Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A jury convicted Appellant Jody Miles of first-degree felony murder and related offenses, including robbery with a deadly weapon and use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence. Miles was sentenced to death. The Court of Appeals affirmed Appellant's convictions and sentence. Miles subsequently filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, arguing that he was entitled to a new sentencing hearing on the ground that the jury should have been instructed that a death sentence cannot be imposed unless every juror is persuaded beyond a reasonable doubt that the aggravating circumstances outweigh the mitigating circumstances. The circuit court denied the motion. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant was not entitled to a new sentencing hearing as Maryland's capital sentencing procedure did not violate the Sixth Amendment. View "Miles v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Ronald Cox was convicted of multiple offenses related to a murder. The court of special appeals affirmed his convictions. The Court of Appeals granted Cox's petition for certiorari and affirmed, holding (1) the court of special appeals did not err in upholding the admission of hearsay testimony of a fellow inmate as (a) because the out-of-court statements were made voluntarily and were unprompted in casual conversation, they were not made with the primary purpose of creating an out-of-court substitute for trial testimony, and thus the statements were not testimonial and the Confrontation Clause did not bar their exclusion, and (b) the testimony was sufficiently attenuated from the taint of an earlier illegal search and arrest under the attenuation analysis set forth in Miles v. State, and (2) the evidence presented at trial was sufficient to allow a reasonable jury to find that Cox was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. View "Cox v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, William Langley was convicted of first-degree murder, use of a handgun in the commission of a crime of violence, and wearing or carrying a handgun. The court of special appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the admission into evidence of a recording of a 911 call violated Langley's confrontation rights where the call was placed after the offense had been completed and the alleged perpetrator had left the scene and where the caller indicated that she was aware that the police had been notified and were in the process of responding. Upon applying the U.S. Supreme Court's recent Michigan v. Bryant to the facts of the case, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the statements in the 911 tape were non-testimonial for Confrontation Clause purposes, and thus, Langley's right to confrontation was not infringed by the admission of the statements. View "Langley v. State" on Justia Law

A landowner submitted a site development plan to the county planning board, proposing to construct a mixed-use condominium building. Joel Broida, who lived across the street from the landowner's parcel of land, filed a motion to deny approval of the site development plan. The planning board approved the plan. Broida appealed. A hearing examiner dismissed the appeal, holding that Broida lacked standing. Broida appealed. The board of appeals (Board) split evenly on the issue of Broida's standing and decided to re-vote at a later date. The landowner then filed a complaint for a declaratory judgment, declaring that the Board's split decision was final and required the appeal to be dismissed. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the landowner. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Broida had standing to appeal. The court therefore did not address whether there was a final Board decision. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) there was no final administrative decision and, therefore, the landowner failed to exhaust its administrative remedies; and (2) because there was no final administrative decision, the lower courts erred in reaching the merits of the case, and the declaratory judgment action should have been dismissed. Remanded. View "Renaissance v. Broida" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case, Dorothy Faya, lived most of her life in Catonsville in Baltimore County. After suffering a fall, Faya was taken to University Speciality Hospital (USH) in Baltimore City, where she remained for eleven months until her death. Before the opening of an estate, USH filed a claim for the amount owed it with the register of wills in Baltimore City. The personal representative denied the claim filed in Baltimore City on the ground that it was invalid because Faya did not reside in the City at the time of her death. The Orphans' Court for Baltimore County agreed with the personal representative and entered judgment for the estate. The circuit court affirmed the judgment. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Faya's bodily presence as an inhabitant of a Baltimore City health facility at the time of her death qualified her as a resident of the City when she died. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that under the facts of this case, Faya could be considered a resident of Baltimore City. View "Boer v. Univ. Specialist Hosp." on Justia Law

Armardo Atkins was convicted of second degree assault in circuit court. On appeal, Atkins argued that the trial judge abused her discretion by instructing the jury that the State was not required to shoulder its burden of persuasion by the use of certain categories of demonstrative evidence. The court of appeals affirmed the convictions. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the instruction that the State need not use certain investigative and scientific techniques violated Atkins's constitutional rights to due process and a fair trial because it resulted in a non-neutral commentary on the evidence, or lack thereof, invaded the province of the jury, and relieved the State of its burden to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "Atkins v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioners, Douglas and Vanessa Wietzke, filed a four-count complaint against the Chesapeake Conference Association of Seventh-Day Adventists (the Church), alleging nuisance, trespass, and negligence in connection with the construction of a new parking lot by the Church. The Wietzkes claimed the lot was the cause of continued flooding of their home and requested damages and injunctive relief. The circuit court granted the Church's motion for judgment on the negligence claim then entered judgment in favor of the Church on the nuisance and trespass claims. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer several questions, most of which related to the trial judge's denial of several of the Wietzkes' requested jury instructions. The Court affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the trial court did not err in denying Wietzke's proposed jury instructions, (2) the model jury instructions requiring a finding of unreasonable conduct in a private nuisance action were a correct exposition of the law, and (3) the trial court erred in granting the Church's motion for judgment on the Wietzkes' negligence claim as the evidence could have supported a negligence claim. View "Wietzke v. Chesapeake Conference Ass'n" on Justia Law

Roger Greenberg was indicted and tried before a jury on five counts related to the care of Evelyn Zucker, to whom Greenberg had been married. During the proceeding against Greenberg, the trial judge permitted Greenberg's former lawyer, Mark Hessel, to testify as part of the State's case-in-chief. After Greenberg was convicted, he sought reversal on the grounds that the trial court allowed Hessel to testify without conducting a preliminary inquiry regarding the surrounding facts and circumstances of Hessel's representation of Greenberg, the complete circumstances related to Greenberg's possible waiver of privilege, and the scope of the prosecution's proposed use of the evidence at trial. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding that the trial court erred in determining that Greenberg waived the attorney-client privilege and that the error was not harmless. Remanded for a new trial. View "Greenberg v. State" on Justia Law

After responding to a domestic altercation between Mark Furda and his wife, police officers seized Furda's collection of weapons and transported Furda to the hospital for a mental health evaluation. Furda was later transferred to a behavioral health facility. Upon release, Furda requested the return of his firearms, which the trial court judge denied. Furda asked the judge to reconsider but purchased a new gun before the judge responded. When filling out the application to purchase the firearm, Furda certified, under penalty of perjury, that he had not been committed to a mental institution. Furda was later convicted of prejury and false information in a firearm application. The court of special appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Furda's motion for the return of his weapons but affirmed Furda's convictions. On review, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in the State's required application to purchase a firearm, a question asking whether the applicant has ever been adjudicated mentally defective or has been committed to a mental institution was not impermissibly ambiguous; and (2) Furda knowingly and willfully answered that question falsely. View "Furda v. State" on Justia Law

Tyrone Lawson was a seventeen-year veteran of the Bowie State University Police Department until his termination for violating the Department's chain of command policy. Specifically, Lawson had drafted a letter disclosing alleged abuses by his fellow officers, and instead of reporting the violations to the Department's Chief of Police, Lawson presented the letter to the university's vice president of student affairs. Lawson was later fired for, among other things, insubordination. Lawson sought relief, arguing that he was entitled to whistleblower protection because the letter constituted a "protected disclosure" as contemplated by Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 5-305. The ALJ concluded that Lawson's letter was not a protected disclosure because it was part of Lawson's crusade to improve the Department. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari and reversed, holding that the ALJ improperly conflated Lawson's personal motivation for disclosure with the statutory requirement that an employee have a reasonable belief that the information disclosed evidences a violation. Remanded. View "Lawson v. Bowie State Univ." on Justia Law