Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Waymon Anderson was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and second degree sexual offense. The State's evidence submitted to the trial court included a written report made to a detective in the police department by the medical director of the facility that conducted a forensic exam of the victim and interviewed the victim. The court of special appeals affirmed the ruling. Anderson filed a petition for writ of certiorari, contending that the trial court erred in admitting the report by the doctor, who was not present at trial, and allowing another doctor to testify as to its contents when the report had not been made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, holding that (1) the report should have been excluded on the ground that it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and was not admissible under either the "business records" exception or the "statements in contemplation of treatment" exception to the rule against hearsay; and (2) the erroneous decision to admit the report into evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

After Lee Stephens was indicted on charges of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, Stephens sought a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the state could produce DNA evidence at trial connecting him to the murder. The circuit court denied the request, and Stephens appealed. The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was an impermissible interlocutory appeal. The court of special appeals denied the motion. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative and dismissed the appeal, holding that the circuit court's ruling did not come within the purview of the collateral order doctrine because the order was reviewable after final judgment. View "Stephens v. State" on Justia Law

Bromberg Rosenthal filed a complaint against Coralie Kurstin in district court, seeking a judgment for the balance of fees owed by Kurstin under an employment agreement in which Kurstin hired Bromberg to represent her in her divorce. During pretrial skirmishing, Bromberg issued a deposition subpoena to Kurstin's present counsel. Kurstin's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting the attorney-client privilege, and also filed a motion for a protective order. The district court denied both motions and ruled that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. Kurstin appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal as premature, concluding that collateral order doctrine precluded the appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the intermediate appellate court correctly concluded that the circuit court's denial of the motion to quash was not immediately appealable because the issue (1) was inextricably intertwined with the merits of the action, and (2) will be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. View "Kurstin v. Bromberg" on Justia Law

Petitioner Warren Ballard was indicted on charges of first degree murder and related offenses. Ballard filed a motion to suppress a portion of what he disclosed during the latter half of his interrogation, arguing that, although he properly received Miranda warnings, he unequivocally invoked his right to counsel when he uttered the words, "You mind if I not say no more and just talk to an attorney about this" mid-way through the interrogation. The trial court denied the motion and later found Ballard guilty as charged. On appeal, the intermediate court of appeals affirmed, finding the trial court properly denied the suppression motion. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court with instructions to reverse the judgments of the circuit court, holding that Ballard's statement constituted an unequivocal invocation of the right to counsel, and therefore, pursuant to Miranda and its progeny, the interrogating detective was required at that moment to cease all questioning. Because the state made substantive use of Ballard's statements made during the ensuing interrogation that should have been suppressed, the case was remanded for a new trial. View "Ballard v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Troy Jones was convicted of unlawful possession of a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a felony, pursuant to Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety, 5-133(b). Jones appealed, arguing in the alternative that (1) Section 5-133(b) does not contain a penalty provision and that the penalty provisions in Md. Code Ann., Pub. Safety, 5-133(c) and 5-143 do not apply; and (2) an out-of-state conviction cannot serve as a predicate conviction for a violation of Section 5-133(b) and that the trial judge erred in imposing a mandatory minimum five-year sentence for the violation. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding that (1) Section 5-143 serves as the penalty provision for a violation of Section 5-133(b); (2) an out-of-state conviction can serve as a predicate conviction for purposes of Section 5-133(b); and (3) the trial judge erred in imposing a mandatory five-year sentence for a violation of Section 5-133(b). Remanded for new sentencing. View "Jones v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Leroy Evans appealed his conviction for the unlawful obliteration, removal, change, or alteration of a manufacturer's identification mark or number on a firearm pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-142, asserting that Section 5-142 does not contain a penalty provision, and therefore, penalizing him for altering a manufacturer's identification mark on a firearm was unlawful. The court of special appeals affirmed petitioner's conviction. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and held that the omission of a penalty provision in or related to Section 5-142, which prohibits obliterating, removing, changing, or altering the manufacturer's identification mark or number, renders Section 5-142 incapable of sustaining a criminal conviction. Accordingly, the Court reversed petitioner's conviction and remanded the case. View "Evans v. State" on Justia Law

In a declaratory judgment action, the Court of Appeals was asked to consider whether records of an investigation undertaken by the county police department's internal affairs division related to alleged violations of administrative rules of the department by two of its officers in connection with an automobile accident involving the assistant fire chief can be disclosed to the county's inspector general. After a hearing on the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the circuit court ordered the disclosure of the records of the internal investigation, but not information of a personal nature. The Court of Appeals held that records of an internal investigation pertaining to the alleged violation of administrative rules are personnel records pursuant to Md. Code Ann. State Gov't 10-616(i) and, therefore, may not be disclosed under the Maryland Public Information Act to the county inspector general. Accordingly, the Court vacated judgment of the circuit court and remanded for entry of a declaratory judgment in conformance with this opinion. View "Montgomery County v. Shropshire" on Justia Law

In the circuit court, a jury convicted petitioner Justin Hannah of the attempted murder of his former girlfriend's new boyfriend. After petitioner's conviction was affirmed by the court of special appeals, petitioner filed a petition for a writ of certiorari, which the Court of Appeals granted. The Court reversed the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that the admission of defense evidence that petitioner did not own or have access to a gun did not justify the admission into evidence of rap lyrics produced by petitioner two years before the offense which dealt with guns and violence. The Court concluded that the erroneous introduction of petitioner's writings did not constitute harmless error, and thus petitioner was entitled to a new trial. View "Hannah v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Lamar Harris was charged with first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder. Court proceedings had stalled in the preliminary stages due to a disagreement about the propriety of the trial judge's pretrial rulings ordering discovery of certain records and testimony pertaining to Harris's court-ordered competency evaluation and in-patient treatment at hospital. Harris sought review on the merits regarding the trial judge's denial of Harris's motion for a protective order resulting from service of subpoenas on one of Harris's treating physicians and the hospital. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding (1) the issue of whether privileged information was improperly disclosed at the competency determination phase may be addressed after Harris is convicted; and (2) because Harris may seek an appellate determination of the propriety of the discovery orders after a final judgment, there was no reason to expand the pool of exceptions to the court's final judgment rule. View "Harris v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, petitioner Ricky Savoy was convicted of involuntary manslaughter, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and carrying a handgun. Petitioner appealed, arguing that the trial court's instruction to the jury on the standard of proof violated due process by reducing the state's burden of proof to below the constitutionally-required standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Petitioner made no objection to the instruction at trial and argued to the court of special appeals that the erroneous instruction was a structural error that is per se reversible, even in the absence of a contemporaneous objection. He argued, alternatively, that the intermediate appellate court should reverse the judgments on the basis of plain error, as permitted by Maryland Rule 4-325(e). The intermediate appellate court affirmed. On appeal, the Supreme Court vacated and remanded the case for a new trial, holding (1) that the intermediate appellate court erred when it held that the reasonable doubt instructions did not constitute structural error or violate petitioner's fundamental right to a fair trial; and (2) this case was appropriate for the exercise of plain error review. View "Savoy v. State" on Justia Law