Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Christian was born in 1990. Until October 1992, he resided on Spaulding Avenue in Baltimore. Christian and his mother then moved to Denmore. In September 1993, they moved back to Spaulding and lived there until September 1997. In 1991, Christian's blood test exhibited an elevated free erythrocyte protoporphyrin level. From 1992-1993, Christian displayed elevated blood lead levels five times. In 2011, Christian sued Levitas, the owner of Spaulding, alleging negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Arc Environmental tested Spaulding for lead; 31 interior surfaces and five exterior surfaces tested positive. Christian designated Howard Klein, M.D., a pediatrician with experience treating lead-poisoned children, as an expert witness to opine on the source of Christian’s lead exposure and his lead-caused injuries (medical causation). Levitas moved to exclude Klein's testimony. Levitas also moved, unsuccessfully, to exclude the Arc test results. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City excluded Klein’s testimony because he did not have adequate information concerning other sources of lead exposure and would not be able to explain the IQ test results because he does not use the test in his own practice. The court stated that Klein relied on information from another doctor and Christian’s attorney in developing his opinion, rather than examining Christian himself. The intermediate appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Klein is competent to testify about lead-source causation and medical causation. View "Levitas v. Christian" on Justia Law

Stevenson was born in 1990. After 10 months, Stevenson and her mother moved to Fairview Avenue (owned by Rochkind), where they lived for 15 months. Fairview contained flaking paint on the windowsills, floors, and porch. In 1992-1993, Stevenson’s blood lead level was tested three times. When Stevenson was five years old, she was evaluated because she was struggling to pay attention in school. A psychologist found that Stevenson’s cognitive functioning was within the “low average to borderline range.” He diagnosed Stevenson with ADHD; she started medication. In 2004, at age 13, Stevenson attempted suicide., Stevenson had auditory hallucinations and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Since graduating from high school in 2008, Stevenson has been sporadically employed. Stevenson sued Rochkind for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Arc Environmental conducted testing at Fairview and detected lead-based paint on 22 interior surfaces and nine exterior surfaces. Cecilia Hall-Carrington, M.D., filed a report concluding to “a reasonable degree of medical probability” that Stevenson was poisoned by lead at Fairview, and that “her lead poisoning is a significant contributing factor” to her neuropsychological problems, including her ADHD. The court denied motions to exclude Hall-Carrington’s testimony, citing Maryland Rule 5-702. Due to the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, the court reduced the total jury award to $1,103,000. The intermediate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The trial court failed to determine whether Stevenson’s proffered sources logically supported Hall-Carrington’s opinion that lead exposure can cause ADHD. View "Rochkind v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

LaBonte worked for Electrical General, which had workers’ compensation insurance. LaBonte injured his back at work when he caught a ladder that was falling. The Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded him temporary total disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits. Later, LaBonte was injured during a traffic stop of a vehicle that LaBonte was driving outside the course of his employment. According to LaBonte, the officer pushed him down onto the vehicle, causing his existing back pain to be aggravated. The Commission awarded LaBonte permanent partial disability benefits, finding that his disability was partly due to his work-related injury and partly due to “pre-existing and subsequent conditions[.]” Years later, LaBonte claimed that his back condition had worsened. The Commission reopened the case but found that a “subsequent intervening event” broke the “causal nexus” between LaBonte’s work-related injury and his existing condition. A jury found that LaBonte’s work injury was the cause of the recent worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the later incident did not preclude Electrical General’s liability for the worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that liability for a temporary disability depends on the injury that occurred last, but liability for a permanent disability should be apportioned among all of the injuries that caused the permanent disability, not just the injury that occurred last. View "Electrical General Corp. v. LaBonte" on Justia Law

Scott was convicted of attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and conspiracy to commit robbery with a dangerous weapon. Md. Code, Crim. Law 14-101(d) provides for an enhanced sentence for a defendant who was convicted of a third crime of violence. The prosecutor offered cited Scott's first-degree assault conviction in Maryland and an aggravated assault conviction in the District of Columbia. The court imposed an enhanced sentence of 25 years for attempted robbery; a consecutive sentence of 10 years for use of a handgun; and a consecutive sentence of 10 years for conspiracy. The Court of Special Appeals vacated the 25-year sentence, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to establish that the D.C. conviction constituted a crime of violence. On remand, Scott argued that the imposition of an enhanced sentence would constitute double jeopardy. The court reimposed the enhanced sentence, with the other sentences to be served consecutively. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed. An appellate court's determination that the evidence was insufficient to establish a requisite prior conviction as a basis for an enhanced sentence does not preclude a trial court from determining at resentencing that the prior conviction satisfies the requirement for an enhanced sentence. Where an appellate court vacates a sentence and remands without vacating a consecutive sentence, the trial court may not make the new sentence concurrent with the non-vacated consecutive sentence. View "Scott v. State" on Justia Law

The circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s petition to compel arbitration was not a final, appealable judgment under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 12-301.Appellees were individuals who each purchased vehicles from the automobile dealership operated by Appellant. Appellees filed a class action lawsuit against Appellant, challenging Appellant’s practice of providing customers with an alleged free lifetime limited warranty for their vehicles conditioned on the consumer’s continued use of and payment for other services provided by Appellant. Appellant filed an independent action seeking to compel arbitration in the class action case. The circuit court concluded that Appellees’ claims were not subject to binding arbitration. Appellant appealed. Appellees filed a motion to dismiss on the basis that the order denying arbitration was not an appealable final judgment. The court of special appeals denied the motion. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the court of special appeals and remanded to that court with instructions to dismiss the appeal, holding that the circuit court’s order denying Appellant’s petition to compel arbitration was not a final, appealable judgment, depriving the court of special appeals of jurisdiction to hear an appeal of that order. View "Deer Automotive Group, LLC v. Brown" on Justia Law

While Md. Code. Ann. Crim. Law 10-615 does not provide for seizure of an animal that is already in state custody in connection with a criminal proceeding, an officer of a humane society may notify the animal’s owner or custodian of an intent to take possession of the animal upon the animal’s release from state custody in the criminal case, and the seizure of an animal under the statute need not occur contemporaneously with the alleged mistreatment of the animal.In this case, the humane society exercised its authority under section 10-615 to take possession of Petitioner’s animals based on allegations of animal cruelty. Petitioner unsuccessfully petitioned the district court for their return. Ultimately, the vast majority of the animal cruelty charges against Petitioner were disposed of by dismissal or acquittal, but the humane society retained possession of the animals. The Court of Appeals remanded the case in light of the change of circumstances since the district court’s initial decision, holding (1) Petitioner was not entitled to return of the animals based on the humane society’s alleged failure to comply with section 10-615; but (2) the denial of Petitioner’s petition for return of the animals did not eliminate Petitioner’s ownership interest in the animals. View "Rohrer v. Humane Society of Washington County" on Justia Law

The Maryland Condominium Act allows access to communally-held property to be restricted as a means to enforce payment of condominium fees, but such restrictions must first be authorized by the unit owners through agreement in the condominium’s declaration.In this case, a condominium association and its management firm (collectively, Elvaton) claimed that unit owners William and Dawn Rose were delinquent in paying their condominium fees. The association thus prohibited the Roses from parking in the parking lot overnight or using the pool until they paid their allegedly delinquent fees. The circuit court ruled that Elvaton did not have the authority to restrict the Roses’ use of the parkings lots and the pool as a means of collecting on the debt. The Court of Appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Elvaton did not include a restriction to the general common elements of the condominium as a means to enforce payment of condominium fees in the condominium’s declaration, the restriction was invalid. View "Elvaton Towne Condominium Regime II, Inc. v. Rose" on Justia Law

Between 2011 and 2013, a labor union held demonstrations at Walmart stores throughout Maryland, protesting Walmart’s employment conditions. Consequently, Walmart sued the union for trespass and nuisance and sought an injunction against the union. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Walmart and issued a permanent injunction against UFCW. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Walmart’s claims for trespass and nuisance were not preempted by the National Labor Relations Act, and therefore, the circuit court properly denied the union’s motion to dismiss; and (2) the circuit court properly ruled that this case did not involve a labor dispute within the meaning of Maryland’s Anti-Injunction Act. View "United Food & Commercial Workers International Union v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Special Appeals did not err in concluding that Defendant’s sentence was imposed in violation of Maryland Rule 4-243(c) because, pursuant to a plea agreement, the State did not receive what it bargained for when the judge imposed a sentence below the terms of the plea agreement. Defendant pleaded guilty to theft scheme greater than $10,000 but less than $100,000. The plea agreement provided that Defendant would be found guilty of a crime and serve jail time, but, instead, the sentence imposed did not include a finding of guilt or incarceration. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, concluding that the sentence was illegal because it was below the floor of the terms. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the Court of Special Appeals did not err in holding that Defendant’s sentence was imposed in violation of Rule 4-243(c). View "Smith v. State" on Justia Law

The circuit court and Court of Special Appeals affirmed the decision of the Howard County Board of Appeals approving a conditional use application for a funeral home in Howard County’s Rural Residential-Density Exchange Option zone. The Howard County Board of Appeals hearing examiner initially denied the proposed conditional use plan, but after public hearings and two revisions, the Board approved the conditional use application subject to several conditions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Board properly analyzed the revised plan pursuant to the relevant statutory requirements; (2) the Board did not err in concluding that the revised plan would not create an adverse cultural impact on vicinal properties or that such impact will be beyond those ordinarily associated with funeral home and mortuary uses; and (3) substantial evidence supported the Board’s conclusion that the revised plan contemplated a 100-foot stream buffer in compliance with state requirements. View "Clarksville Residents Against Mortuary Defense Fund, Inc. v. Donaldson Properties" on Justia Law