Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that where there are two legal parents, both legal parents must consent to and foster a third party's formation and establishment of a parent-like relationship with a child under the first factor of the test set forth in In re Custody of H.S.H.-K., 533 N.W.2d 419 (Wis. 1995), adopted by this Court in Conover v. Conover, 146 A.3d 433 (Md. 2016).E.N. was the biological mother and D.D. was the biological father of two minor children. When D.D. entered into a relationship with T.R. the children moved in with the couple. T.R. later filed a complaint seeking sole legal and physical custody of the children. The circuit court granted T.R.'s complaint for custody, concluding that T.R. was a de facto parent of the children. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) to establish de facto parenthood where there are two legal parents, a prospective de facto parent must demonstrate that both legal parents consented to and fostered a parent-like relationship with a child, or that a non-consenting legal parent is an unfit parent or exceptional circumstances exist; and (2) the circuit court erred in concluding that T.R. was a de facto parent and in granting her joint legal custody and sole physical custody. View "E.N. v. T.R." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Petitioner's convictions and the judgment of the circuit court denying Petitioner's motion to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court pursuant to Md. Code Crim. Proc. 4-202, holding that the circuit court did not properly consider Petitioner's amenability to treatment in a juvenile institution, program, or facility.Petitioner was charged with several crimes that he committed when he was sixteen that were beyond the jurisdiction of the juvenile court. After the circuit court denied Petitioner's motion to transfer jurisdiction to the juvenile court Petitioner entered a conditional guilty plea. The court of special appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded the matter for a new hearing on Petitioner's motion to transfer, holding that it was evident from the circuit court's remarks that it did not properly consider amenability. View "Davis v. State" on Justia Law

In this case concerning Talbot County's authority to impose civil penalties for Petitioners' violations of the Talbot County Code arising from their unlawful actions associated with clearing trees and constructing a driveway on their property without a permit the Court of Appeals held that the Talbot County Board of Appeals (Board of Appeals) lacked subject matter jurisdiction to consider or review the purported assessment of civil penalties.The penalties at issue were imposed by six assessment notices issued after the Talbot County Chief Code Compliance Officer (CCCO) was notified about the violations and issued abatement orders. Petitioners filed an administrative appeal of the assessments. The Board of Appeals concluded that the CCCO had the authority to issue the civil assessments but that the daily accrual of fines was stayed by Petitioners' administrative appeal. The circuit court reversed that portion of the Board's determination and entered an order authorizing Talbot County to enforce the civil assessments as originally assessed. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court's judgment, holding that the adjudication of civil penalties by a charter county in circumstances such as those within this case is within the original jurisdiction of the Maryland courts and not within the jurisdiction of a local board of appeals established by a charter county. View "Angel Enterprises Ltd. Partnership v. Talbot County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's conviction of murder and attempted murder, holding that Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda and that the circuit court correctly determined that a jury instruction on duress was unwarranted.Before trial, Defendant moved to suppress his confession to a law enforcement officer. The circuit court denied the motion, concluding that Miranda had been complied with and that Defendant's confession was voluntary. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Defendant knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights under Miranda, his confession was voluntary, and his circumstances did not render his waiver of rights involuntary; and (2) the circuit court did not err in declining to give a jury instruction on duress because the instruction was unwarranted. View "Madrid v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction for armed robbery, robbery and other crimes, holding that accepting a jury as ultimately empaneled does not waive any prior objection to the trial court's refusal to propound voir dire questions.Prior to the commencement of the jury trial in this case, defense counsel submitted several voir dire questions to be posed to the venire. When the trial court declined to pose a proposed question defense counsel objected, but the objection was overruled. At the conclusion of jury selection, the court asked whether either party objected to the jury as empaneled. Defense counsel responded, "no." After Defendant was convicted, he appealed, arguing that the trial court committed reversible error in failing to ask the proposed question. The court of special appeals reversed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) objections relating to a trial court's determination not to ask a proffered voir dire question are not waived by later acceptance, without qualification, of the jury as empaneled; and (2) Defendant did not waive his objection to the trial court's decision not to ask the proffered voir dire question at issue by accepting the jury as empaneled without repeating his prior objection. View "State v. Ablonczy" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the circuit court denying Appellant's motion to reinstate her appeal and her motion to reconsider that denial, holding that the circuit court incorrectly applied the "good cause" standard when it denied Appellant's motion to reinstate her appeal.Appellant was convicted for failing to send her child to school. Appellant appealed, and the circuit court scheduled the case for a trial de novo. Thereafter, the COVID-19 pandemic required the circuit court to postpone several criminal cases on its docket, including Appellant's appeal for a trial de novo. During a status hearing which Defendant was unable to attend, the circuit court dismissed Appellant's appeal. