Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder and sentenced to life imprisonment. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. Two issues were presented in this appeal, first, whether Petitioner’s statement, “I don’t want to say nothing. I don’t know” was an ambiguous or clear invocation of his right to remain silent under Miranda, and second, whether Petitioner’s confession, given after he waived his Miranda rights, was voluntary or the product of inducement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioner’s statement, “I don’t want to say nothing. I don’t know” was an ambiguous invocation of his right to remain silent; and (2) Petitioner’s confession was voluntary. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with theft of property with a value of at least $500 and embezzlement. The charges arose from Petitioner’s removal of funds from a multiple-party bank account, to which Petitioner and her father were parties, to use for her own benefit without her father’s permission. After a bench trial, the circuit court found Petitioner guilty. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for theft, as an individual can commit theft from a joint or multiple-party bank account to which the individual is a party under certain circumstances; and (2) the evidence was sufficient to support a conviction for embezzlement. View "Wagner v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was terminated from her position as the Clerk-Treasurer of the Town of Hurlock two and one-half years after she entered into a written employment agreement with the Mayor-elect. Under the employment agreement, Petitioner was to serve a four-year term. Petitioner brought this action against Respondent, the Town, alleging breach of contract and seeking damages and other relief. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, concluding that the four-year term of employment in the agreement was inconsistent with the Town Charter and therefore ineffective. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the language of the Town Charter means that an official like the Clerk-Treasurer is an at-will employee; and (2) the Mayor and Council of Hurlock lacked authority under the Town Charter to enter into an agreement conferring a fixed term of employment in this case. View "Clough v. Mayor & Council of Hurlock" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner pleaded guilty to a drug offense. In 2012, after being subject to sentencing as an armed career criminal, Petitioner filed a petition for coram nobis relief, contending that he pleaded guilty to an offense other than possession of heroin with intent to distribute, which was one of the predicate offenses to be used for his enhanced sentence. The State filed a response to the coram nobis petition, asserting that the doctrine of laches barred Petitioner from seeking coram nobis relief. After a hearing, the circuit court granted the coram nobis petition. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the doctrine of laches barred the coram nobis petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the doctrine of laches may bar the right to seek coram nobis relief; and (2) the doctrine of laches barred Petitioner’s right to seek coram nobis relief in this case. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

In 1999, Petitioner was charged with, among other crimes, three counts of first degree assault. In 2000, the circuit court determined that Petitioner was incompetent and ordered that he be committed. In 2004, Petitioner was found competent to stand trial. Petitioner pled not guilty to the charges of second degree assault. Petitioner was found guilty. The circuit court determined vacated Petitioner’s sentence and ordered a new trial, concluding that Petitioner’s counsel provided ineffective assistance because he had not advised Petitioner of the immigration consequences of his assault conviction. After a retrial, the jury found Petitioner guilty of two counts of first-degree assault and two counts of second-degree assault, among related crimes. Petitioner was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court erred in failing to determine, prior to trial, that he was competent to stand trial and erred in finding at sentencing that he was competent to stand trial. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc.. 3-104, the trial court was required to make a determination upon retrial whether Petitioner was competent to stand trial and therefore clearly erred in determining at sentencing that Petitioner was competent. View "Sibug v. State" on Justia Law

