Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Md. Code Ann. Crim. Proc. 4-102 provides that in a circuit court proceeding a defendant is entitled to a preliminary hearing when charged by information with felonies but not when the defendant is charged by information with misdemeanors.Defendant was charged by information with misdemeanor offenses. Defendant moved to dismiss the charges, arguing that his case was improperly before the circuit court because he had been charged with misdemeanors by means of a criminal information without a preliminary hearing resulting in a finding of probable cause. The circuit court granted the motion and dismissed the case with prejudice. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the court of special appeals did not err in concluding that when the State charges misdemeanors by criminal information in the circuit court no preliminary hearing is required. View "Brown v. State" on Justia Law

Contractually-shortened limitations periods, such as the one at issue in this case, are valid only if there is no statute to the contrary, the provision is not the result of fraud, duress or misrepresentation, and the provision is reasonable in light of all relevant circumstances.Here a residential furnace maintenance agreement offered by Carroll Home Services, LLC (CHS) reduced the period for a consumer to bring a tort or contract claim against CHS from the statutory three years to one year. Petitioners, who had entered into a maintenance agreement with CHS, asserted tort and contract claims against CHS for damage to their residence allegedly caused by the company. Petitioners filed their complaint more than one year after their claims accrued but before the expiration of three years. The circuit court dismissed the complaint on the basis of the shortened limitations provision in the agreement. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded the case for assessment as to whether the criteria for enforcement of the provision were met and whether the provision was reasonable. View "Ceccone v. Carroll Home Services, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the suppression of certain evidence discovered upon detectives’ use of a cell site simulator - or an undercover cell tower - concluding that whether use of a cell site simulator is a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment or whether a court order authorizing its use fell short of a search warrant, the detectives here acted in objectively reasonable good faith. The circuit court suppressed the evidence on the ground that the use of the cell site simulator to locate the phone was a search for purposes of the Fourth Amendment and that the court order authorizing them to use a “cellular tracking device” to locate the victim’s phone did not function as a search warrant. In reversing, the Court of Appeals held that, based on existing case law, it was objectively reasonable for detectives to believe that their use of a cell site simulator pursuant to the court order was permissible under the Fourth Amendment, and therefore, and evidence obtained as a result of the detectives’ use of the cell site simulator should not be suppressed because of use of that device. View "State v. Copes" on Justia Law

In this construction contract dispute, White Flint express Realty Group Limited Partnership, LLLP (White Flint) was entitled to recover attorney’s fees in connection with an action to enforce the contract between White Flint and Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC (Bainbridge). The court of special appeals affirmed the fee award in favor of White Flint, ruling that the contract provided expressly for attorney’s fees to be recovered in a first-party indemnification action. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the contract contained express provisions that authorized first-party fee shifting, and therefore, White Flint was entitled to attorney’s fees. View "Bainbridge St. Elmo Bethesda Apartments, LLC v. White Flint Express Realty Group Limited Partnership, LLLP" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a charter school located in Frederick, Maryland, and Respondent, the Frederick County Board of Education (Local Board), disputed whether the Local Board’s annual funding allocation to Petitioner in its first year of operation satisfied Md. Code Ann. Educ. 9-109. Specifically, Petitioner argued that the Local Board’s decision to withhold a proportional share of transportation funds was incorrect. The State Board of Education disagreed and upheld the Local Board’s decision to withhold transportation funding from Petitioner’s annual funding allocation. The circuit court and court of special appeals upheld the State Board’s decision. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the State Board’s decision to deny transportation funds to Petitioner was arbitrary and capricious and an abuse of discretion. View "Frederick Classical Charter School, Inc. v. Frederick County Board of Education" on Justia Law

The court of special appeals did not abuse its discretion by denying the State’s motion for reconsideration requesting a remand for the coram nobis court to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the merits of Defendant’s claim. Defendant had filed a petition for writ of error coram nobis challenging the voluntariness of his guilty plea to distribute marijuana. The coram nobis court denied Defendant’s petition without holding a hearing. The court of special appeals determined that, based on the record of the plea hearing, Defendant’s guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary, and therefore, the coram nobis court erred by denying Defendant relief. The State then filed a motion for reconsideration arguing, for the first time, that the record of the plea hearing was inadequate for the intermediate appellate court to determine whether Defendant’s guilty plea was knowing and voluntary. The court of special appeals denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the intermediate appellate court did not abuse its discretion in denying the motion because the State effectively waived any argument that a remand on the merits was, in fact, necessary. View "State v. Rich" on Justia Law

