Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Petitioner Raymond Lupfer was convicted of second-degree murder, first-degree assault, and use of a handgun in a crime of violence. During the trial, the prosecution elicited testimony regarding the fact that Lupfer remained silent after he was arrested and advised of his Miranda rights. Petitioner appealed. The intermediate appellate court affirmed, explaining that a defendant's post-arrest, post-Miranda silence is permissible where the silence is introduced for the limited purpose of rebutting an impression created by the defendant that defendant cooperated fully with the police. The Supreme Court reversed and remanded, holding that because Lupfer did not open the door sufficiently under the open door doctrine with his statements at trial regarding his pre-arrest actions and intentions, the state was not entitled to elicit testimony regarding his post-arrest, post-Miranda silence. The Court concluded that when the prosecution elicits such evidence to rebut an implication that the defendant merely intended, at some undetermined point in the future, to cooperate with police, the probative value of such evidence is dwarfed by the danger of unfair prejudice. View "Lupfer v. State" on Justia Law

After lobbying for legislation authorizing collective bargaining for its members, the Maryland Transportation Authority Police Lodge #34 of the Fraternal Order of Police, Inc. (FOP) struck a written memorandum agreement with the Maryland Transportation Authority (MTA), in which the MTA agreed to fund a multi-million take-home vehicle (THV) program provided the bills were withdrawn and no collective bargaining legislation covering the MTA was passed that session. When a new governor took office, he declined to continue funding for the THV program. The FOP sued on theories of breach of contract and promissory estoppel. The circuit court granted MTA's motion to dismiss, finding that the agreement was unenforceable and violated the state's collective bargaining laws. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the appellate court and remanded the case with instructions to affirm the judgment of the circuit court, holding that because the legislature did not expressly authorize the MTA and its employees to bargain collectively at the time the agreement was executed, the agreement was unenforceable. View "Maryland Transp. Auth. v Maryland Transp. Auth. Police Lodge #34" on Justia Law

Petitioners Donna and Hilton Silver owned three horses found by police in terrible health. One horse had to be euthanized, and the other two were sent to a rescue farm for rehabilitation. The state charged the Silvers with three counts of animal cruelty. At a de novo trial in circuit court, the state pursued only the charge relating to the horse that died. At trial, the circuit court heard evidence regarding the condition of the other two horses and convicted the Silvers each of one count of animal cruelty. As a condition of probation, the court ordered the Silvers to pay restitution to the rescue farm. On appeal, the Court of Appeals held that the circuit court was not permitted to order restitution for the other horses with regard to whom the defendants were not convicted of a crime and vacated that order. The Court affirmed the rest of the circuit court's judgments, holding (1) the lower court did not abuse its discretion when it denied the Silvers' motion to strike and instead granted them a short continuance and opportunity to examine belatedly delivered discovery documents; and (2) the lower court did not err in admitting photographs of the surviving horses. View "Silver v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner James Thomas, a retired Maryland State Police officer, applied for special disability retirement benefits after being found guilty of neglect of duty, submitting inaccurate reports, and submitting false reports and being sanctioned with suspension and demotion. Petitioner's argument that he was entitled to the benefits was rejected by the Board of Trustees of the State Retirement and Pension System of Maryland (the Board). After that administrative decision was affirmed upon judicial review by the circuit court and court of special appeals, petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari. The Court of Appeals concluded that because petitioner's incapacity arose out of his "willful negligence," he was not entitled to special disability benefits provided by Md. Code Ann., State Pers. & Pens. 29-111(b)(1). Affirmed. View "Thomas v. State Ret. & Pension Sys. of Md." on Justia Law