Respondent had his vehicle serviced at Russel Collision and was billed for the repairs. Jeremy Martin, Russel Collision’s manager, later signed a “Notice of Sale of Motor Vehicle to Satisfy a Lien” for Respondent’s vehicle. The notice listed the “cost of process” at $1,000, which was the amount to which Russel Collision and Allstate Lien agreed they were entitled to keep Respondent’s car and sell it unless Respondent paid the costs related to the future sale of the car. Respondent’s vehicle was eventually sold at auction. Respondent filed suit against Russel Collision, Martin, and Allstate Lien, alleging that Md. Code Ann. Com. Law ("CL") 16-202(c), which provided Russel Collision a lien for Respondent’s vehicle, does not permit lien recovery costs of $1,000 as fees prior to the sale of the car. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that, under CL 16-202(c), a motor vehicle lien does not encompass “cost of process” fees and that such fees should not be included in the amount the customer must pay to redeem the vehicle. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a garagemen’s lien does not encompass lien enforcement costs or expenses or cost of process fees prior to sale should the owner attempt to redeem the vehicle before sale. View "Allstate Lien & Recovery Corp. v. Stansbury" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed suit against Respondents in the circuit court, alleging tort and contract claims. Petitioner served the opposing parties with its complaint along with a completed Case Information Report (CIR). Petitioner checked the “yes” in the Jury Demand section of the CIR but filed no other pleadings or papers in the case asserting the right to a trial by jury. Defendants moved to confirm a bench trial, arguing that the manner in which the alleged jury demand had been elected by reference was procedurally defective. The motions judge granted the motion, concluding that a completed CIR is neither a “pleading” nor separate “paper” within the meaning of Maryland Rule 2-325(a), and therefore, Petitioner’s right to trial by jury had been waived because Petitioner did not comply with the Rule. The case proceeded to a bench trial, and a final judgment was entered in favor of Respondents. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a CIR, whether served or unserved, does not constitute a separate “paper” within the meaning of Rule 2-325, and therefore, Petitioner’s failure to comply with the Rule resulted in a waiver of the right to a jury trial. View "Lisy Corp. v. McCormick & Co." on Justia Law

In 1996, Appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder and related offenses. In 2008, Appellant filed a petition for post-conviction DNA testing pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. (CP) 8-201, alleging that socks he had allegedly worn at the time of the murders that the State introduced into evidence at trial lacked his DNA. The State responded with documentation that the socks were destroyed along with other items seized in the case after Appellant’s conviction had been affirmed on direct appeal. In 2011, the circuit court closed the case. In 2013, Appellant sought to reopen the proceedings pursuant to CP 8-201, alleging that the State had improperly destroyed the socks. The pro bono counsel that had assisted Appellant in the earlier proceedings under CP 8-201 moved to strike their appearance. The circuit court granted counsels’ motion, denied Appellant’s request for new court-appointed counsel, and denied Appellant’s request to conduct further proceedings under CP 8-201. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it (1) granted the motion of Appellant’s pro bono counsel to strike their appearance; (2) declined to appoint new counsel for Appellant; and (3) declined to order relief under CP 8-201. View "Simms v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, through his mother, filed this negligence suit against the landlord and owners (collectively, Respondents) of a rental dwelling where Petitioner had resided with his mother for alleged personal injuries resulting from lead-based paint poisoning. Petitioner identified two expert witnesses to testify both as to the source of his lead exposure, but only one of them as to the medical causation of the injuries suffered by Petitioner. Respondents filed a motion to exclude Petitioner’s experts and a companion motion for summary judgment. The circuit court granted Respondents’ motion for summary judgment, finding that Petitioner’s medical expert was not qualified to provide an expert opinion as to source of lead exposure or to medical causation, and that without the testimony of the medical expert, there was no dispute of material fact and Respondent was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the medical expert was competent to testify as a medical causation expert; and (2) with the presence of the second expert to speak to the source of lead, it was improper for the circuit court to grant summary judgment when it did. View "Roy v. Dackman" on Justia Law

Appellees’ farm was condemned by the Board of Education for the purpose of building a school. On Appellees’ behalf, the Board paid the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. Appellees requested from the County a refund of a portion of the County farmland transfer tax, arguing that the County, in calculating the County farmland transfer tax, was incorrect in concluding that the twenty-five percent State surcharge was not part of the combined transfer tax. The County denied the request for a refund. The Tax Court affirmed, concluding that the State surcharge was to be collected in addition to the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Special Appeals certified the case to the Court of Appeals to answer a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered (1) the agricultural land transfer tax, as set forth in Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-407(a)(2) and (3), includes the State surcharge imposed under Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-303(d), and the State surcharge must be calculated into the tax ceiling on a county’s agricultural land transfer tax; and (2) therefore, Appellees were entitled to a refund in the amount of the overcharge of the County farmland transfer tax. View "Montgomery County v. Phillips" on Justia Law