Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Appellant used NVR Mortgage Finance, Inc. to apply for a mortgage and paid NVR Mortgage a broker fee. More than three but fewer than twelve years later, Appelalnt sued NVR Mortgage and NVR, Inc. (collectively, NVR) for allegedly violating Md. Code Ann., Com. Law 12-805(d) by failing to make certain disclosures to Appellant and similarly situated homebuyers before collecting finder’s fees for brokering mortgages. At issue before the Supreme Court was whether an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is an “other specialty” under Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-102(a)(6), which is subject to a twelve-year statute of limitations. The Supreme Court answered the certified question of law in the negative, holding that an alleged violation of CL 12-805(d) is not an “other specialty” under CJP 5-102(a)(6), and thus is subject to the default three-year statute of limitations. View "NVR Mortgage Fin., Inc. v. Carlsen" on Justia Law

Appellant owned property located within the heart of a planned development. The City of Baltimore sought to condemn the property. When the City and Appellant were unable to agree upon a price to be paid for the property, the City filed a petition for condemnation. Prior to trial, the City filed a petition for immediate possession and title, alleging that immediate possession of the property was necessary. Ultimately, the circuit court concluded that Appellant was a “hold-out,” which justified a “quick-take” condemnation of the property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the facts of this case justified a “quick-take” condemnation action. View "Makowski v. Mayor & City of Baltimore" on Justia Law

Petitioners obtained a loan from a Lender by taking out a second mortgage on their residence secured by a deed of trust on that property. The Lender sold the loan to another entity, to whom it assigned the loan instruments. That entity, in turn, sold the loan and assigned the loan instruments. After Petitioners had paid off the note and Respondent had released the deed of trust, Petitioners sued the Lender and Respondent, alleging that Lender had violated the Maryland Secondary Mortgage Loan Law (SMLL) at the time of the original transaction. The circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondent. The court of special appeals affirmed, holding (1) Petitioners’ sole recourse against an assignee such as Respondent for the Lender’s violations of the SMLL would be by way of recoupment, but (2) because Petitioners filed suit only after they had paid off the loan, that remedy was not available to them. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Respondent was not liable for violations of the SMLL committed by the Lender when the loan was originated, and (2) Respondent was not derivatively liable under statute or the common law for a violation of the SMLL committed by the Lender. View "Thompkins v. Mountaineer Invs., LLC" on Justia Law

Buyer purchased property located within a homeowners association. Buyer, who already owned other lots within the association, later canceled the contract with Sellers because he had not received mandatory disclosures from Sellers pursuant to the Maryland Homeowners Association Act, which requires that notice be given to "a member of the public who intends to occupy or rent the lot for residential purposes." Sellers sued Buyer for breach of contract, contending that Buyer was not a "member of the public" under the statute because Buyer, as a property owner in the association, already had access to the homeowners association policies and thus did not require disclosures making him aware of the relevant applicable rules and policies. The circuit court granted Buyer's motion to dismiss, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Buyer was a "member of the public" for purposes of the statute; but (2) the circuit court erred in granting Buyer's motion to dismiss because Sellers presented a justiciable issue of equitable estoppel based on Buyer's affirmative refusal to receive the requirement documents and information proffered to him by Sellers.View "Lipitz v. Hurwitz" on Justia Law

