Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

American Sedan Services, Inc. is a commercial transportation service that has a permit from Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA) to provide ground transportation services at the Baltimore Washington International Thurgood Marshall Airport (BWI). Vadim Roshchin, who was employed as a driver by American Sedan, was picking up passengers at BWI without displaying the permit as required by an MAA regulation when Maryland Transportation Authority (MdTA) police arrested him and impounded the American Sedan. Roshchin and American Sedan sued MAA, MdTA, the MdTA police, and the State, alleging, among other claims, false arrest and false imprisonment. The circuit court granted summary judgment for the State on all counts. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that there was no legal justification for the arrest of Roshchin. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the regulation requiring commercial transportation services to display permits was not required to be posted at the airport as a prerequisite to its enforcement; and (2) there was legal justification for the arrest, as nothing in the MAA regulation or the Transportation Article deprives a police officer of the general authority to arrest an individual who commits a misdemeanor in the presence of the officer. View "State v. Roshchin" on Justia Law

Petitioner operated a lake-front recreational campground on her property in Caroline County. The lake was contaminated allegedly by run-off from failed septic systems serving homes and businesses in the Town of Goldsboro. Unable to operate the campground because of the pollution to the lake, Petitioner lost the property through foreclosure. Petitioner filed a complaint for Caroline County against the State and several of its entities, alleging inverse condemnation against all Respondents and trespass against the Town. The circuit court dismissed the complaint as to all Respondents. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court remanded, concluding that the court of special appeals erred in affirming the dismissal of Petitioner’s causes of action for negligence, trespass, and inverse condemnation on the grounds of limitations. On remand, the court of special appeals concluded that the circuit court properly dismissed the State and its agencies but erred in dismissing the three claims against the Town. The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding that Petitioner adequately alleged a facial claim for inverse condemnation against all Respondents and that a claim for inverse condemnation is not covered by the notice provisions of either the Local Government Tort Claims Act or the Maryland Tort Claims Act. View "Litz v. Dep’t of Env’t" on Justia Law

Respondent was stopped for failure to securely fasten a registration plate and was arrested after a police officer observed signs of impairment. Respondent agreed to take an alcohol concentration test, which he passed, but Respondent refused to take a blood test for drugs or controlled dangerous substances. The officer subsequently confiscated Respondent’s driver’s license and served an order of suspension on Respondent. An administrative law judge determined that Respondent violated Md. Code Ann., Transp. (“TR”) 16-205.1 by refusing to take the drug test and ordered that Respondent’s driver’s license be suspended. The circuit court reversed, holding that, once Respondent passed the alcohol concentration test, he was not required to submit to a blood test to avoid suspension. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) under TR 16-205.1(b)(2) and (3), a law enforcement officer with reasonable grounds to suspect that a driver was driving while impaired by drugs may request that the driver take both an alcohol concentration test and a drug test; and (2) the driver is subject to an automatic license suspension for refusing to take the drug test. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gonce" on Justia Law

The Capital Crescent Trail, a hiker/biker route, runs between Georgetown in the District of Columbia and Silver Spring, Maryland. Its path was formerly used as a railroad. When the trains stopped running, the property was transferred to Montgomery County, Maryland via a quit-claim deed. The County planned to develop within the former rail line (and current hiker/biker trail) a commuter light rail project. The predecessors in interest to a private landowner adjacent to the rail line had previously erected a fence and installed a shed that encroached for more than twenty years upon the railroad right-of-way. The landowner argued that he owned the encroached-upon land by adverse possession. The circuit court ultimately concluded that the landowner had a creditable claim for adverse possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence in the record did not establish that the current use of the right-of-way by Montgomery County was unreasonable or that the Railroad or the County abandoned the right-of-way, and therefore, the landowner had no claim for adverse possession. View "Montgomery County v. Bhatt" on Justia Law

Respondent, on her own behalf and as the personal representative of the estate of her deceased son, brought a wrongful death suit against Petitioner, a Baltimore City police officer, alleging negligence and gross negligence, among other causes of action. Petitioner sought both compensatory and punitive damages. The circuit court granted Petitioner’s motion for judgment in part, allowing only the question of whether Respondent was negligent and what amount of compensatory damages should be awarded. The jury returned a verdict for compensatory damages for Respondent, which amount was reduced by the trial judge to comply with the damages cap of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The court of special appeals reversed and remanded for a new trial, concluding that there was sufficient evidence for each of Petitioner’s claims to have been submitted to the jury, that Petitioner’s claims could qualify as predicates for punitive damages, and that the LGTCA cap applied. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) there was sufficient evidence as to the counts for which the trial court gave judgment in favor of Respondent and on the LGTCA question; but (2) Respondent was not entitled to punitive damages, and therefore, a new trial was not warranted. View "Beall v. Holloway-Johnson" on Justia Law

