Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In this dispute between a municipality seeking tax setoffs and a county that refused to grant them, the Court of Appeals affirmed the conclusion of the court of special appeals that Md. Code Tax-Prop. ** 6-305 and 6-306 do not fall within a category of constitutionally prohibited legislation, holding that the provisions are permissible within the scope of article XI-E, 1 of the Maryland Constitution.Ocean City, the second largest municipality in Worcester County, repeatedly requested tax setoffs for the money that the city spent on governmental services, such as fire, police, and ambulance services. In lieu of granting Ocean City's requested tax setoffs, Worcester County provided discretionary funding to the city in the form of annual grants. Ocean City then filed this action seeking a declaratory judgment that TP 6-305 and 6-305, which granted the county the ability to deny municipal tax setoff requests, were unconstitutional as violating Md. Const. Art. XI-E, 1. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Worcester County. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that TP 6-305 and 6-306 are constitutional within the language of Article XI-E, Section 1. View "Ocean City v. Worcester County" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming Defendant's convictions, holding that, under article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, a statement contained in a scientific report is testimonial if a reasonable declarant would have understood the primary purpose for the creation of the report to be to establish or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution.Defendant was indicted on charges of first-, third-, and fourth-degree burglary, theft, and malicious destruction of property. At the scene of the reported burglary, a police officer swabbed the burglar's suspected blood from the window frame and a curtain. Thereafter, Molly Rollo, a forensic scientist, conducted a DNA analysis of the samples and produced a report providing a DNA profile for a male contributor. A subsequent DNA records database search identified Defendant as a possible match. At trial, the court admitted Rollo's report into evidence and allowed a different forensic scientist, Tiffany Keener, to convey the report's results to the jury without requiring that Rollo be available for cross-examination. The Court of Appeals reversed the convictions, holding that the trial court violated Defendant's rights to confrontation and cross-examination under Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. View "Leidig v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the trial court convicting Defendant of first-degree rape and other offenses, holding that the trial court did not violate Defendant's constitutional rights by allowing the technical review of a report analyzing DNA evidence to testify about the results of that analysis without requiring the primary author of the report to be available for cross-examination.In 2008, an unidentified assailant sexually assaulted a nineteen-year-old woman in her apartment. Forensic evidence was collected from the woman's body and from her apartment, and forensic scientists generated a DNA profile from the evidence for an "unknown male #1." Nine years later, the FBI's Combined DNA Index System produced Defendant as a match for "unknown male #1." Defendant was subsequently convicted with several offenses relating to the sexual assault. Thomas Hebert was the primary author of two reports that analyzed and/or compared DNA evidence relevant to this case. The State did not call Hebert as a witness and instead offered the testimony of two other Forensic Services Division analysts in Hebert's stead. The court of special appeals reversed the convictions, concluding that the trial court violated Defendant's constitutional rights to confrontation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's constitutional rights were not violated under the circumstances of this case. View "State v. Miller" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the circuit courts against Petitioners on counts of unjust enrichment and violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law that were entered upon remand and reinstated the original judgments in favor of Petitioners, holding that the circuit court erred.Petitioners and Harry Kortki (Harry) came before the Court of Appeals twice in this case concerning whether a partnership was created. The circuit court found that Harry intended to form a general partnership and was entitled to an award of damages. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the circuit court erroneously found that the parties intended to form a partnership. On remand, the circuit court reopened two counts - for unjust enrichment and violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law - that Harry had brought in the original complaint and entered judgments in favor of Harry on the two counts. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court erred on remand in reopening the unjust enrichment and wage payment counts and in awarding Harry damages against Petitioners on the claims. View "MAS Associates, LLC v. Korotki" on Justia Law