Substitute trustees initiated a foreclosure action against defaulting borrowers. The foreclosure sale was announced in a newspaper advertisement stating that if the purchaser failed to settle within ten days of the ratification, the purchaser would pay attorney fees of $750. Appellant subsequently purchased the property. Prior to any ratification by the circuit court of the foreclosure sale, the administrative judge for the circuit court issued a notice stating that because the $750 included in the advertisement was an impermissible fee under Maddox v. Cohn, the sale was invalid. A hearing judge deferred to the administrative judge's opinion and entered an order vacating the sale and ordering a resale. The Court of Appeals reversed the order vacating the foreclosure sale, holding (1) the hearing judge abused her discretion in yielding deference to the administrative judge's view of the matter; (2) the screening procedures utilized by the circuit court, pursuant to Md. Rule 14-207.1, were permissible in this case; and (3) Maddox was inapposite to this case because the fee here was contemplated by a Maryland rule. Remanded.View "101 Geneva LLC v. Wynn" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the State Center Project, a $1.5 billion redevelopment project intended to revitalize property owned by the State in Baltimore. In 2005, the State issued a public request for qualifications to solicit a master developer for the project. The State Center, LLC was chosen as the master developer. The Maryland Department of General Services (“DGS”), the Maryland Department of Transportation (“MDOT”) and the State Center, LLC negotiated for the Project, entering a series of agreements between 2007 and 2010 to complete the Project in a timely manner. In 2010, Plaintiffs, property owners in downtown Baltimore and taxpayers, filed suit against the DGS, MDOT, and the State Center and its subsidiaries, seeking a declaratory judgment that the formative contracts for the Project were void and seeking an injunction to halt the Project. The trial court voided the formative contracts, concluding that they violated the State Procurement Law. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the circuit court and remanded with directions to dismiss Plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice, holding that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the doctrine of laches due to an unreasonable delay in bringing their claims, causing prejudice to the defendants. View "State Ctr., LLC v. Lexington Charles Ltd. P’ship" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was Chapter 286 of the 2007 Session Laws of Maryland. The legislation revised existing law by replacing ejectment with a lien-and-foreclosure process for defaulting lessees of ground leases when more than six months of rent is overdue. Plaintiffs, a group of lessors holding ground leases, brought an action against the State challenging Chapter 286 on constitutional grounds, claiming that the Legislature impermissibly abrogated their vested rights. The State counted that the legislation simply substituted one remedy for another remedy that achieves the same purposes. The circuit court held that the General Assembly exceeded its power and that Chapter 286 operated as an unconstitutional taking of the ground lease holder’s property. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the foreclosure-and-lien remedy of Chapter 286 does not provide the same safeguards for leaseholders as the prior ejectment remedy did; (2) accordingly, the foreclosure-and-lien remedy cannot effectively replace the ejectment remedy, which is essential for the right of re-entry in Maryland ground rents; and (3) thus, Chapter 286 cannot survive constitutional scrutiny because the right of re-entry is vested in ground rents entered prior to its enactment. View "State v. Goldberg" on Justia Law

In two cases, Montgomery County took a portion of properties owned by Respondents. Because the parties disputed the value paid for either taking the County filed a complaint for condemnation. During the proceedings, the circuit court imposed discovery violation sanctions precluding Respondents from introducing evidence as to the fair market value of the taken properties. Respondents were therefore unable to generate a genuine issue of material fact concerning the County's appraisal valuations. As a result, the circuit court granted summary judgment for the County on the issue of just compensation. The court of special appeals reversed, concluding that summary judgment on the question of just compensation is not available in condemnation proceedings because a property owner cannot be deprived of the constitutional right to have a jury determine just compensation. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) permitting summary judgment does not violate the constitutional right to have the opportunity for a jury trial to ascertain just compensation in compensation actions provided the landowner litigates the case according to the Maryland Rules; and (2) summary judgment was properly granted in each case because there was no genuine dispute of material fact and the County was entitled to judgment as a matter of law. View "Montgomery County v. Soleimanzadeh" on Justia Law

Defendant was assigned the serving rights to Plaintiff's mortgage on a piece of property. Plaintiff sued Defendant, claiming that Defendant attempted to collect more than was due on the loan. The parties settled. Plaintiff then filed this action against Defendant, alleging breach of the settlement agreement, defamation, and violations of the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act. An order of default was later entered against Defendant. Defendant subsequently filed a motion for a new trial or to alter or amend the judgment, requesting that the default judgments be set aside because Plaintiff's claims were legally deficient. The trial court denied the motion. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a defaulting party who does not file a motion to vacate the order of default after a default judgment has been entered cannot file a Maryland Rule 2-534 motion to alter or amend a judgment to contest liability, and the defaulting party cannot appeal that judgment in order to contest liability. View "Franklin Credit Mgmt. Corp. v. Nefflen" on Justia Law

Druid Ridge Cemetery Company entered into a contract to sell thirty-six acres of the approximately 200 acres it owned and were a part of its cemetery operation. The intended purchaser entered into the contract to construct residences on portions of the land immediately adjacent to Park Heights Avenue. The Dumbarton Improvement and Long Meadow Neighborhood Associations challenged the sale, claiming that the residential development violated a restrictive covenant contained in the deed conveying the cemetery property to Druid Ridge. The circuit court determined (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was ambiguous, and (2) alternatively, there were radically changed circumstances in the area rendering the restrictive covenant ineffective and unenforceable. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) the language of the restrictive covenant was unambiguous; and (2) the nexus between the changed circumstances and the purpose of the covenant was not sufficient to render the restrictive covenant unenforceable. Remanded. View "Dumbarton Improvement Ass'n v. Druid Ridge Cemetery Co." on Justia Law