Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

After responding to a domestic altercation between Mark Furda and his wife, police officers seized Furda's collection of weapons and transported Furda to the hospital for a mental health evaluation. Furda was later transferred to a behavioral health facility. Upon release, Furda requested the return of his firearms, which the trial court judge denied. Furda asked the judge to reconsider but purchased a new gun before the judge responded. When filling out the application to purchase the firearm, Furda certified, under penalty of perjury, that he had not been committed to a mental institution. Furda was later convicted of prejury and false information in a firearm application. The court of special appeals reversed the trial court's denial of Furda's motion for the return of his weapons but affirmed Furda's convictions. On review, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) in the State's required application to purchase a firearm, a question asking whether the applicant has ever been adjudicated mentally defective or has been committed to a mental institution was not impermissibly ambiguous; and (2) Furda knowingly and willfully answered that question falsely. View "Furda v. State" on Justia Law

Tyrone Lawson was a seventeen-year veteran of the Bowie State University Police Department until his termination for violating the Department's chain of command policy. Specifically, Lawson had drafted a letter disclosing alleged abuses by his fellow officers, and instead of reporting the violations to the Department's Chief of Police, Lawson presented the letter to the university's vice president of student affairs. Lawson was later fired for, among other things, insubordination. Lawson sought relief, arguing that he was entitled to whistleblower protection because the letter constituted a "protected disclosure" as contemplated by Md. Code Ann. State Pers. & Pens. 5-305. The ALJ concluded that Lawson's letter was not a protected disclosure because it was part of Lawson's crusade to improve the Department. The circuit court affirmed. The Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari and reversed, holding that the ALJ improperly conflated Lawson's personal motivation for disclosure with the statutory requirement that an employee have a reasonable belief that the information disclosed evidences a violation. Remanded. View "Lawson v. Bowie State Univ." on Justia Law

In this action, secured parties, as creditors in bankruptcy proceedings and appellees here, attempted in separate cases before the bankruptcy court to execute on four deeds of trust whose affidavits of considerations were missing or improper. Appellants, four trustees in bankruptcy, argued that those defects rendered the deeds of trust invalid such that the trustees possessed the properties free and clear of the creditor's interests. The creditors countered that Md. Code Ann. Real Prop. 4-109 cured the defects at issue. The Court of Appeals accepted certified questions regarding the statute and answered them in the affirmative, holding that Section 4-109 is unambiguous, and pursuant to the plain language of the statute and as confirmed by legislative history, cures the type of defects identified by the trustees, including missing or improper affidavits or acknowledgments, unless a timely judicial challenge is mounted. View "Guttman v. Wells Fargo Bank" on Justia Law

At issue in this medical malpractice action was a requirement of the Healthcare Malpractice Claims Act (HCMCA) that a plaintiff in a medical malpractice action file a proper Certificate of Merit (Certificate), and whether, in this case, Respondent's filing of a Certificate that did not meet the requirements of Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-2A-02 required dismissal, without prejudice, of the underlying claim rather than the grant of summary judgment to Petitioner. Here the circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of Petitioner. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that because Respondent filed a Certificate of an expert that did not meet the requirements of section 3-2A-02, dismissal without prejudice of the underlying claim was required. On appeal, Petitioner argued that because Respondent's attesting expert was not qualified to attest to the standard of care allegedly breached by Petitioner, summary judgment was proper. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the plain language of the HCMCA was clear and required dismissal without prejudice of the underlying claim for the filing of a non-compliant Certificate, regardless of the particular qualification or requirement the Certificate or its attestor failed to meet. View "Breslin v. Powell" on Justia Law

Deltavia Cure was convicted of possession with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, conspiracy to distribute a controlled dangerous substance, and conspiracy to possess with intent to distribute a controlled dangerous substance. Cure appealed, arguing that the trial court abused its discretion by ruling that he could be impeached with a prior arson conviction. The court of special appeals held that (1) Cure waived his right to appellate review of the admissibility of his conviction for impeachment purposes, and (2) waiver aside, it was not an abuse of discretion for the trial court to rule that Cure's arson conviction would be admissible for impeachment purposes. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) when a defendant elects to testify and, in so doing, testifies affirmatively on direct examination as to the existence of a prior conviction to "draw the sting out" of that conviction, he does not waive necessarily his right to appellate review of the merits of the trial judge's prior in limine determination that the prosecution may use the conviction for impeachment purposes; and (2) the trial judge did not abuse his discretion in ruling that Cure's prior arson conviction could be used for impeachment purposes. View "Cure v. State" on Justia Law

