Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case arose out of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding involving a residential sale. In the advertisement for the sale, the trustees included an additional condition not found in the mortgage documents or authorized by the Maryland Rules that any successful purchaser at the sale would be required to pay the legal fees of attorneys who would be utilized to review the documents on behalf of the trustees by which they would hold settlement and ultimately convey title. The circuit court and court of special appeals ratified the sale. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that in the absence of specific authority in the contract of indebtedness or contained in statute or court rule, it is an impermissible abuse of discretion for trustees or the lenders who 'bid in' properties to include the demand for additional legal fees for the benefit of the trustees in the advertisement of sale or in any other way that is in contrary to the duty of trustees to maximize the proceeds of the sales and, moreover, is not in conformance with state or local rules and is against public policy. View "Maddox v. Cohn" on Justia Law

After three separate trials for several criminal offenses, Appellant Benoit Tshiwala was sentenced to an aggregate of seventy years in prison. Appellant subsequently filed an application for review of his sentences, and a three-judge review panel reduced the total period of imprisonment to thirty-nine years. Thereafter, Appellant filed a motion for reconsideration of sentence, which was denied. Appellant then instituted the present action by filing a motion to correct an illegal sentence pursuant to Md. R. Crim. P. 4-345(a), alleging that the three judges who denied reconsideration were not authorized to rule on the motion. The circuit court denied Appellant's motion to correct an illegal sentence. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that Tshiwala's claim was not cognizable under a motion to correct an illegal sentence because Tshiwala's claim did not involve an "illegal sentence" within the meaning of Rule 4-345(a). View "Tshiwala v. State" on Justia Law

Respondents, the owner of the City Paper and a reporter, published two articles in the City Paper that reported on a double murder. Petitioner, Nicholas Piscatelli, who was mentioned unflatteringly in the articles, perceived that his reputation had been injured thereby and he had been portrayed in a false light. Piscatelli sued Respondents for damages based on defamation and false light claims. The circuit court granted Respondents' motion for summary judgment. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the manner in which Respondent published the statements placed them within the protection of fair reporting and fair comment privileges, and consequently, Piscatelli's claims were not actionable. View "Piscatelli v. Smith" on Justia Law

After an auction sale was ratified, Respondent David Simard defaulted on his contract to purchase the real property in question. Simard admitted liability for the risk and expense of the initial resale, but when the purchaser at the resale defaulted as well, Simard balked at paying the expense and loss incurred at a second resale. Applying Md. R. Civ. P. 14-305(g), the circuit court held that Simard was liable for the risk and expense of both resales. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Rule 14-305(g) required that a defaulting purchaser be responsible for only one resale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent special circumstances, a defaulting purchaser at a foreclosure sale of property is liable, under Rule 14-305(g), for only the one resale resulting from his or her default. View "Burson v. Simard" on Justia Law

Six individuals and the Magothy River Association (Appellees), brought suit against the recent purchasers of Dobbins Island (Appellants), seeking to establish a public right to use a beach located alongside the island's northern crescent area. Following a bench trial, the trial judge determined that Appellees had demonstrated the existence of a prescriptive easement on behalf of the public and ordered the removal of portions of a fence erected on the beach by Appellants. In making this determination the trial judge applied the general presumption of adverse use and, accordingly, placed the burden on Appellants to prove that the use was, in fact, permissive. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the trial court's application of the general presumption of adverse use was in error, as the beach at issue was unimproved and otherwise in a general state of nature; and (2) therefore, the proper presumption, under the circumstances, was that public use was by permission of the owner. Remanded. View "Clickner v. Magothy River Ass'n " on Justia Law

In 2007, the house of delegates enacted legislation that proposed a constitutional amendment that would legalize video slot machine gambling in Maryland. During that same session, the state senate initiated companion legislation, an appropriations bill, contingent on the proposed constitutional amendment being ratified by the electorate, pursuant to which the gambling revenue would be appropriated and distributed. Each piece of legislation was passed by the general assembly and signed into law by the governor. Petitioners mounted an attack on both the contingent legislation and the constitutional amendment, arguing (1) the contingent legislation unconstitutionally delegated legislative power to the voters, and (2) the ballot question language regarding the constitutional amendment was misleading and deficient. The Supreme Court addressed the first of Petitioners' contentions in Smigiel v. Franchot, in which it held that the legislation was constitutional. In this case, the Court (1) affirmed its holding in Smigiel; and (2) held that, regarding Petitioners' second contention, the ballot question language was sufficient, as it accurately conveyed the effect of the proposed amendment, and was neither misleading nor deficient. View "Stop Slots MD v. Bd. of Elections" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, each of whom was arrested for a crime that qualified as a serious offense and requested an attorney to represent him or her at the initial appearance, sought a declaration that they and the class of indigent persons they represented had the right, under the federal and state constitutions and the Public Defender Act, to be represented by the public defender at bail hearings, which were conducted as part of the initial appearance before commissioners at the central booking jail. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Plaintiffs, entered a declaratory judgment, and denied Plaintiffs' request for an injunction to enforce the rights declared. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the bail hearing that occurs at the initial appearance before a Commissioner is a stage of the criminal proceeding under the Act; and (2) consequently, if a defendant qualifies for public defender representation, a bail hearing may not occur at the initial appearance unless the defendant has been afforded appointed counsel or waived the right to counsel. View "DeWolfe v. Richmond" on Justia Law

Petitioner Rodney Moore was convicted of illegal possession of a regulated firearm and sentenced to five years' imprisonment without possibility of parole. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari and affirmed, holding that the proof of operability of the firearm, as it is defined in Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-101(h), is not a prerequisite to a conviction of illegal possession of a regulated firearm under Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 5-133(c), which prohibits a person convicted of a crime of violence or offenses related to the sale and distribution of controlled dangerous substances from possessing a regulated firearm. View "Moore v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Olusegun Ogundipe was charged with multiple crimes stemming from his involvement in an incident in which one man was killed, one man was seriously injured, and one man was assaulted. Following a jury trial in the circuit court, Petitioner was convicted as charged. The court of special appeals affirmed the jury's verdict. The Court of Appeals granted certiorari to answer whether there is a duty of the trial court to disclose a signed verdict sheet to a defendant or his counsel before the jury is discharged. The Court affirmed, holding that the trial court did not err in failing to disclose the contents of the verdict sheet used by the jury in its deliberations before dismissing the jury because the jury verdict sheet is not a communication within the meaning of Md. R. Crim. P. 4-326(d), which requires the court to notify and disclose to counsel any jury communication received before responding to the communication. View "Ogundipe v. State" on Justia Law

On February 22, 2007, a prostitute alleged that she had sexual intercourse with Petitioner, an officer with the Baltimore Police Department (BDP). On June 26, 2008, the BDP administratively charged Petitioner with six violations of BDP general orders arising out of his alleged sexual misconduct and his alleged false statements to investigators with the BDP's internal investigation division on July 11, 2007 and August 1, 2007. On July 11, 2008, the BPD terminated Petitioner. Petitioner appealed, contending that the administrative charges were barred by the one-year statute of limitations set forth in section 3-106 of the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights. The circuit court granted the BPD's cross-motion for summary judgment as it related to the false statement charge, ruling that it was filed within the one-year limitations window. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the limitations period begins when the officer makes the false statement, not when the earlier misconduct that underlies the investigation was alleged to have occurred. View "Robinson v. Baltimore Police Dep't" on Justia Law