Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that a change in life insurance beneficiary constitutes a conveyance under the Maryland Uniform Fraudulent Conveyance Act (MUFCA), Md. Code Comm. Law 15-201(c), and that a guardian of property is not granted the authority to change a life insurance beneficiary on a policy of the ward under section 15-102(t) of the Estates and Trusts Article (ET).In a case arising from a decade-long dispute between the adult children of the Buckingham family and United Bank, the United States District Court for the District of Maryland certified two questions of law to the Court of Appeals regarding whether the children intentionally defrauded the Bank when they successfully diverted significant amounts of life insurance proceeds away from the declining family business and to their personal use. The Court of Appeals answered the questions as follows: (1) a change of the beneficiary designation of a life insurance policy constitutes a conveyance under MUFCA; and (2) the guardian of property does not have the authority to change the beneficiary on a life insurance policy of a ward under ET 15-102(t). View "United Bank v. Buckingham" on Justia Law

In this family dispute regarding a family business the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the decision of the trial court entering judgment in favor of Valley Mill Camp, Inc., holding that a person claiming the right to possession against a person in actual peaceable possession of real property can bring an action in circuit court for common law trespass to recover possession of the property.In 2017, after some escalating family disagreements, Valley Mill terminated the employment of Bruce Uthus and requested that he vacate the campground residence, where he had been living for approximately twenty years. Uthus refused to leave, and Valley Mill brought this trespass action. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Valley Mills. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Valley Mill had the choice to take legal action to remove Uthus from the campgrounds either by filing a trespass action in circuit court or a wrongful detainer action in district court; and (2) Valley Mill met all the elements of trespass. View "Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp" on Justia Law

In this case stemming from a lawsuit brought by Respondent against the State and the law enforcement officers and prosecutors who were responsible for charging her with assault and juror intimidation, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court was correct in granting summary judgment in favor of the State and the two prosecutors as to any action in the complaint alleged to have been taken by the prosecutors.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) there was no genuine dispute of material fact as to the prosecutors' entitlement to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity; (2) the two officers were not entitled to absolute common law immunity in the form of prosecutorial immunity or absolute common law immunity in the form of judicial immunity; (3) state personnel statutory immunity under the MTCA barred Plaintiff's claims against the officers and the prosecutors in their individual capacities and, as such, the State does not have immunity under the MTCA; and (4) whether the State was liable for any actions taken by the officers was a matter to be resolved by further proceedings in the circuit court. View "State v. Rovin" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals concluding that it had jurisdiction to consider this appeal, holding that, under the circumstances, there was no right to appeal arising under statute or local law.ProVen Management, Inc. filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Department of Public Works Director's final decision in favor of the City as to ProVen Management, Inc.'s action seeking additional sums under the parties' contract. The circuit court affirmed, and ProVen appealed. The City filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the court of special appeals lacked jurisdiction under Md. Cts. & Jud. Proc. art. 12-302(a). The court of special appeals denied the motion to dismiss. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) ProVen's petition for judicial review was, in both form and substance, a petition for judicial review of an administrative agency decision arising under pertinent provisions of the Baltimore City Charter; and (2) because the Charter provided no right to appeal, the court of special appeals was required to dismiss the matter. View "Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. ProVen Management, Inc." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the denial of Defendant's motion for new trial on the grounds that certain newly discovered evidence was immaterial, holding that there was no Brady violation in this case.Defendant was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder. Following the trial but prior to sentencing, the State informed Defendant's counsel of an interview that took place between two detectives and the family members of one of the State's witnesses. Defendant moved for a new trial, arguing that the nondisclosure of the interview violated Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963). The circuit court denied the motion, finding that the evidence of the interview was not material. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the nondisclosure of the interview did not constitute a Brady violation. View "Canales-Yanez v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's convictions on the grounds that the circuit court should have granted Defendant's motion to suppress, holding that the State failed to meet its burden of establishing the constitutionality of Defendant's seizure at the suppression hearing.When Maryland Transit Administration (MTA) police officers conducted a fare sweep aboard a Light Rail train Defendant confessed that he did not have a ticket. An officer obtained identifying information from Defendant and ran a warrant check on him revealing the existence of a warrant for Defendant's arrest. In attempting to arrest Defendant, officers saw that Defendant had a gun. Defendant moved to suppress the gun, arguing that the fare sweep constituted a warrantless seizure not based on reasonable suspicion. The circuit court denied the motion to suppress. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that the circuit court erred in denying Defendant's suppression motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) police officers effected a seizure of Defendant without reasonable suspicion by announcing the fare sweep, and Defendant did not impliedly consent to the seizure by riding the train; and (2) the record was insufficiently developed to conclude whether Light Rail sweeps are constitutional under the special needs doctrine. View "State v. Carter" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of voluntary manslaughter and ordering a new trial, holding that the trial court erred in its formulation of the jury instruction on Battered Spouse Syndrome, and this error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.Defendant killed her boyfriend but claimed that she did so in self-defense. To support her theory of self-defense, Defendant introduced expert testimony concerning Battered Spouse Syndrome (the Syndrome). The jury acquitted Defendant of murder but convicted her of voluntary manslaughter. The court of special appeals ordered a new trial, concluding that the trial judge's instruction to the jury concerning the Syndrome was erroneous and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the trial court erred in instructing the jury regarding the Syndrome and that the error was not harmless. View "State v. Elzey" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals holding that a developer, K. Hovnanian Homes of Maryland, LLC (Hovnanian) could not enforce an agreement against the Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace because the Mayor or his subordinate did not execute the agreement, holding that the agreement was ultra vires and unenforceable.The agreement in this case provided that the City would impose and collect a recoupment fee in connection with the development of residential dwelling units on those properties. The City Council approved the agreement, but the Mayor refused to sign the agreement, and the City did not collect any recoupment fees. The circuit court declared that the agreement was a binding and enforceable contract. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the imposition of a fee by the City must be undertaken by the municipal legislative body known as the "Mayor and City Council of Havre de Grace" and pursuant to a duly enacted ordinance; and (2) because no such ordinance was enacted, the agreement was ultra vires and unenforceable against the City. View "K. Hovnanian Homes of Maryland, LLC v. Havre de Grace" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing Defendant's conviction of perjury and making a false statement to a police officer, holding that the State presented sufficient evidence to prove the elements of perjury and false statement beyond a reasonable doubt.Specifically, the Court of Appeals held (1) the court of special appeals erred when it applied a non-deferential, de novo standard of review to the legal sufficiency of the evidence; (2) the court of special appeals erred in finding that the evidence was insufficient to show willful and knowing falsity and in finding that one witness's testimony corroborated by surveillance video was insufficient to satisfy the two-witness rule for perjury; and (3) the evidence was legally sufficient to support Defendant's convictions. View "State v. McGagh" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the circuit court's judgment entering judgment on the jury's verdict finding Defendants guilty of home invasion and other crimes, holding that the court of special appeals erred in concluding that jury nullification is authorized in Maryland.Three defendants were charged with multiple offenses related to a home invasion, kidnapping, and armed robbery. During jury deliberations, the jury sent three notes to the court inquiring about jury nullification. The court of special appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that the power of jury nullification exists in Maryland and that the circuit court's instructions in response to two of the jury notes at issue were legally incorrect and prejudicial. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) jury nullification is not authorized in Maryland; and (2) the circuit court's instructions were neither legally incorrect nor prejudicial. View "State v. Sayles" on Justia Law