Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Beka Industries, Inc. ("BEKA") sued the Board of Education of Worcester County ("County Board") alleging claims that arose from a written contract dispute between BEKA and the County Board when BEKA was dissatisfied with the methods and amounts of the County Board's payment for its work. The court considered several issues on appeal and held that a new trial was warranted where the County Board was precluded from presenting evidence on its recoupment claim and BEKA may have been awarded impermissible "delay damages" under the contract. The court also reversed the intermediate appellate court's holding that the County Board's governmental immunity was not waived unless and until BEKA proved that there was a funding mechanism to satisfy a judgment for money damages rendered against the County Board. Accordingly, court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded the case to the intermediate appellate court with direction to remand to the circuit court for a new trial.

Petitioner, a police officer, filed a complaint against respondent under the theory of respondeat superior and alleged negligent hiring/supervision and negligence in supervising 911 dispatch protocols when he suffered severe injuries from a car accident that occurred while he was pursuing a suspect from an "armed robbery." At issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in concluding that a police officer injured during a high-speed pursuit was barred by the common-law firefighter's rule from recovering in a tort action alleging negligence by a police dispatcher in giving the police officer faulty information that led to the commencement of the high-speed chase. Also at issue was whether the Court of Special Appeals erred in declining to address whether a "special duty" exception to the firefighter's rule should be recognized in Maryland. The court held that the firefighter's rule barred petitioner's claim where he failed to show the court a reason, based either in law or policy, to limit application of the firefighter's rule and where adopting such a limitation on the rule ran counter to its undergirding public policy, which recognized that the very nature of the firefighter's or police officer's occupation limits the public safety officer's ability to recover in tort for work-related injuries. The court also held that petitioner's general opposition to the application of the firefighter's rule was not sufficient to allow the circuit court the opportunity to decide the issue and therefore, the court also declined to decide the issue.

Petitioner filed a breach of contract claim against its former employee claiming that the employee violated the terms of her employment agreement by breaching the duty of loyalty and by breaching a non-solicitation clause which was included in the contract. The employee filed a counterclaim alleging that petitioner withheld her bonus in violation of the Maryland Wage Payment and Collection Law, Md. Code Ann., Labor and Employment section 3-501. At issue was whether an employee who breached her duty of loyalty could seek certain of the provisions of the contract which she breached. Also at issue was whether a party could recover attorneys' fees pursuant to a contract provision that provided reimbursement of fees incurred when a third party retained and paid counsel and the party did not pay attorneys' fees, nor had any obligations to pay attorneys' fees. The court held that the employee's breach of duty of loyalty did not result in forfeiture of her rights under the fee shifting provision of the non-solicitation clause where the clause presented divisible rights and obligations from the remainder of the contract. The court also held that the employee was entitled to attorneys' fees under the fee shifting provision where she prevailed under the terms of the contract and the breach did not result in the forfeiture of her rights.

Respondent James Goldsberry, Jr. was tried before a jury in Prince Georgeâs County Circuit Court and convicted of second degree felony murder, conspiracy, attempted robbery and weapons charges. He appealed the judgments of conviction to the Court of Special Appeals, where he raised a number of claims. The appellate court found merit in some claims, and reversed some of the convictions. The court remanded the case for a new trial on the attempted robbery and weapons charges, but affirmed the conviction of second degree felony murder and conspiracy to commit felony murder. Both parties sought Supreme Court review of the case. The issues presented to the Court for consideration were: (1) whether the trial court violated Respondentâs Sixth Amendment rights to representation by his counsel of choice when it dismissed one of Respondentâs three privately retained attorneys; (2) whether the trial court erred in giving the jury an instruction on an unanimous verdict; and (3) whether the appellate court erred by holding Respondent was convicted of a ânon-existentâ crime of second degree felony murder predicated on attempted robbery with a dangerous weapon. The Supreme Court found that the trial court did violate Respondentâs Sixth Amendment right to counsel of his choosing, and that the appellate court erred in its holding regarding the felony murder violation. The Courtâs decision entitled Respondent to a new trial, and accordingly it did not address the propriety of the trial courtâs jury instruction.

At issue on review by the Supreme Court is the extent to which the Local Government Tort Claims Act limits the recovery of a man whose constitutional rights were violated by acts of a local police force. Respondent Keith Longtin was arrested, interrogated for over 36 hours, and charged with the rape and murder of his wife. He was held in prison for over eight months. During his stay, the police department obtained exculpatory evidence, but failed to inform Respondent or to release him. Only when the police confirmed through a DNA match that the crime was committed by the another suspect did it release Respondent from prison. Respondent sued the police, the County and individual officers, and obtained a jury verdict of $6.2 million. The County appealed and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed the verdict. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to address, among other issues, the Countyâs primary argument on appeal: whether Respondentâs claim and verdict complied with the state Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). On review, the Supreme Court upheld the lower courtsâ decisions, finding that neither the notice provisions nor the damages cap of the LGTCA apply to limit the claim or the jury award in this case.

