Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this case involving application of Maryland's "implied consent" statute, Md. Code Ann., Trans. (TR) 16-205.1(b), the Court of Appeals held that Defendant was fully advised of his rights under TR 16-205.1(b)(1) despite two police officers speaking to him simultaneously, because he was not prevented from understanding his rights and the sanctions for refusing to submit to a blood alcohol concentration test, as outlined by the Motor Vehicle Administration's DR-15 "Advice of Rights" form.Defendant's driver's license was suspended because he refused to take a blood alcohol concentration test after being detained for suspicion of driving while under the influence of alcohol. An ALJ upheld the order of suspicion, finding that Defendant had been advised in conformity with the DR-15. The circuit court reversed, holding that Defendnat was not fully advised of his rights because he was distracted while trying to understand his rights. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court improperly substituted its judgment for that of the ALJ in determining that Defendant incur no sanctions for his violation of the implied consent statute. View "Motor Vehicle Administration v. Barrett" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of first-degree murder and other offenses, holding that this Court's holding as to voir dire questions in Twining v. State, 198 A.2d 291 (Md. 1964), is based on outdated reasoning and has been superseded by significant changes in the law and is hereby overruled.In this case, Defendant requested, unsuccessfully, that the circuit court ask during voir dire whether any prospective jurors were unwilling or unable to follow jury instructions on the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and the defendant's right to testify. The Court of Appeals held (1) to the extent the Court of Appeals held in Twining that it is inappropriate to ask on voir dire questions concerning the presumption of innocence, the burden of proof, and a defendant's right to remain silent, the holding in Twining is overruled; (2) on request, during voir dire, a trial court may ask the questions at issue; and (3) absent additional circumstances, the status of a State's witness as an undocumented immigrant, or the existence of a deportation order applicable to the witness, do not show the character of the witness for untruthfulness or demonstrate a motive to testify falsely. View "Kazadi v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals denying a motion to dismiss an appeal, holding that, to constitute an effective judgment under Maryland Rule 2-601 and start the thirty-day appeal period set forth in Maryland Rule 8-202(a), the entry of judgment must satisfy both rule 2-601(b)(2) and (b)(3).Petitioner obtained a default judgment against Respondent and submitted a request to file notice of lien based on the federal judgment. More than a decade later, Petitioner filed a request to renew judgment. The clerk entered a notice of renewed judgment on the docket. Respondent filed a motion to vacate renewal of judgment. The circuit court denied the motion. However, the date of the entry of judgment was not entered in the docket entries. Respondent then noted an appeal. Petitioner moved to strike the notice of appeal as untimely. The Court of Appeals held that the notice of appeal, although initially premature, had become ripe and vacated the renewal of the judgment. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the initial docket entries concerning the denial of the motion to vacate failed to satisfy the requirements of rule 2-601(b) and that the trial court erred in denying the motion to vacate the renewal of the judgment. View "Lee v. Lee" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction for murder and firearms offenses, holding that the administrative judge did not abuse his discretion in finding good cause for the continuance of the trial date.Under the Hicks rule, a criminal trial in a circuit court must commence within 180 days of the first appearance of the defendant or defense counsel in the circuit court. This deadline is known as the Hicks date. A continuance of the trial beyond the Hicks date may be granted only for good cause. Here, the administrative judge found good cause to postpone Defendant's trial from the original trial date based on the State's need to provide additional discovery to the defense. Defendant's trial began approximately forty days after the Hicks date, but the court believed that the deadline under the Hicks rule was tolled for the period of time during which evidence was at a lab for DNA analysis. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the "Hicks rule" does not incorporate a mechanism for tolling or extending the Hicks date; but (2) the administrative judge properly found good cause for the continuance, and Defendant did not carry his burden of demonstrate that there was an inordinate delay in the new trial date. View "Tunnell v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court affirming the finding of the administrative law judge (ALJ) that Defendant did not drive under the influence of alcohol in violation of Md. Code Ann. Transp. 