Mother took her child to health providers on several occasions after complained that her father had hurt her. The child also exhibited vaginal redness. The Department of Human Resources notified Mother that it found her responsible for indicated child abuse mental injury. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) affirmed the Department’s finding of indicated child abuse mental injury and found that Mother could be placed on the central registry maintained by the Department. The circuit court affirmed the ALJ’s decision. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding, in relevant part, that the ALJ did not err by failing to include scienter as an element of indicated child abuse mental injury. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that a parent can only be identified on a central registry as responsible for child abuse if the parent intended to injure the child or acted with reckless disregard of the child’s welfare. View "McClanahan v. Washington County Dep’t of Soc. Servs." on Justia Law

Defendants Matthew Meyer and Helen Rivera were placed on probationary terms and, as a special condition of probation, prohibited from operating a motor vehicle. The circuit court denied Meyer’s motion to correct and illegal sentence, concluding that Meyer’s sentence was not illegal. In Rivera’s case, the court of special appeals held that Rivera’s no-driving condition of probation violated the separation of powers doctrine. The State filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Court of Appeals in both cases. The Court consolidated the cases to address the common questions of law and fact and held (1) Sheppard v. State, which prohibits a court from restricting a defendant’s driving privileges as a condition of probation under certain circumstances, was wrongly decided and is thus overruled; and (2) in Meyer, the circuit court properly denied the defendant’s motion to correct an illegal sentence, and in Rivera, the court of appeals’ judgment holding that the no-driving condition of probation violated the separation of powers doctrine is reversed. View "Meyer v. State" on Justia Law

A local public school superintendent decided to terminate a school nurse, who was a “noncertificated” employee. The school nurse challenged her termination by way of a grievance process set forth in a collective bargaining agreement (CBA) between the school board and a union. The superintendent denied the grievance, asserting that the termination was an illegal subject of collective bargaining. The union, on behalf of the school nurse, made a demand for arbitration. The school board filed a motion for injunctive relief seeking to enjoin the arbitration. The Maryland State Board of Education (State Board) and the Public School Labor Relations Board (PSLRB) both issued opinions in the matter. The circuit court affirmed the decision of the State Board, which concluded that the binding arbitration provision of the CBA was illegal, and reversed the decision of the PSLRB, which came to the opposite conclusion. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the PSLRB was the entity with the jurisdiction to resolve the dispute. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the termination of a noncertificated employee is a proper subject of binding arbitration pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement. View "Bd. of Educ. v. Howard County Educ. Ass'n" on Justia Law

Dustin R., who was born in 1992, has lived in a foster home since 1995. Guardianship was granted to the Department of Social Services. Dustin is medically fragile and has special needs. In 2010, Dustin began to seek the provision of services for himself after age twenty-one. In 2013, the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene (DHMH) consented to co-commitment. The parties, however, continued to debate Dustin’s request that services continue after his twenty-first birthday after the guardianship terminates. The juvenile court ordered DHMH to continue to provide services to Dustin after the age of twenty-one. DHMH appealed. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed the appeal, concluding that the juvenile court’s order was not a final, appealable order. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the juvenile court’s order is appealable as an interlocutory order granting an injunction; (2) the juvenile court had jurisdiction and statutory authority to order DHMH to enter into a plan to obtain “life-sustaining services” for Dustin to continue after he reached age twenty-one; and (3) the juvenile court did not violate the separation of powers in the instant case. View "In re Adoption/Guardianship of Dustin R." on Justia Law

Respondents manufactured steam pumps that were sold to the United States Navy. Although Respondents’ pumps contained asbestos gaskets and packing when they were delivered to the Navy, Respondents’ manuals did not contain any warnings regarding the danger of inhaling asbestos dust or directions to wear protective gear. Petitioner was the widow of a machinist mate who served on active duty in the Navy from 1956 until 1976. Petitioner’s husband was only exposed to asbestos after other Navy mechanics, who performed maintenance on Respondents’ pumps, replaced Respondents’ gaskets and packing with new components also containing asbestos that were acquired from third parties. Petitioner filed suit against Respondents, alleging negligence. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Respondents, concluding that Respondents had no duty to warn of the dangers of the asbestos-containing replacement parts that they neither manufactured nor placed into the stream of commerce. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) summary judgment on Petitioner’s negligent failure to warn claims was inappropriate; and (2) Petitioner supplied sufficient evidence to survive Respondents’ motion for summary judgment on her strict liability claim. View "May v. Air & Liquid Systems Corp." on Justia Law