Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, Petitioner was convicted of neglect of a minor. Petitioner was sentenced to twenty days’ incarceration. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to address the questions of whether Md. Code Ann. Crim. Law 3-602.1, the criminal neglect of a minor statute, was unconstitutionally vague and whether the evidence was sufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence presented at trial was insufficient to support Petitioner’s conviction for criminal child neglect. Remanded with directions to reverse the judgment of the circuit court. View "Hall v. State" on Justia Law

In 2003, Petitioner entered an Alford plea to second degree rape. Thereafter, Petitioner filed several motions for DNA testing. In 2005, the petition was granted, but the results of the testing yielded inconclusive results. In 2015, Petitioner filed a petition for DNA testing alleging that that testing a piece of underwear and additional material collected on laboratory microscope slides would produce exculpatory or mitigating evidence. The circuit court denied the petition pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 8-201. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that none of Petitioner’s assertions in his 2015 petition would have produced evidence which would have exculpated him of second degree rape under the standard of section 8-201(c), and therefore, the circuit court did not err in denying the petition. View "Jackson v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner, the assignee of an entity that paid certain sewer connection charges, sought a refund of the charges, asserting that they were improperly charged by the Town of Bel Air. The Town’s Director of Finance denied Petitioner’s refund application. On appeal, the Tax Court granted the Town’s motion to dismiss, concluding (1) it lacked jurisdiction to consider Petitioner’s refund claim because it did not come within the purview of the refund statute, and (2) even if the sewer connection charges were miscalculated or illegally imposed the common law voluntary payment doctrine precluded Petitioner from obtaining a refund. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) Petitioner may pursue its refund claim under the refund statute; (2) Petitioner’s claim is not barred by the voluntary payment doctrine; and (3) the Tax Court has jurisdiction to consider the appeal. View "Brutus 630, LLC v. Town of Bel Air" on Justia Law

Under the Workers’ Compensation Act (Act), the amount of compensation due to a “covered employee” - which may include a sole proprietor - who has a “permanent total disability resulting from an accidental personal injury” is based on the employee’s “average weekly wage” (AWW). At issue in this case was how to calculate the AWW of a sole proprietor who elects coverage for an accident personal injury under the Act. Petitioner, a self-employed sole proprietor who elected to obtain workers’ compensation coverage as a covered employee, was injured while working as a subcontractor. The Workers’ Compensation Commission issued an award of compensation, but the parties disputed the amount of compensation due. The Commission ultimately calculated Petitioner’s AWW based on his net profit rather than his gross receipts. The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the AWW of a sole proprietor who elects coverage under the Act is calculated based on the sole proprietorship’s net profit, not on the sole proprietorship’s gross receipts or gross income. View "Long v. Injured Workers' Ins. Fund" on Justia Law

Petitioner filed a complaint against the State of Maryland alleging negligence and malfeasance of an unspecified clerk of the district court. Specifically, Petitioner alleged that she was injured as the direct and proximate result of the issuance of a body attachment. The State filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground of absolute judicial immunity. The circuit court denied the motion, questioning whether the clerk was acting at the direction or under the supervision of a judge in generating the body attachment. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the issuance of arrest warrants is a judicial act. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner’s claims were barred by absolute judicial immunity because the clerk’s role in transmitting the application for a body attachment to the judge for signature was not the proximate cause of Petitioner’s wrongful arrest, but, rather, the judge’s act of signing the body attachment caused Petitioner’s injury. View "Keller-Bee v. State" on Justia Law

Adkins started working at PRMC in 2005, delivering and organizing supplies. In April 2011, Adkins went to PRMC’s emergency room after experiencing pain. Adkins was diagnosed with a tear in the joint of her hip and a deformation in her hip socket. She scheduled surgery and completed paperwork under the Family and Medical Leave Act, 29 U.S.C. 2612, stating that she would return to work in October 2011. PRMC approved Adkins’s leave, explaining that her 12-week FMLA leave would expire on November 17, 2011, After surgery, Adkins’s pain intensified. Doctors advised that recovery could take up to a year. On November 7, 2011, Adkins returned to work, stating that she was still in pain and would be unable to fulfill her job responsibilities that day. An “Employee Charting Note” states that “[a]ll parties” agreed that Adkins could not return to work; that Adkins had “been educated on FMLA and to start looking at job postings,” and that Adkins reported having applied for a position. PRMC granted a 14-week extension, after which Adkins was terminated. Adkins unsuccessfully applied to positions. The trial court rejected her suit under the Maryland Fair Employment Practices Act, Code 20-601 on summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, finding disputes of material fact with respect to whether: Adkins was qualified to perform the essential functions of a specific job with or without a reasonable accommodation, and whether Adkins was terminated because of her disability. View "Peninsula Regional Med. Ctr. v. Adkins" on Justia Law