Petitioners Policarpio Perez and Adam Canela were convicted of murder and related offenses in circuit court. During the course of the trial, jury members sent more than thirty notes to the court, seeking clarification of testimony and asking questions relating to the case. Of those notes, six were not disclosed to counsel for the defense or the state, or to the petitioners. Petitioners appealed, challenging the failure of the trial judge to disclose jury notes in accordance with Md. Rule 4-326(d). The state agreed that the trial judge erred in not disclosing the notes. At issue was whether the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that the court of special appeals erred in applying a weakened harmless error test to the erroneous non-disclosure to counsel of the six substantive jury notes. The Court concluded that it was not persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial judge's failure to disclose the receipt of the jury notes to counsel did not influence the jury's verdict. View "Perez v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with possessing marijuana, importing into Maryland between 5 and 45 kilograms of marijuana, and related offenses. Near the beginning of the trial of his criminal case, after the prosecution's first witness had completed his direct testimony and before cross-examination by the defense, the circuit court permitted petitioner to discharge his attorney and represent himself. At issue was whether, under the Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 21 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights, petitioner's decision to waive counsel and to represent himself satisfied the Johnson v. Zerbst standard of an intelligent and knowing waiver of counsel. The court held that petitioner did not intelligently and knowingly waive counsel where the circuit court failed to inform him of the full range of penalties he faced as a subsequent offender and where the record did not show that petitioner had previously been told of the maximum penalties he faced as a subsequent offender.

Petitioner was found guilty of armed robbery and use of a handgun in the commission of a felony and sentenced to concurrent sentences of 25 years' imprisonment without the possibility of parole for armed robbery, and 5 years without the possibility of parole for the handgun violation. Petitioner sought review of the sentence by a three-judge panel pursuant to Maryland Code 8-102, 8-105 of the Criminal Procedure Article and the panel unanimously increased the sentence originally imposed to 45 years of executed time. Thereafter, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of conviction and sentenced petitioner to a total of 40 years of executed time. At issue was what was the "sentence previously imposed" when the judge's sentence was increased by a three-judge sentence review. The court held that, in that instance, the sentence imposed by the three-judge panel was the "sentence previously imposed" for purposes of Maryland Code 12-702(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Court of Appeals and petitioner's 40-year sentence.

Petitioner sued the owners of her childhood home alleging injuries from lead paint on the premises. At issue was the trial court's instruction regarding the joint responsibilities of landlords and tenants in keeping the property in good condition. The court held that the inclusion of the instruction was error because neither plaintiff's contributory negligence nor negligence of her family members were at issue in the case. The court also held that the error was prejudicial because it introduced into the jury deliberations the idea that plaintiff, or her family, could have also been to blame for the injuries and such an argument was not only irrelevant to the case but prohibited by law and policy. The court further held that the inclusion of the argument could have permitted the jury to speculate or precluded a finding of liability where it was otherwise appropriate.

Plaintiff, born in September 1983, filed a five-count complaint against defendant, her grandfather, in September 2008 alleging that he raped her on two separate occasions, the first of which occurred when she was either six or seven-years-old and the second incident when she was eight-years-old. At issue was whether section 5-117 of the Courts & Judicial Proceedings Article could be properly applied retroactively to permit a claim that arose before the effective date of section 5-117 and which was barred by the prior statute of limitations. The court held that, assuming arguendo application of section 5-117 to plaintiff's claims represented a retrospective application of the statute, section 5-117 was a procedural and remedial statute, and, accordingly, it could be given such retrospective application to claims that were not-yet barred by the previously-applicable three-year statute of limitations period as of the extended period's effective date on October 1st, 2003.

Petitioners attempted to vacate their escape convictions where they were sentenced to terms of imprisonment with a deferred, or "springing," start date and the sentencing judge informed them that if they stayed out of further legal trouble during that time, they could return to court before the start date and have their sentences vacated; where petitioners did not return to court and later failed to report on the respective start dates; and where petitioners were charged and pled guilty to second degree escape. At issue was whether a conviction and/or sentence for second degree escape was legally valid if it was predicated on the failure to obey a court order to report to a place of confinement where that court order was legally invalid. The court held that petitioner's failure to report for imprisonment was sufficient to support their escape convictions. The court also held that the subsequent ruling in Montgomery v. State allowed petitioners to challenge, in the appropriate venue, the validity of their "springing" sentences but did not, however, allow them to engage in self-help. The court further held that Maryland law had clearly foreclosed, as a defense to escape, a challenge to the validity of the underlying conviction or sentence.