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that, under the undisputed facts in the record, the circuit court would abuse its discretion if it did not reinstate the appeal. View "Tengeres v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that Md. Code Ts. & Jud. Proc. (CJP) 11-1110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages stemming from the tortious injury or death of a pet.A police officer shot and killed Respondent's dog in the front yard of Respondent's home. Respondent brought suit, alleging that the officer committed a trespass to Respondent's chattel, acted with gross negligence, and violated Respondent's rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding (1) CJP 11-110 did not bar Respondent from recovering noneconomic damages related to the death of his dog, and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the officer acted with gross negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) CJP 11-110 defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet; and (2) under the single recovery rule, Respondent may not recover any damages under the gross negligence claim. View "Anne Arundel County v. Reeves" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, under the unique circumstance of the late Joseph Kopera's deception of Maryland's courts and defendants for decades in a number of criminal cases in which he testified as an expert in the field of firearms ballistics, due diligence did not require defense counsel to unearth Kopera's fraud prior to 2007.In 2007, an attorney working for the innocence project discovered that Kopera gave perjured testimony in hundreds of criminal trials concerning his credentials. Ronnie Hunt later filed a second amended petition for writ of actual innocence, arguing that had Kopera's fake credentials been known, it was reasonably probable that the outcome of his trial would have been different. The circuit court denied the petition on the ground that Kopera's false testimony concerning his credentials was not newly discovered evidence. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) in this and all similarly situated cases tried prior to the discovery of Kopera's fraud, due diligence did not require defense counsel to unearth the charade prior to 2007; and (2) remand was required for the trial court to determine whether Hunt could establish a substantial possibility that, had Kopera's false testimony been known at the time of his trial, the result of Hunt's trial may have been different. View "Hunt v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's denial of Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the court of special appeals did not err in holding that the placement and use of a GPS tracking device was legal.In investigating suspected drug distribution activities Harford County Narcotics Task Force applied for and received an "application for court order" to install a GPS tracking device on Defendant's vehicle. The Task Force detectives subsequently applied for a received a search warrant for Defendant's vehicle and suspected residence. After the search warranted was executed, Defendant was indicted on drug-related charges. Defendant filed a motion to suppress, arguing that the GPS tracking of his vehicle was unconstitutional. The circuit court held that the search warrant lacked probable cause but that the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule applied. Defendant then entered a conditional guilty plea. The court of appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the use of the GPS tracking device was legal because the GPS order satisfied the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement; (2) the issuing judge had substantial evidence for finding probable cause; and (3) the good faith exception to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule applied in this case. View "Whittington v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM) in this negligence complaint, holding that Ashley Hector and Alyaa Hector alleged sufficient facts for their claim against BNYM in its individual capacity to go to the jury.The Hectors lived as children in a row house that contained lead-based paint. The Hectors' landlord had taken out a mortgage on her interest in the property that became part of a residential mortgage backed securitization trust. When the landlord's interest in the property was sold at foreclosure BNYM as trustee as the purchaser. The Hectors filed a negligence complaint against BNYM. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BNYM, concluding that the Hectors erroneously named BNYM in its individual capacity as opposed to its fiduciary capacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a trustee may be held individually liable for a tort committed in the course of trust administration if the trustee is personally at fault; and (2) the Hectors produced facts from which a jury could find that BNYM breached a duty it owed to the Hectors as the "owner" of the property. View "Hector v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law