In this two putative class action cases concerning the applicable statute of limitations for claims filed by consumer debtors against a consumer debt buyer, Midland Funding, LLC, the Court of Appeals held that Petitioners' claims for unjust enrichment and statutory claims for money damages were subject to the three-year statute of limitations established by Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-101.Petitioner Clifford Cain and Petitioner Tasha Gambrell each filed a putative class action complaint against Midland, alleging improper debt collection activities in connection with money judgments that Midland obtained against the plaintiffs during a time when Midland was not licensed as a collection agency under Maryland law. In Cain's case, the circuit court granted summary judgment to each party in part and a separate declaratory judgment declaring the rights of the parties. In Gambrell's case, the circuit court granted Midland's motion to dismiss. The court of appeals held (1) Petitioners were not entitled to injunctive relief, and (2) Petitioners' claims seeking restitution under an unjust enrichment theory and money damages for statutory claims were barred by CJ 5-101's three-year statute of limitations. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment as to Gambrell in its entirety and reversed the judgment in part as to Cain, holding that Cain's individual claims were timely filed. View "Cain v. Midland Funding, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's convictions of numerous criminal offenses related to a drunk driving incident that resulted in the death of a cyclist, holding that Defendant's challenge to the jury selection method in this case was unavailing.On appeal, Defendant argued that the trial judge impermissibly excluded numerous groups of people from his jury without making specific findings of bias or other cause, in violation of his right to an impartial jury. The court of special appeals affirmed the convictions. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that there was no indication in the record that any cognizable group was excluded from the jury as a result of the method of jury selection used in this case. View "Kidder v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals dismissed this appeal of the court of special appeals' denial of an application for leave to appeal in a postconviction proceeding, holding that this Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CJ) 12-202.Petitioner was found guilty of first-degree murder and other crimes. Nearly ten years after Petitioner was sentenced, he filed a petition for postconviction relief, alleging ineffective assistance of both trial and appellate counsel. The postconviction court denied the petition. Petitioner filed an application for leave to appeal, which the court of special appeals denied without explanation. Petitioner then petitioned the Court of Appeals for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, holding that CJ 12-202 is not precluded by article IV, section 14A of the Maryland Constitution. View "Mahai v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's dismissal of Plaintiff's malicious prosecution claim and reversing the grant of Defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict (JNOV) on Plaintiff's discrimination claim, holding that the court of special appeals did not err.Plaintiff sued the Town of Riverdale Park and members of the Riverdale Park Police Department for claims including intentional discrimination on the basis of national origin. The circuit court granted the Town's motion for judgment on the malicious prosecution claim and sent the discrimination claim to the jury. The jury found in favor of Plaintiff and awarded damages. The circuit court granted the Town's motion for JNOV, citing Plaintiff's lack of evidence. The court of special appeals affirmed the dismissal of the malicious prosecution claim but reversed the grant of the motion for JNOV. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiff presented sufficient evidence of discrimination to withstand a motion for JNOV. View "Town of Riverdale Park v. Askhar" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's declaratory judgment concluding that Homeowners' amended restrictive covenant validly prohibited the construction of a commercial driving range on a lot within a residential subdivision and that a restrictive covenant permitted the realignment of the lot's property boundaries, holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner applied for zoning variances and exceptions from the Talbot County Board of Appeals to modify the boundaries of the sixth of five lots in the Swan Point Subdivision and to construct a driving range. Respondents, property owners in Swan Point, opposed the variance and amended the restrictive covenant specifically to prohibit a driving range on any lot within Swan Point. The Board granted the zoning variance for Petitioner. After the circuit court affirmed, Respondents brought this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court declared that Respondents' restrictive covenant validly prohibited the construction of a driving range on the lot at issue and that the original Swan Point restrictive covenant permitted the realignment of the lot's property boundaries. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court reached the correct result. View "RDC Melanie Drive v. Eppard" on Justia Law

In this case concerning the interpretation of an ambiguous voting provision in a corporation's charter the Court of Appeals affirmed the circuit court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Respondents, shareholders of Petitioner's Series B shares, holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner raised issued a series of preferred stock known as Series B and a nearly identical series of preferred stock known as Series C. Petitioner later sought to buy back the shares of both series. Owners of two-thirds of the shares of both series approved the measure, but owners of less than two-thirds of Series B did so. Petitioner argued that the approval of two-thirds of shares of both series, counted together, provided the necessary approval required by the charter provision relating to Series B shares. Respondents filed this action seeking to restore and rights and preferences of Series B shares. The circuit court found that the charter language was ambiguous and that the failure to obtain the approval of owners of two-thirds of the Series B shares doomed Petitioner's proposal to buy back those shares. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the voting provision was ambiguous; and (2) the extrinsic evidence relating to the voting provision resolved the ambiguity in favor of separate voting by Series B shareholders. View "Impac Mortgage Holdings, Inc. v. Timm" on Justia Law