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the arbitration award. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) under the County’s code, the County lacked the authority to enter into a CBA that requires a Weingarten advisement before a criminal investigative interview of one of the County’s police civilian employees; and (2) therefore, the arbitrator the arbitrator exceeded his authority by basing the arbitration award on the determination that the County violated the CBA because its police officers failed to make a Weingarten advisement. View "Police Civ. Empl. Ass'n. v. Prince George's Co." on Justia Law

Respondent was charged with second-degree assault and drug offenses. Respondent and defense counsel, a public defender, later appeared for a motions hearing, and defense counsel moved for a postponement, indicating that Respondent wished to obtain a postponement to hire private counsel that Respondent had retained in the past. The district court denied the request to postpone the motions hearing and denied Respondent’s request to replace his counsel. A jury subsequently found Respondent guilty. Respondent appealed, arguing that the circuit court failed to comply with Md. Rule 4-215(e) by never asking him why he wished to replace his counsel. The Court of Special Appeals agreed, concluding that defense counsel’s request for a postponement required that the circuit court permit Respondent to explain the reasons for the request and that this requirement was not satisfied at the motions hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under the circumstances of this case, Rule 4-215(e) required that the circuit court seek an explanation for the request to discharge counsel from Defendant or ensure that Defendant agreed with the reasons proffered by defense counsel. View "State v. Graves" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of child abuse, second degree rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest. As charged, any of the three sexual offenses could have provided the basis for the child abuse conviction. The court imposed consecutive sentences for rape, third degree sexual offense, and incest, and a suspended sentence for child abuse, for a total of forty years’ incarceration. At issue on appeal was whether all, or only one, of the sexual offenses merge for sentencing purposes with the sentence for child abuse and whether Maryland law permits a remand to afford the trial court the opportunity to consider resentencing on the child abuse conviction. The Court of Special Appeals concluded that Petitioner was entitled to have all three sexual offenses vacated and that the case may be remanded to the trial court for resentencing on Petitioner’s sexual child abuse conviction. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) only the sentence Petitioner received for second degree rape must be vacated, by application of State v. Johnson; and (2) Maryland Rule 8-604(d) authorizes a remand for a new sentence hearing at which the sentencing court has the discretion to resentence Petitioner to a term of active incarceration on the child abuse conviction. View "Twigg v. State" on Justia Law

Moran Perry was injured when he was struck by a dump truck operated by William Johnson and owned by Higher Power Trucking, LLC. Asphalt Concrete Services, Inc. (ACS) had hired High Power to perform services at the time of the accident. Perry filed suit against Higher Power, Johnson, and ACS, alleging negligence and negligent hiring. ACS sought to exclude evidence that Johnson had a suspended license and that the truck was uninsured at the time of the accident. The circuit court allowed into evidence witness testimony regarding Johnson’s lack of liability insurance coverage at the time of the accident. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Perry. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in admitting evidence of Johnson’s lack of insurance. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court’s admission into evidence of irrelevant evidence of lack of insurance was error, and the admission of this evidence prejudiced the jury’s verdict. Remanded for a new trial. View "Perry v. Asphalt & Concrete Servs., Inc." on Justia Law

Maryland Underground Damage Prevention Authority cited Reliable Contracting Company for violating Md. Code Ann. Pub. Util. Cos. 12-101, under which advance notice must be given to the one-call system of certain types of excavation, and imposed a civil monetary penalty. Reliable Contracting petitioned for judicial review, asserting that the Authority’s enabling statute conferred judicial power on a non-judicial body in violation of separation of powers principles. Reliable Contracting also contended that the statute failed to provide adequate guidance to the Authority for the assessment of such penalties. The circuit court upheld the constitutionality of the statute. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals and remanded, holding (1) the Authority is an administrative agency in the executive branch of State government that exercises quasi-judicial powers subject to judicial review, and therefore, its enabling law is not contrary to the State Constitution’s Judicial Vesting Clause or Separation of Powers Clause; and (2) because the Authority is an administrative agency, Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-1001 provides guidelines for the exercise of its discretion in assessing civil penalties. View "Reliable Contracting Co. v. Underground Facilities Damage Prevention Auth." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Defendant was convicted of child sexual abuse, third-degree sex offense, and second-degree sex offense. Defendant appealed, asserting that the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress a recorded telephone conversation with the victim during which Defendant made multiple incriminating statements. The Court of Special Appeals upheld the circuit court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress, concluding that the victim, a West Virginia resident, was sufficiently supervised by a Maryland law enforcement officer so as to make the recording a permissible interception under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CP) 10-402(c)(2). CP 10-402(c)(2) provides an exception to the Maryland Wiretapping and Electronic Surveillance Act’s general prohibition on the interception of wire, oral, and electronic communications. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court erred in admitting the taped telephone call between the victim and Defendant because the victim was not acting “under the supervision of an investigative or law enforcement officer” as required by CP 10-402(c)(2) where the officer simply set up the recording equipment, instructed the victim on how handle the equipment, and gave the victim the equipment to conduct the recording on his own in West Virginia. View "Seal v. State" on Justia Law