Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Court of Appeals held that a determination of whether to order reimbursement of attorney's fees under Md. Code Ann., Tax-Property (TP) 14-843(a)(4)(i) after a complaint has been filed is discretionary and that a circuit court may consider whether the tax sale certificate holder (TSCH) impeded the property owner's exercise of the right of redemption in making a determination as to reimbursement.After a tax sale at which the TSCH purchased property, the TSCH billed the owner for attorney's fees and expenses for a complaint that had not yet been filed and did not promptly notify the owner that an expired release could be used to redeem the property. The owner reimbursed the TSCH for the attorney's fees owed at the time, but before the redemption process was completed the TSCH filed a complaint to foreclose the owner's right of redemption. The owner later paid all amounts necessary to redeem the property. At issue was whether the owner was required to reimburse the TSCH for attorney's fees incurred after the complaint was filed. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order reimbursement of the TSCH's attorney's fees under TP 14-843(a)(4)(i) or in declining reimbursement of attorney's fees in exceptional circumstances under TP 14-843(a)(4)(iii). View "Thornton Mellon LLC v. Adrianne Dennis Exempt Trust" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that, under Maryland law, an individual cannot be convicted of robbery by means of threatening force against property or threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy.Defendant pleaded guilty to possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon. The federal district court sentenced Defendant to a term at the top of the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines range after determining that he possessed the firearm after sustaining a felony conviction for a crime of violence, namely his 2007 Maryland conviction for robbery. The court then certified a question concerning Maryland robbery to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals answered the question in the negative, holding that, under Maryland law, an individual cannot be convicted of robbery by means of threatening force against property or threatening to accuse the victim of having committed sodomy. View "Dickson v. United States" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the tax court reversing the decision of the Comptroller of Maryland denying Broadway Services Inc.'s request for an offset and refund of the taxes it paid to cleaning supply vendors, holding that the tax court erred.Under contracts between three non-profit tax-exempt hospitals of the Johns Hopkins Health System and Broadway, a for-profit business, Broadway provided management services to the hospitals, including purchasing and providing cleaning supplies for the use of he hospitals' janitorial staff. Broadway filed a request for an offset and refund of the taxes it paid to cleaning supply vendors, asserting that Broadway was tax exempt because it was reselling the cleaning supplies. The Comptroller denied the refund. The tax court reversed, concluding that because Broadway acted as the hospitals' agent it should not have been charged sales tax. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the tax court erroneously conducted its agency analysis as a matter of law. View "Broadway Services v. Comptroller" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the decision of the circuit court ordering the parties to arbitrate their dispute, holding that the lower courts did not err.The arbitration agreement at issue in this case did not specify an arbitration service. When Respondent refused to cooperate to start the arbitration proceedings, Petitioner petitioned to compel arbitration. The circuit court ordered the parties to arbitrate their dispute, thus denying Respondent's argument that the petition was barred by the statute of limitations. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when the contract is silent on the issue, a petition to compel arbitration under Md. Code Cts. & Jud. Proc. (CJ) 3-207 is not subject to a defense under CJ 5-101; (2) the court of special appeals did not err in applying Gannett Fleming in affirming the circuit court; and (3) a petition to compel arbitration under CJ 3-207 is not subject to the limitations period set forth in CJ 5-101. View "Park Plus v. Palisades of Towson, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed Defendant's conviction of second-degree murder and possession of a firearm, holding that Defendant's contentions on appeal were unavailing.After a trial, the jury found Defendant guilty of second-degree murder and possession of a regulated firearm while under the age of twenty-one and not guilty of first-degree assault and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence. On appeal, Defendant argued, among other things, that the guilty verdict as to second-degree murder and the not-guilty verdicts as to first-degree assault and use of a firearm in the commission of a crime of violence were inconsistent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the verdicts were not legally inconsistent; (2) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for a new trial based on the jury having allegedly returned inconsistent verdicts; and (3) the evidence was sufficient to support the convictions. View "Williams v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals reversing the judgment of the circuit court granting summary judgment to Pabst Brewing Company (Pabst) and dismissing this breach of contract lawsuit brought by Frederick P. Winner, Ltd. (Winner), holding that the circuit court erred in its interpretation of the Successor Manufacturers Law (SML), Md. Code Ann., Alco. Bev. (AB) 5-201.Under a contract agreed upon in 1994, Winner and its predecessor entity distributed Pabst beer brands in Maryland. In 2014, Blue Ribbon, LLC purchased 100 percent of the stock of Pabst's parent entity. In 2015, Pabst terminated its contract with Winner, claiming that the termination was allowed under the SML. Winner disagreed and brought this lawsuit. The circuit court concluded that Blue Ribbon was permitted to cause Pabst to terminate its contract with Winner. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the SML applies only where the beer manufacturer that holds a Maryland license to distribute a brand of beer is replaced by another entity as the license hold with respect to that brand; and (2) Blue Ribbon did not qualify as a successor beer manufacturer, and Pabst did not have the right to terminate its contract with Winner without cause. View "Pabst Brewing Co. v. Frederick P. Winner, Ltd." on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals affirming the judgment of the circuit court convicting Defendant of driving under the influence of alcohol per se and driving while impaired by alcohol, holding that the record supported a finding that police officers complied with the twenty-minute observation period set forth in COMAR 10.35.02.08G.Prior to trial, Defendant filed a motion in limine to exclude the results of a breath test on the ground that the twenty-minute observation period set forth in the COMAR regulation had not been complied with. The circuit court denied the motion. After he was convicted, Defendant appealed, arguing that the circuit court erred in admitting the results of the breath test. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the alleged compliance or noncompliance with the twenty-minute observation period goes to the weight to be given to breath test results, not the admissibility; and (2) the circuit court made findings on the record that the officers complied with the twenty-minute observation period set forth in the COMAR regulation. View "Dejarnette v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the court of special appeals finding that Petitioner waived his objections to the trial court's denial of his proposed voir dire questions, holding that Petitioner failed to preserve his claims based on Kazadi v. State, 223 A.3d 554 (2020).In Kazadi, the Court of Appeals held that, upon request, a court is required to ask potential jurors voir dire questions directed at a defendant's fundamental rights related to the burden of proof, the presumption of innocence, and the right not to testify and held that this ruling applied retroactively to cases pending on appeal so long as the relevant question was preserved for appellate review. In the instant case, which was pending when Kazadi was decided and in which the trial court declined Defendant's request to ask Kazadi voir dire questions, was whether Petitioner's claim based on the trial court's failure to ask questions required by Kazadi was properly reserved for appellate review. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Petitioner's claims were not preserved for appellate review under Md. Rule 4-323(c). View "Lopez-Villa v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that a defendant's right to a unanimous jury verdict is violated when the State presents evidence of multiple incidents at trial to prove a single charged count in the absence of an election between the incidents or a special jury instruction.The court of special appeals affirmed the circuit court's judgment convicting Defendant of first-degree burglary, first-degree assault, and other crimes. At issue on appeal was whether the circuit court abused its discretion in failing to provide a supplemental instruction after the State argued in closing arguments that "the jury could rely on either of two distinct incidents to find [Defendant] guilty of the crimes that were charged as single counts." The court of special appeals determined that Defendant's encounters with the victim were part of a single continuous incident, and therefore, that a special unanimity instruction or election between incidents was not required. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that Defendant's convictions did not meet this Court's constitutional standards for unanimity and must be vacated. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that only the amount that a workers' compensation insurer actually pays for medical expenses is part of the statutory offset against underinsured motorist benefits.Michael Gilliam was injured in an automobile accident during the course of his employment and received payments from his employer's workers' compensation insurer and the other driver's liability insurer. Gilliam later sought to recover the amounts by which the other driver was underinsured from an insurance policy covering the vehicle he was driving. As required by Maryland law, the healthcare providers who treated Gilliam had generated bills in amounts greater than the amounts set by the Workers' Compensation Commission but accepted payments at those lower amounts in full satisfaction for their services. At issue was whether the difference between the bills' amounts and the workers' compensation insurer's payments constituted a "benefit" that Gilliam had "recovered" under the Workers' Compensation Act that was to be offset against any recovery Gilliam would obtain from the underinsured motorist coverage of the auto policy. The Supreme Court held that a difference between a higher face amount billed by a healthcare provider and the amount actually paid by the workers' compensation insurer was not part of that offset. View "Westfield Insurance Co. v. Gilliam" on Justia Law