Petitioner 600 North Frederick Road, LLC, owner of one parcel of a three-parcel tract of land in Montgomery County, appealed the judgment from the Court of Special Appeals that affirmed the judgment of the circuit court. In that case, the court held that Petitionerâs predecessor in interest and the owner of one of the other parcels could modify bilaterally an earlier declaration executed and recorded by a single predecessor-owner at the time when all three parcels were under single ownership. The modification now limits Petitionerâs development rights on its later-acquired parcel, notwithstanding that two earlier declarations provided that any purported modification required the consent of the owner(s) of all three parcels. The court also ruled that the revised declaration applied not only to any third-party developer of the restricted parcel, but to Petitioner as owner of the proposed-for-development restricted parcel. Petitioner claims that because the original declaration required expressly the consent of the owner(s) of all of the parcels, an attempt to modify the agreement in a writing executed by less than all of the owners is ineffective, and the revised declaration is invalid and unenforceable. Respondent Burlington Coat Factory of Maryland, LLC, the assignee-leaseholder on one of the parcels, argued that two parties to a tripartite agreement may modify that agreement in writing, provided that the modifications do not prejudice the non-signatory party. The Supreme Court, on review of the record, held that the modifications in the revised declarations in this case were valid and enforceable absent a showing of prejudice by the non-consenting parcelâs owners. Furthermore, the Court held that the restrictions contained in the revised declaration apply not only to third-party developers of the restricted parcel, but also to Petitioner as owner. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs decision, and remanded the case to the circuit court for further proceedings.

Petitioner Stephen Norman and two others owned equal shares in Sussex Title Company. Respondents Scott Borison and the Legg Law Firm filed on behalf of their clients a proposed class action lawsuit against multiple defendants-companies, including Sussex, for their alleged participation in âthe single largest mortgage scam in Maryland history.â Respondents did not name Petitioner as a defendant in any version of their original complaint. However, in the second amended complaint, Petitioner was mentioned in certain allegations. Petitioner claims that respondents defamed him by republishing the pleadings to the press and on the internet, and by making verbal comments to the press about the lawsuit. The Supreme Court found that an absolute privilege applies to Respondentsâ challenged statements contained in the pleadings because they âreasonably contemplated [the] proceedingsâ of the class action suit. The Court affirmed the appellate courtâs judgment dismissing Petitionerâs defamation action.

Petitioner Ms. B. and Mr. T. are the biological parents of Shirley, Jordan, Davon and Cedric (collectively, "the Children"). In 2005, the Children were referred to Prince George's County Department of Social Services following reports of neglect and sexual abuse. A subsequent psychological evaluation revealed that Ms. B. was cognitively impaired, and that the Children had special needs of their own. Ms. B. was largely unresponsive to the Department's assistance, and she allowed vital benefits to lapse. She also allowed unauthorized adults to move into her home, exposing the Children to drug use and sexual activity. After a violent altercation between Ms. B., Mr. T. and Shirley, the Department sought to remove the Children from Ms. B.'s care. Proceedings at juvenile court ended with the Children being permanently removed from their home. Ms. B. appealed the decision, arguing the Department failed to make reasonable efforts to reunite her with her children, claiming she did not receive any specialized parenting services. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed the juvenile court's decision. On appeal, the Supreme Court reviewed the lower courts' records and affirmed their decisions: "the Department actively tried to connect the mother with services that could potentially assist her in her parental role⦠Accordingly, it made reasonable efforts toward unification."

In January, 2006, Appellee-Defendant Demetrius Daughtry was indicted with murder, robbery, robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a violent felony stemming from the botched robbery and shooting death of Anthony Brown. Defendant negotiated with the State to plead guilty to first-degree murder and use of a handgun in the commission of a violent felony. The circuit court agreed with the terms of the plea agreement, and sentenced Defendant to a term of life imprisonment. On appeal of the sentence, Defendant argued that the guilty plea should be vacated because the circuit court judge did not determine "on the record that defense counsel had advised [Defendant] of the elements of first degree murder." The appellate court vacated the convictions, explaining that "all [Defendant] said [on the record] was that he had 'talked over his plea' with counsel. â¦[The court] did not, in any way, assure that he understood the elements of the charge of first-degree murder. â¦Consequently, the voir dire conducted in this case failed to show that the plea met the required knowing, voluntary and intelligent standard [of Maryland Rule 4-242 and relevant caselaw]." On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the appellate decision vacating Defendant's convictions, finding no indicia that Defendant made a "knowing and voluntary" plea.

At issue on review by the Supreme Court is whether people aggrieved by the Board of County Commissioners of Kent County can appeal the Commissioners' decision to an appellate court. The Commissioners approved a request that effectively amended the County's local Critical Area Plan under the Chesapeake and Atlantic Coastal Bays Critical Area Protection Program. Petitioner Jerry Smith and several Kent County Residents challenged the Court of Special Appeals's decision to dismiss their challenge to the Commissioners' ruling that granted increased development of a particular parcel of property within the County. A procedural problem arose from a proclamation that said the County's decision is not effective until it's approved by the State Critical Area Commission. While consideration of the initial development request was pending before the Critical Area Commission, Petitioners sought judicial review in the circuit court of the County Commissioners' initial approval of the development. The court affirmed the County's approval for the development; Petitioners filed an appeal to the Court of Special Appeals. The appellate court dismissed the matter as premature. On review of the enabling statutes creating the Critical Area Protection program and the records of proceedings, the Supreme Court held that the County's approval of the development was not a final action, "considering that the [Critical Area] Commission's required decision may modify, reject, delay or even preclude the local approval from becoming effective. As a non-final order ⦠no immediate right existed to have judicial review take place." The Court affirmed the lower court's decision in dismissing Petitioner's case.