Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in its formulation of the jury instruction on Battered Spouse Syndrome, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant killed her boyfriend but claimed that she did so in self-defense. To support her theory of self-defense, Defendant introduced expert testimony concerning Battered Spouse Syndrome (the Syndrome). The jury acquitted Defendant of murder but convicted her of voluntary manslaughter. The court of special appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge's instruction to the jury concerning the Syndrome was erroneous and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the Syndrome and that the error was not harmless. View "State v. Elzey" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals holding that a developer, K. Hovnanian Homes of Maryland, LLC (Hovnanian) could not enforce an agreement against the Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace because the Mayor or his subordinate did not execute the agreement, holding that the agreement was ultra vires and unenforceable.The agreement in this case provided that the City would impose and collect a recoupment fee in connection with the development of residential dwelling units on those properties. The City Council approved the agreement, but the Mayor refused to sign the agreement, and the City did not collect any recoupment fees. The circuit court declared that the agreement was a binding and enforceable contract. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the imposition of a fee by the City must be undertaken by the municipal legislative body known as the "Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace" and pursuant to a duly enacted ordinance; and (2) because no such ordinance was enacted, the agreement was ultra vires and unenforceable against the City. View "K. Hovnanian Homes of Maryland, LLC v. Havre de Grace" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of perjury and making a false statement to a police officer, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of perjury and false statement beyond a reasonable doubt.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) the court of special appeals erred when it applied a non-deferential, de novo standard of review to the legal sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the court of special appeals erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient to show willful and knowing falsity and in finding that one witness's testimony corroborated by surveillance video was insufficient to satisfy the two-witness rule for perjury; and (3) the evidence was legally sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. View "State v. McGagh" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment entering judgment on the jury's verdict finding Defendants guilty of home invasion and other crimes, holding that the court of special appeals erred in concluding that jury nullification is authorized in Maryland.Three defendants were charged with multiple offenses related to a home invasion, kidnapping, and armed robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury sent three notes to the court inquiring about jury nullification. The court of special appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that the power of jury nullification exists in Maryland and that the circuit court's instructions in response to two of the jury notes at issue were legally incorrect and prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland; and (2) the circuit court's instructions were neither legally incorrect nor prejudicial. View "State v. Sayles" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the admissibility of jailhouse rap lyrics composed by Defendant as substantive evidence that he shot and killed George Forrester the Court of Appeals held that the rap lyrics were relevant and admissible and that the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in admitting the lyrics.The State sought to introduce a recorded telephone call containing the rap lyrics as substantive evidence of Defendant's guilt. Defendant moved in limine to exclude the recording. The circuit court denied the motion and admitted the rap lyrics. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the lyrics were admissible under Maryland Rules 5-401, 5-402, and 5-403. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the rap lyrics were relevant under Rule 5-401, and therefore were admissible under Rule 5-402; (2) the rap lyrics bore a close factual and temporal nexus to the details of the murder; and (3) therefore, the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the rap lyrics under Rule 5-403. View "Montague v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of assault in the first degree, use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence, and wearing, carrying or transporting a handgun, holding that the Court of Special Appeals did not err.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held that the Court of Special Appeals (1) correctly affirmed the admission of a statement by a witness with memory loss as a prior inconsistent statement given the witness's contradictory testimony at trial; and (2) did not err in expanding the circumstances rule which hearsay is admissible under Md. Rule 5-802.1(a) to include statements containing a "material" inconsistency with the witness's testimony. View "Wise v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals upholding the circuit court's denial of coram nobis relief, holding that the nondisclosure of evidence relating to the alleged misconduct of several of the officers that prompted the charges and pleas in this case was not sufficient to render Petitioner's pleas involuntary.Petitioner pled guilty to have committed, in two separate cases, the crime of possession of heroin with intent to distribute. Upon completion of his sentences and probation, Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of error coram nobis, arguing that prior to the entry of his guilty pleas, the State failed to disclose to him evidence of misconduct on the part of some officers involved in the arrests that prompted the criminal charges and pleas. The circuit court denied the petition, and the court of appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the State was under no obligation to disclose the potential evidence of misconduct prior to trial and that the nondisclosure did not constitute a misrepresentation in violation of Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742 (1970). View "Byrd v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the order of the circuit court directing that Saint Luke Institute, Inc. (SLI) produce a patient's mental health records under seal, holding that the circuit court erred by failing to conduct the necessary statutory relevancy analysis required by the Maryland Confidentiality of Medical Records Act, Md. Code Ann. Health-Gen 4-301 through 309.Plaintiffs filed a civil case in Massachusetts alleging that they were sexually abused by a brother or member of a religious order while they were residing in a children's group home that employed the brother. Plaintiffs filed a proceeding in Maryland seeking discovery of the brother's mental health records they believed were in the custody of SLI, a Maryland facility. The circuit court entered an order directing the SLI to produce the brother's mental health records under seal. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed and outlined the process to be undertaken by the trial court prior to disclosure of mental health records requested by a private litigant in a civil case, holding that remand was required. View "St. Luke Institute v. Jones" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation action, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the Court of Special Appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court denying Uninsured Employers' Fund's (UEF) motion for judgment, holding that the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that the evidence was sufficient to establish that Tyson Farms, Inc. was Mauro Garcia's co-employer as a matter of law.Mauro Jimenez Garcia sustained an occupational disease of the lungs while working on a chicken farm. The chickens were raised for and owned by Tyson. The Uninsured Employers' Fund became involved in Garcia's workers' compensation claim, and Tyson was impleaded into the claim. The Commission issued an award of compensation, determination that Garcia was a covered employee that sustained an occupational disease arising of and in the course of his employment and that Tyson was Garcia's co-employer. On judicial review, the jury returned a verdict in favor of Tyson, finding that Tyson was not Garcia's co-employer. The Court of Special Appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that there was sufficient evidence from which a reasonable jury could find that Tyson was not a co-employer of Garcia. View "Tyson Farms, Inc. v. Uninsured Employers' Fund" on Justia Law

In this workers' compensation action, the Court of Appeals held that the Workers' Compensation Commission did not err in calculating the deduction of decibels from Claimants' total average hearing losses under Md. Code Ann., Lab. & Empl. (LE) 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each firefighter's fiftieth birthday and the dates that they each retired from employment with Montgomery County, Maryland.Anthony Cochran and Andrew Bowen, former firefighters, developed hearing loss, and Bowen also developed tinnitus. Both men filed a claim under LE 9-505. The Commission awarded compensation to both claimants, finding that each had sustained hearing loss arising in and out of the course of their employment and that Bowen had sustained tinnitus arising in and out of the course of his employment. The Court of Special Appeals held that the Commission correctly calculated the deduction set forth in LE 9-650(b)(3) but erred in awarding permanent partial disability benefits to Bowen for tinnitus. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the Commission properly calculated the deduction set forth in LE 9-650(b)(3) by counting the number of years between each man's fiftieth birthday and the date of retirement; and (2) the Court of Special Appeals erred in reversing the Commission's decision as to tinnitus. View "Montgomery County v. Cochran & Bowen" on Justia Law