Evidence of a medical diagnosis is not required to establish that a victim is mentally defective as defined by Md. Crim. Law 3-301(b).Petitioner challenged his convictions of second-degree rape and third-degree sexual offense, arguing, in part, that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions where the convictions were contingent on the victim’s status as a mentally defective individual and the State failed to establish that she had been diagnosed with either mental retardation or a mental disorder. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the jury was able reasonably to infer that the victim suffered from a mental defect that rendered her incapable of consenting to sexual intercourse and sexual contact under Md. Crim. Law 3-304(a)(2) and 3-307(a)(2); (2) the prosecutor erred by informing the jury during closing argument that Petitioner had admitted to taking advantage of the victim’s mental diminished capacity in an interview that was never introduced at trial, but the error did not influence the verdict; and (3) the trial court’s exclusion of the victim’s employment records was legally correct. View "Fuentes v. State" on Justia Law

Christian was born in 1990. Until October 1992, he resided on Spaulding Avenue in Baltimore. Christian and his mother then moved to Denmore. In September 1993, they moved back to Spaulding and lived there until September 1997. In 1991, Christian's blood test exhibited an elevated free erythrocyte protoporphyrin level. From 1992-1993, Christian displayed elevated blood lead levels five times. In 2011, Christian sued Levitas, the owner of Spaulding, alleging negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Arc Environmental tested Spaulding for lead; 31 interior surfaces and five exterior surfaces tested positive. Christian designated Howard Klein, M.D., a pediatrician with experience treating lead-poisoned children, as an expert witness to opine on the source of Christian’s lead exposure and his lead-caused injuries (medical causation). Levitas moved to exclude Klein's testimony. Levitas also moved, unsuccessfully, to exclude the Arc test results. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City excluded Klein’s testimony because he did not have adequate information concerning other sources of lead exposure and would not be able to explain the IQ test results because he does not use the test in his own practice. The court stated that Klein relied on information from another doctor and Christian’s attorney in developing his opinion, rather than examining Christian himself. The intermediate appellate court reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Klein is competent to testify about lead-source causation and medical causation. View "Levitas v. Christian" on Justia Law

Stevenson was born in 1990. After 10 months, Stevenson and her mother moved to Fairview Avenue (owned by Rochkind), where they lived for 15 months. Fairview contained flaking paint on the windowsills, floors, and porch. In 1992-1993, Stevenson’s blood lead level was tested three times. When Stevenson was five years old, she was evaluated because she was struggling to pay attention in school. A psychologist found that Stevenson’s cognitive functioning was within the “low average to borderline range.” He diagnosed Stevenson with ADHD; she started medication. In 2004, at age 13, Stevenson attempted suicide., Stevenson had auditory hallucinations and was diagnosed with major depressive disorder and generalized anxiety disorder. Since graduating from high school in 2008, Stevenson has been sporadically employed. Stevenson sued Rochkind for negligence and violations of the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. Arc Environmental conducted testing at Fairview and detected lead-based paint on 22 interior surfaces and nine exterior surfaces. Cecilia Hall-Carrington, M.D., filed a report concluding to “a reasonable degree of medical probability” that Stevenson was poisoned by lead at Fairview, and that “her lead poisoning is a significant contributing factor” to her neuropsychological problems, including her ADHD. The court denied motions to exclude Hall-Carrington’s testimony, citing Maryland Rule 5-702. Due to the statutory cap on noneconomic damages, the court reduced the total jury award to $1,103,000. The intermediate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed. The trial court failed to determine whether Stevenson’s proffered sources logically supported Hall-Carrington’s opinion that lead exposure can cause ADHD. View "Rochkind v. Stevenson" on Justia Law

LaBonte worked for Electrical General, which had workers’ compensation insurance. LaBonte injured his back at work when he caught a ladder that was falling. The Workers’ Compensation Commission awarded him temporary total disability benefits and temporary partial disability benefits. Later, LaBonte was injured during a traffic stop of a vehicle that LaBonte was driving outside the course of his employment. According to LaBonte, the officer pushed him down onto the vehicle, causing his existing back pain to be aggravated. The Commission awarded LaBonte permanent partial disability benefits, finding that his disability was partly due to his work-related injury and partly due to “pre-existing and subsequent conditions[.]” Years later, LaBonte claimed that his back condition had worsened. The Commission reopened the case but found that a “subsequent intervening event” broke the “causal nexus” between LaBonte’s work-related injury and his existing condition. A jury found that LaBonte’s work injury was the cause of the recent worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, holding that the later incident did not preclude Electrical General’s liability for the worsening of LaBonte’s back condition. The Maryland Court of Appeals affirmed, stating that liability for a temporary disability depends on the injury that occurred last, but liability for a permanent disability should be apportioned among all of the injuries that caused the permanent disability, not just the injury that occurred last. View "Electrical General Corp. v. LaBonte" on Justia Law