Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Jerry Hansen suffered a heart attack while working for Laurel City and assumed disabled status. When he attempted to return to work, he was informed he would no longer be employed with the City. After exhausting his administrative remedies, Hansen filed suit in the circuit court seeking damages. The City filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that Hansen had not satisfied the notice requirements of the Local Government Tort Claims Act (LGTCA). The circuit court dismissed the suit, and the court of special appeals affirmed. On appeal, Hansen argued that he complied with the required notice provision of the LGTCA by delivering written notice of his claims against the City to the City Administrator. The Supreme Court held that Hansen's failure to plead expressly in his complaint satisfaction of the LGTCA notice provision prevented Hansen from pursuing his claim. Accordingly, the Court did not decide whether Hansen's conduct complied with the applicable notice provision. View "Hansen v. City of Laurel" on Justia Law

Respondent Perry Simms was charged with murder as well as various weapons charges. Before the trial, Simms filed a timely notice of alibi witnesses, listing the names of eleven individuals. Prior to admission, the notice was redacted so that it showed only the name of Simms's father. At trial, the notice was admitted into evidence by the State and submitted to the jury along with transcripts of jailhouse phone calls. The trial judge reasoned that the notice was probative evidence of guilt when considered in conjunction with the phone calls, in which Simms and other callers referred to people who could vouch for Simms's whereabouts on the night of the incident. The intermediate appellate court reversed and remanded the case for a new trial, holding that the circuit court abused its discretion by admitting, over objections, a redacted copy of the alibi notice and that the error was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that admission of the alibi notice was error and an abuse of discretion, and the error was not harmless. View "State v. Simms" on Justia Law

Debtor Maureen Roberson filed a petition under Chapter 13 of Title 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, alleging that Ford Motor Credit Company wrongfully repossessed her car in the wake of her prior Chapter 7 bankruptcy charge and seeking to recover damages from Ford. During the proceedings, Ford filed a motion for summary judgment. Before the court could rule on the motion, Roberson filed a motion seeking certification of the question of whether a secured creditor is permitted under Maryland law to repossess in a car in which it maintains a security interest when the debtor has filed a bankruptcy petition and has failed to reaffirm the indebtedness, but has otherwise made timely payments before, during, and after bankruptcy proceedings. The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion. The Supreme Court answered the certified question in the positive because the parties agreed that Ford elected Section 12-1023(b) of the Credit Grantor Closed End Credit Provisions, Commercial Law Article, Maryland Code, to govern the retail installment contract in the present case. View "Ford Motor Credit Co., L.L.C. v. Roberson" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Dedrick Wilkerson was found guilty of second-degree rape, second-degree assault, and false imprisonment. While investigating the crime, Wilkerson was placed in flex cuffs in his home and questioned for several minutes by detectives before he was advised of his Miranda rights. At trial, Wilkerson moved to suppress both his pre-advisement and post-advisement statements made during the interrogation. The trial judge suppressed the pre-advisement statements, finding the interrogation was custodial, and denied the motion with respect to the post-advisement statements. The court of special appeals affirmed Wilkerson's conviction, concluding that the interrogating officers did not engage in the two-step or pre-advisement warning question-first tactics prohibited in Missouri v. Seibert but holding that Wilkerson preserved his Seibert argument for appellate review. In the interest of justice, the Court of Appeals concluded that the appropriate disposition of the case was a limited remand to the circuit court so the record could be more fully developed on the possible Seibert contention and the trial court could make the appropriate findings. View "Wilkerson v. State" on Justia Law

As part of the requirements of refinancing his home loan, Maurice Carter purchased lender's coverage title insurance from Huntington Title & Escrow. On behalf of a putative class of similarly situated persons, Carter alleged in a complaint filed in the circuit court that he was entitled to a reduced policy reissue rate, as mandated by the Maryland Insurance Administration (MIA), rather than the original issue rate actually charged. Huntington filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that the MIA was invested with primary jurisdiction over Carter's claim, such that Carter must pursue his claim initially in an administrative, rather than judicial, forum. The circuit court granted Huntington's motion and dismissed the case. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari and vacated the judgment of the circuit court, concluding that (1) the MIA possessed primary jurisdiction over Carter's claim, and, consequently, Carter must seek relief initially through the administrative process; and (2) the circuit court should stay the case pending the outcome of any administrative proceeding rather than relinquishing jurisdiction by dismissing Carter's case. View "Carter v. Huntington" on Justia Law