In cases consolidated for this appeal, defendants were found guilty but not criminally responsible at the time of the commission of the offense and were committed to the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene. The court granted conditional releases on various occasions but each conditional release was subsequently revoked, resulting in recommitment to DHMH for treatment. The Maryland Court of Appeal held that the Circuit Court erred in determining that the statutory scheme, Criminal Procedure Article 3-114, for granting or revocation of the conditional release of a committed person violated the separation of powers provision found in Article 8 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The court also erred in revoking defendant’s conditional release and ordering his continued commitment for institutional inpatient care and treatment after the ALJ had found that defendant was eligible for conditional release and had recommended the same. The court held that under CP 3-114 the substantial evidence standard applies to a circuit court’s review of an ALJ’s findings of facts and recommendations. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

The Maryland Critical Area law establishes a cooperative program with local jurisdictions to ensure that land near Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic coastal bays has special protection against development that might cause environmental damage. Although the law allows a property owner to seek a variance, it places the burden of proof on the applicant to demonstrate that the applicant would suffer an “unwarranted hardship” without the variance and that granting the variance will not have an adverse environmental impact. Schwalbach sought a variance from a Worcester County ordinance that limits piers to 100 feet in length, in order to access navigable water from his waterfront property in a community where piers and boating are common. Schwalbach obtained necessary federal, state, and local environmental agency approvals. The County Board of Zoning Appeals granted the variance. The Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals, and the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the approval.Schwalbach was not required to show that he would be denied all reasonable and significant use of his land without the variance, but rather that he would be denied a reasonable and significant use throughout the entire property. There was sufficient evidence to conclude that Schwalbach satisfied that standard and the standard that there be no adverse environmental impact from granting the variance. View "Assateague Coastal Trust v. Schwalbach" on Justia Law

The Advice of Rights form assists law enforcement officers with making the advisements that are required by Md. Code, Transp. 16-205.1,2, (the implied consent, administrative per se law), which provides a basis for the automatic suspension of the licenses of drivers who refuse to submit to testing for alcohol and drugs. Seenath, a holder of a commercial driver’s license, argued that the Advice form violated due process under the U.S. Constitution and the Maryland Declaration of Rights because it does not advise that a holder of a commercial driver’s license who drives a non-commercial motor vehicle and fails an alcohol concentration test is ineligible for a “restrictive license,” which allows a driver to drive only for certain purposes, for example, in the course of employment. The Motor Vehicle Administration asked the Maryland Court of Appeal: “Does the standard Advice of Rights form (DR-15) provide the necessary information to a driver who holds a commercial driver’s license of the consequences of submitting to a test of blood alcohol content if the driver’s results are 0.08 or more?” That court responded “yes,” and held that the form is not misleading as to the eligibility for a restrictive license of a holder of a commercial driver’s license and comports with due process. View "Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Seenath" on Justia Law

Cambridge Police Officer Mothersell stopped petitioner at 1:00 a.m. after observing him speeding and failing to stop at a stop sign. Mothersell – the only witness at the suppression hearing – said that, when he approached the passenger side of the vehicle, he detected a minor odor of alcohol coming from petitioner’s breath and person, even though petitioner was several feet away, in the driver’s seat. Mothersell observed that petitioner’s speech was slurred and hard to understand and that his eyes were bloodshot and glassy. Petitioner said that he had been at the Point Break bar. Mothersell had petitioner exit the car so he could perform field sobriety tests, which petitioner did not complete successfully. Petitioner was placed under arrest. A backup officer arrived. Mothersell placed petitioner in the rear seat of his squad car to advise him of his rights, while the backup officer searched petitioner's car and found the cocaine inside the front seat center armrest. Mothersell said that the sole purpose for the search was to locate any “other alcohol, open containers, anything pertaining to the DUI arrest.” The court denied a motion to suppress; the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the ensuing conviction. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. In this case there was an articulable basis for suspicion: the arresting officer’s prior experiences of finding open containers inside the passenger compartment. View "Taylor v. State" on Justia Law