Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Department of Public Safety and Correctional Services (DPSCS) sent Laura Hughes a notice of termination from her position with the agency. Hughes followed the directions for invoking the first tier of the administrative appeal process. The Secretary of DPSCS did not respond within the statutory time limit, thus denying Hughes first-tier appeal. Hughes was unaware that this silent denial triggered the limited time for her to invoke a second-tier appeal, and therefore she did nothing before the deadline passed. Hughes belatedly attempted to pursue her administrative appeal, but DPSCS did not respond. Hughes then commenced this mandamus action in the circuit court. The circuit court dismissed the mandamus action. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, in order to discharge its responsibility to provide a disciplined employee with notice of the employee’s administrative appeal rights, an agency must advise the employee of the possibility of a second-tier appeal and alert the employee as to the significance of silence in response to a first-tier appeal. Remanded for consideration whether Hughes should be afforded the opportunity to pursue a second-tier appeal. View "Hughes v. Moyer" on Justia Law

Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission (the Commission) contracted with Fort Myer Construction Corporation to build a pedestrian bridge. After disputes arose, Fort Myer sued the Commission. The Commission impleaded URS Corporation (URS), the engineering firm that created the design documents. The circuit court eventually dismissed Fort Myer’s original complaint, but the claims between URS and the Commission went to trial. Both parties asked the court to award monetary sanctions against Fort Myer on the basis that Fort Myer had litigated its original complaint “without substantial justification.” The circuit court did so. All three parties appealed. The Court of Special Appeals reversed the circuit court’s sanctions awards. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the intermediate appellate court properly exercised its jurisdiction to decide Fort Myer’s appeal; and (2) as for the sanctions awards against Fort Myer, the circuit court’s explanation of its reasoning did not support a finding that Fort Myer’s pursuit of its claim was “without substantial justification.” View "URS Corp. v. Fort Myer Construction Corp." on Justia Law

Respondent was acquitted in a jury trial of first-degree murder premeditated murder, second-degree specific intent murder, and other charges. Thereafter, the State sought to prosecute Respondent for second-degree felony murder predicated on first-degree assault. Respondent interposed a plea of double jeopardy, which was denied. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that a subsequent trial for felony murder based upon first-degree assault was barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. The Court of Appeals affirmed but on different grounds, holding that first-degree assault may not serve as a predicate for second-degree felony murder when that assault is not collateral to the lethal act. In so holding, the Court overruled Roary v. State, which was the foundation and predicate for the State’s charge for second-degree felony murder based on first-degree assault. View "State v. Jones" on Justia Law

After an investigation, the Commission on Judicial Disabilities found by clear and convincing evidence that Judge Pamela J. White had committed sanctionable conduct and that a public reprimand was the appropriate disposition under the circumstances. Judge white filed with the Court of Appeals an appeal and, in the alternative, a petition for writ of certiorari, seeking to have the Court review whether the Commission had denied her procedural due process and whether the Commission had erred in finding sanctionable conduct and reprimanding her. The Commission filed a motion to dismiss. The Court ordered that the matter be set for a show cause hearing for the limited purpose of addressing whether the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction to decide whether Judge White was denied procedural due process during the Commission proceedings. The Court of Appeals entered an order holding (1) this Court has authority to consider Judge White’s arguments as to whether the Commission proceeding accorded her with the due process required by the State Constitution and the Maryland Rules; but (2) the Court was not able at this time to conduct that review. View "In re Judge Pamela J. White" on Justia Law

The City of Baltimore contracted with Engineer to design upgrades to a wastewater treatment plant. Contractor successfully bid for work on the construction project. During construction, Contractor encountered leaking and other problems, resulting in delays and cost overruns. Contractor subsequently filed a complaint against Engineer, arguing that Engineer owed it a tort duty of care because Engineer knew that Contractor would rely on its designs in bidding and constructing the project. The circuit court granted Engineer’s motion to dismiss due to lack of privity between Contractor and Engineer. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the economic loss doctrine barred Contractor’s negligence and negligent misrepresentation claims; and (2) privity equivalent concepts of extra-contractual duty did not apply in Contractor’s case. View "Balfour Beatty Infrastructure, Inc. v. Rummel Klepper & Kahl, LLP" on Justia Law

The Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City (the Liquor Board) found that Steven Kougl and his company, Kougl, Inc., violated three Rules and Regulations for the Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City when Kougl’s employee solicited prostitution and exposed her breasts. The Liquor Board imposed a thirty-day suspension of Kougl’s liquor license. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding (1) the Rules require actual or constructive knowledge on the part of the licensee, and (2) therefore, Kougl did not violate the Rules at issue because his employee acted improperly without his knowledge. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the Rules impose strict liability on licensees for offending conduct that occurs on their premises, and (2) therefore, the Liquor Board was not required to show that Kougl knew or should have known about his employee’s actions to find that he violated the Rules. View "Board of Liquor License Commissioners for Baltimore City v. Kougl" on Justia Law

Ian Schlakman and Frank Richardson (Appellees) filed suit challenging the decisions of the Baltimore City Board of Elections to certify Dan Sparaco as an eligible candidate and the State Board of Elections to include him as a candidate for the District Twelve seat on the 2016 General Election ballot. The court held that the temporary restraining order the Circuit Court granted was in error because Appellees’ state court challenges to the Boards’ actions were untimely and are barred by laches; Appellees have not explained this delay, or explained why they did not institute a parallel action in the Circuit Court within the statutorily-mandated time limits; where the federal court dismissed Appellees’ action because Appellee’s counsel was not admitted to practice before that court, the savings provision under Maryland Rule 2-101(b) did not apply to toll Appellees’ obligation to file in the appropriate circuit court, as instructed by ELEC. LAW 12-202(b)(1); and Appellees have not demonstrated any basis for relief on the merits under any theory of action or avenue for relief. The court explained that the plain language of ELEC. LAW 5-703(d)(1) does not require candidates to submit the required filings until the first Monday in August preceding the General Election. In this case, the City Board’s certification of Mr. Sparaco as a qualified candidate, and the State Board’s listing of his candidacy, complied with the provisions of the Election Law Article. Accordingly, the court vacated the temporary restraining order and remanded. View "Lamone v. Schlakman" on Justia Law

This case related to three actions: (1) an Endangered Species Act case (ESA case), where the Fund for Animals, Inc. (FFA) and other plaintiffs sued Ringling Brothers and its owner, Feld Entertainment, (collectively, Feld) for the mistreatment of Asian elephants in the Ringling Brothers’ Circus; (2) the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act case (RICO case), where Feld sued FFA and the other plaintiffs in the ESA case for improper conduct; and (3) the coverage case, where FFA sued its insurer (National Union) for not providing coverage to FFA when it was sued by Feld in the RICO case. The findings in the ESA case were adverse to FFA and could have been used against it in the RICO case, thus prejudicing National Union. In this appeal stemming from the coverage dispute, FFA argued that although notice of the RICO claim was late under the policy, the late notification was not prejudicial to National Union. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of National Union. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that National Union was not prejudiced in investigating, settling, or defending the RICO claim as a result of any delay in receiving notice of claims brought by FFA. View "National Union Fire Insurance Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Fund for Animals, Inc." on Justia Law

Kor-Ko, Ltd. sought to overturn the Maryland Department of the Environment’s (MDE) grant of a construction permit to Maryland Crematory, LLC (MC) to operate a crematorium in the same commercial park building containing Kor-Ko’s business operations. Kor-Ko argued that the MDE failed to adequately consider the health of people within the park due to the emissions to the air from the operation of the crematorium. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the MDE’s issuance of the permit. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the MDE’s issuance of the permit to construct MC’s incinerator was permissible because (1) the MDE’s interpretation of “premises” as extending to the property line of the commercial park was free of legal error; and (2) the MDE’s application of the term vis-a-vis allowing the modeling of toxins at the property line was not arbitrary or capricious. View "Kor-Ko Ltd. v. Department of Environment" on Justia Law

Applicants applied for a petition for a special exception in the Baltimore County Zoning Regulations to operate a fuel service station with a convenience store. At a hearing conducted by the Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), several petitioners (collectively, Protestants) attended in opposition of the grant of the special exception. The OAH granted the petition with conditions. After a de novo evidentiary hearing, the Board of Appeals for Baltimore County approved the conditions for the special exception. The circuit court affirmed the Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board’s description of the neighborhood impacted by the special exception was precise enough to enable a party or appellate court to comprehend the area that the Board considered; and (2) the Board correctly determined that the Protestants failed sufficiently to rebut the presumption of validity of a special exception. View "Attar v. DMS Tollgate, LLC" on Justia Law