Helen Holton, a member of the Baltimore City Council, was charged with bribery, malfeasance in office, nonfeasance in office, and perjury. The circuit court granted Holton's motion to dismiss those charges on the ground of legislative privilege. The court of special appeals affirmed the ruling. At issue was whether Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-501, which protects local legislators from civil or criminal actions based on words spoken at a board or committee meeting, provided Holton with immunity. The Court of Appeals granted the State's petition for writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals, holding that the lower court did not err in holding that section 5-501 provides legislative immunity to local officials in state criminal prosecutions other than prosecutions for defamation. View "State v. Holton" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Andre Arthur was convicted of failing to obey a lawful order and resisting arrest. The court of special appeals affirmed Arthur's convictions, holding that although the issue of an unlawful arrest was factually generated, the trial court did not err in using a pattern jury instruction rather than Arthur's proposed jury instruction because the language of the pattern jury instruction adequately conveyed that the arrest must be lawful. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, holding that because the evidence presented at trial generated the issue of whether Stanley had probable cause to arrest Arthur, (1) the pattern jury instruction did not fairly cover the issue of whether the arresting officer had probable cause to arrest Arthur, and (2) the trial court abused its discretion in failing to provide a jury instruction on the law concerning Arthur's right to resist an unlawful arrest. Remanded for a new trial. View "Arthur v. State" on Justia Law

Waymon Anderson was convicted of sexual abuse of a minor and second degree sexual offense. The State's evidence submitted to the trial court included a written report made to a detective in the police department by the medical director of the facility that conducted a forensic exam of the victim and interviewed the victim. The court of special appeals affirmed the ruling. Anderson filed a petition for writ of certiorari, contending that the trial court erred in admitting the report by the doctor, who was not present at trial, and allowing another doctor to testify as to its contents when the report had not been made for purposes of medical diagnosis or treatment. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of the intermediate appellate court, holding that (1) the report should have been excluded on the ground that it was prepared in anticipation of litigation and was not admissible under either the "business records" exception or the "statements in contemplation of treatment" exception to the rule against hearsay; and (2) the erroneous decision to admit the report into evidence was not harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Remanded for a new trial. View "Anderson v. State" on Justia Law

After Lee Stephens was indicted on charges of first degree murder and conspiracy to commit first degree murder, Stephens sought a pre-trial evidentiary hearing to determine whether the state could produce DNA evidence at trial connecting him to the murder. The circuit court denied the request, and Stephens appealed. The state filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that it was an impermissible interlocutory appeal. The court of special appeals denied the motion. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari on its own initiative and dismissed the appeal, holding that the circuit court's ruling did not come within the purview of the collateral order doctrine because the order was reviewable after final judgment. View "Stephens v. State" on Justia Law

Bromberg Rosenthal filed a complaint against Coralie Kurstin in district court, seeking a judgment for the balance of fees owed by Kurstin under an employment agreement in which Kurstin hired Bromberg to represent her in her divorce. During pretrial skirmishing, Bromberg issued a deposition subpoena to Kurstin's present counsel. Kurstin's counsel filed a motion to quash the subpoena, asserting the attorney-client privilege, and also filed a motion for a protective order. The district court denied both motions and ruled that the attorney-client privilege had been waived. Kurstin appealed. The court of special appeals dismissed the appeal as premature, concluding that collateral order doctrine precluded the appeal. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding the intermediate appellate court correctly concluded that the circuit court's denial of the motion to quash was not immediately appealable because the issue (1) was inextricably intertwined with the merits of the action, and (2) will be reviewable on appeal from a final judgment. View "Kurstin v. Bromberg" on Justia Law