Three separate sets of repairs were made to a waste hauler purchased by Consolidated Waste from Standard Equipment. Consolidated Waste filed a complaint in circuit court, seeking to recoup the cost of the second round of repairs and claiming that the first and second set of repairs, performed by Standard Equipment, were made in such a way as to constitute a breach of contract and negligence. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Standard Equipment. After appealing to the court of special appeals, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of certiorari. The Court affirmed the judgment of the trial court, holding that the trial court did not abuse its discretion (1) by excluding evidence of the third round of repairs, performed by a different company, as a reasonable trial judge could have determined that the danger of prejudice outweighed substantially any probative value of the evidence; and (2) by utilizing a verdict sheet supplied by Standard Equipment. View "Consolidated Waste Indus. v. Standard Equip. Co." on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Kendall Northam was convicted of second degree murder and first degree assault. During the proceedings, Northam, who was represented by an assistant public defender, filed a pro se motion for change of venue that included a request for a court-appointed attorney. The motion was denied. On appeal, the court of special appeals held that Northam was entitled to a new trial on the ground that the circuit court had failed to comply with the requirements of Md. R. Crim. P. 4-215(e) by failing to permit Northam to explain the reasons for his request to discharge defense counsel. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and reversed, holding that Northam waived his right to appellate review of the claim on the ground that he was not permitted to explain the reasons for requesting permission to discharge defense counsel. View "State v. Northam" on Justia Law

The Maryland State Retirement System (System) filed a claim against Milliman, an actuary, asserting that Milliman had understated the contributions required to fund three of the State's ten retirement and pension systems because of Milliman's misinterpretation of a particular data code. The Retirement System Procurement Officer determined that Milliman had failed to comply with its contractual duties and awarded damages to the System. On appeal, the State Board of Contract Appeals determined that the actuary had substantially breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the damages. The circuit court affirmed the Board's findings that Milliman breached its contracts with the System and affirmed the award of lost investment earnings but reversed the Board's award of amounts equaling lost contributions. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, holding (1) Milliman was liable to the System for repeatedly misinterpreting a data code; (2) the System was not negligent in the development or transmission of data provided to Milliman and, therefore, contributory negligence did not bar the System's recovery; and (3) the circuit court erroneously reduced the Board's damage award representing lost contributions. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment of the circuit court and affirmed the Board's decision. View "Milliman, Inc. v. State Ret. & Pension Sys." on Justia Law

Respondent Annapolis Towne Centre (ATC), the owner and developer of a mixed-use development, entered into an agreement with petitioner Hovnanian Land Investment, a residential developer, under which ATC agreed to sell a portion of the property to Hovnanian for the construction of a residential tower. The contract required certain conditions to be met by ATC prior to the closing and contained a clause stating that any waiver of the contract had to be in writing. Before closing, Hovnanian terminated the agreement, alleging that ATC failed to meet a condition precedent. ATC sought a declaratory judgment, and both parties filed motions for summary judgment on the issue of whether ATC had complied with the condition precedent. The circuit court granted ATC's motion for summary judgment on that issue, holding that Hovnanian waived the condition precedent. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that summary judgment was not appropriate because (1) a condition precedent may be waived by a party's conduct, despite a non-waiver clause, but whether Hovnanian's actions amounted to a waiver was a dispute of material fact; and (2) the question of whether ATC strictly fulfilled the condition also involved material questions of fact. Remanded. View "Hovnanian Land Inv. Group, L.L.C. v. Annapolis Towne Centre at Parole, L.L.C." on Justia Law

While employed with Alpharma, a pharmaceutical company, Debra Parks was involved in marketing a prescription drug known as Kadian. Parks filed a complaint in circuit court for wrongful termination in violation of public policy, claiming that Alpharma was involved in illegal marketing activities and that after Parks had raised her concerns with various people at Alpharma, Alpharma retaliated against her by terminating her employment. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. While Parks' appeal was pending in the intermediate appellate court, the Court of Appeals granted certiorari on its own initiative. The Court affirmed the ruling of the circuit court on the basis that Parks failed to identify any clear mandate of public policy allegedly violated by Alpharma and allegedly reported by her that would constitute some of the required elements of a wrongful discharge claim. View "Parks v. Alpharma" on Justia Law