16-205.1 but instead used his vehicle as a "shelter," holding that the ALJ erred when she failed to consider the detaining officer's reasonable grounds.The detaining officer found Defendant in his vehicle after responding to a trespassing call, woke Defendant, and noticed his eyes were bloodshot and his speech was slurred. When Defendant refused to submit to a breathalyzer test, the detaining officer detained Defendant, confiscated his license, and issued an order of suspension. The ALJ concluded that the suspension was not warranted because the Motor Vehicle Administration did not prove that Defendant was in "actual physical control" of his vehicle. The circuit court upheld the ALJ's decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the ALJ must determine whether the detaining officer had reasonable grounds to believe that Defendant was driving or attempting to drive his vehicle while under the influence. View "Motor Vehicle Administration v. Pollard" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the circuit court affirming the decision of the administrative law judge (ALJ) concluding that an officer did not have reasonable grounds to believe that Respondent was driving or attempting to drive a motor vehicle while impaired, holding that the ALJ erred in imposing his credibility determinations and inferences to make the legal determination at issue.Following a traffic infraction, the officer in this case approached the vehicle, observed Respondent sitting in the driver's seat, and smelled alcohol on her breath and person. The officer requested that Respondent take an alcohol concentration test. Respondent refused to submit to the breath test, and the officers confiscated her driver's license. The ALJ took "no action" on the order of suspension, and Respondent's driving privileges were reinstated. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the detaining officer had reasonable grounds to suspect Respondent was driving or attempting to drive while impaired or under the influence of alcohol. View "Motor Vehicle Administration v. Medvedeff" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court granting Defendant's petition for postconviction relief and ordering a new trial on the ground that Defendant's trial counsel provided ineffective assistance of counsel by not requesting an alibi jury instruction, holding that the circumstance that Defendant's trial counsel did not request an alibi jury instruction did not prejudice Defendant.At issue was whether Defendant satisfied, under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), his burden of proving that he was prejudiced when his trial counsel did not request, and the trial court did not give, an alibi jury instruction where purported alibi witnesses testified at trial. The Court of Appeals concluded that Defendant was not prejudiced because none of the purported alibi witnesses' testimony indicated that Defendant could not have been at the murder scene, and the circumstance that the circuit court gave other instructions regarding the State's burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt diminished the claim of prejudice. View "State v. Mann" on Justia Law

In this case involving the appropriate standard of review in an appeal on the record from the district court to the circuit court and the interpretation of a promissory note the Court of Appeals reversed the circuit court's judgment after applying the clearly erroneous standard to the district court's interpretation of the promissory note, holding that the circuit court applied the incorrect standard of review and erred in its interpretation of the promissory note.Petitioner offered a tuition loan program to its employee, and Respondent, a former employee of Petitioner, participated in this program until he was fired. Petitioner brought this action against Respondent seeking repayment of his debt. The district court entered judgment for Respondent. The circuit court affirmed, finding that the district court was not clearly erroneous in its interpretation of the promissory note. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) a circuit court, in hearing an appeal on the record from the district court, reviews the district court's factual determinations for clear error and its legal conclusions de novo; and (2) the circuit court erred in construing the promissory note to require repayment only in situations where an employee quits. View "Credible Behavioral Health v. Johnson" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals determining that, to be entitled to habeas corpus relief under Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CJ) 3-702(a), a person must be physically restrained within Maryland and that Petitioner was not entitled to habeas corpus relief in this case because he was not physically restrained within the State, holding that because Petitioner filed his habeas corpus when he was not significantly restrained in Maryland he was not eligible to seek habeas corpus relief pursuant to CJ 3-702(a).Petitioner was found guilty of fourth-degree sex offense and placed on probation. The district court later found that Petitioner had violated his probation and modified the conditions of probation to be "unsupervised" so that Petitioner could move from Maryland to Michigan. Thereafter, Petitioner filed his habeas corpus petition. The circuit court denied the petition. The Court of Special Appeals dismissed Petitioner's appeal because Petitioner was neither physically restrained nor within the State when he filed his petition. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, under CJ 3-702(a), to be eligible to seek habeas corpus relief, a person must be committed detained, confined, or restrained in the State. View "Sabisch v. Moyer" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court finding that the Taneytown City Council violated some provisions of the Open Meetings Act (OMA), Md. Code, Title 3 of the General Provisions Article, but declining to impose sanctions, holding that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in not imposing sanctions.Plaintiff alleged that the Council held a meeting that was closed to the public in violation of the OMA and asked the court to impose sanctions. The circuit court entered judgment for Defendant, concluding that the Council had violated certain provisions of the OMA but that those violations were technical, harmless, and not willful. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the use of "technicality" and harmless error as reasons to excuse violations of the OMA is rejected; (2) all sanctions under the OMA are discretionary with the trial court, and the court cannot impose such sanctions unless the violations were willful; and (3) although the trial court imposed used the wrong terms, the court did not abuse its discretion in determining that imposing civil penalties on the Council was not appropriate under the circumstances. View "Frazier v. McCarron" on Justia Law