Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Maryland Critical Area law establishes a cooperative program with local jurisdictions to ensure that land near Chesapeake Bay and the Atlantic coastal bays has special protection against development that might cause environmental damage. Although the law allows a property owner to seek a variance, it places the burden of proof on the applicant to demonstrate that the applicant would suffer an “unwarranted hardship” without the variance and that granting the variance will not have an adverse environmental impact. Schwalbach sought a variance from a Worcester County ordinance that limits piers to 100 feet in length, in order to access navigable water from his waterfront property in a community where piers and boating are common. Schwalbach obtained necessary federal, state, and local environmental agency approvals. The County Board of Zoning Appeals granted the variance. The Circuit Court, the Court of Special Appeals, and the Maryland Court of Appeals upheld the approval.Schwalbach was not required to show that he would be denied all reasonable and significant use of his land without the variance, but rather that he would be denied a reasonable and significant use throughout the entire property. There was sufficient evidence to conclude that Schwalbach satisfied that standard and the standard that there be no adverse environmental impact from granting the variance. View "Assateague Coastal Trust v. Schwalbach" on Justia Law

The Fangmans sought to represent a class of approximately 4,000 to 5,000 individuals who, from 2009 to 2014, retained Genuine Title for settlement and title services and utilized various lenders for the purchase and/or refinancing of their residences, allegedly as a result of referrals from the lenders. All of the lenders are servicers of federally related mortgage loans. The complaint alleges an illegal kickback scheme and that “sham companies” that were created by Genuine Title to conceal the kickbacks, which were not disclosed on the HUD-1 form. After dismissing most of the federal claims, the federal court certified to the Maryland Court of Appeals the question of law: Does Md. Code , Real Prop. [(1974, 2015 Repl. Vol.) 14-127 imply a private right of action?” The statute prohibits certain consideration in real estate transactions. That court responded “no” and held that RP 14-127 does not contain an express or implied private right of action, as neither its plain language, legislative history, nor legislative purpose demonstrates any intent on the General Assembly’s part to create a private right of action. View "Fangman v. Genuine Title, LLC" on Justia Law

At issue in this case were two parcels of land in the Emerald Hills Subdivision called the Triangular Parcel and Parcel 765. In 2009, the owners of Parcel 765 began construction of a paved driveway on the Triangular Parcel to access a public street. The Emerald Hills Homeowners’ Association filed suit, seeking compensatory damages, injunctive relief, and a declaratory judgment that the Triangular Parcel was not subject to an easement for the benefit of Parcel 765. The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of the Association. The Court of Special Appeals reversed, ruling that the Subdivision Plat established an express easement over the Triangular Parcel in favor of Parcel 765 and that a Cross Easement Agreement executed in 2001 by the developer of the Emerald Hills Subdivision had no effect on this easement. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Subdivision Plat for Emerald Hills established an express easement; and (2) the Cross Easement Agreement did not extinguish any easement attached to Parcel 765. View "Emerald Hills Homeowners’ Ass’n, Inc. v. Peters" on Justia Law

The Capital Crescent Trail, a hiker/biker route, runs between Georgetown in the District of Columbia and Silver Spring, Maryland. Its path was formerly used as a railroad. When the trains stopped running, the property was transferred to Montgomery County, Maryland via a quit-claim deed. The County planned to develop within the former rail line (and current hiker/biker trail) a commuter light rail project. The predecessors in interest to a private landowner adjacent to the rail line had previously erected a fence and installed a shed that encroached for more than twenty years upon the railroad right-of-way. The landowner argued that he owned the encroached-upon land by adverse possession. The circuit court ultimately concluded that the landowner had a creditable claim for adverse possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the evidence in the record did not establish that the current use of the right-of-way by Montgomery County was unreasonable or that the Railroad or the County abandoned the right-of-way, and therefore, the landowner had no claim for adverse possession. View "Montgomery County v. Bhatt" on Justia Law

Appellees’ farm was condemned by the Board of Education for the purpose of building a school. On Appellees’ behalf, the Board paid the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. Appellees requested from the County a refund of a portion of the County farmland transfer tax, arguing that the County, in calculating the County farmland transfer tax, was incorrect in concluding that the twenty-five percent State surcharge was not part of the combined transfer tax. The County denied the request for a refund. The Tax Court affirmed, concluding that the State surcharge was to be collected in addition to the State agricultural land transfer tax and the County farmland transfer tax. The circuit court reversed. The Court of Special Appeals certified the case to the Court of Appeals to answer a question of law. The Court of Appeals answered (1) the agricultural land transfer tax, as set forth in Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-407(a)(2) and (3), includes the State surcharge imposed under Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 13-303(d), and the State surcharge must be calculated into the tax ceiling on a county’s agricultural land transfer tax; and (2) therefore, Appellees were entitled to a refund in the amount of the overcharge of the County farmland transfer tax. View "Montgomery County v. Phillips" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether a lender who takes possession of property but does not become the fee simple record owner of the property through foreclosure or a deed in lieu of foreclosure is liable for homeowners’ association assessments. The resolution of the question was not addressed on appeal, however. Petitioner, a homeowners association, filed a complaint against Respondent, a bank, alleging that Respondent had failed to pay homeowners’ association dues since taking possession of property. The district court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss. The circuit court affirmed. The Supreme Court dismissed Petitioner’s appeal for lack of jurisdiction because Petitioner’s appeal from the district court to a circuit court was untimely. View "Brownstones at Park Potomac Homeowners Ass’n v. JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A." on Justia Law

Respondent lived in his home for nearly ten years before razing the existing house in order to build a new house on the lot. Respondent benefitted from the application of the homestead tax credit with respect to increases in the value of the prior structure while he lived in it. The new construction increased the value of the property by approximately $500,000. The tax assessor, while retaining Respondent’s existing credit, included the full value of the renovation in the value to be taxed. The Maryland Tax Court affirmed the assessor’s interpretation. The circuit court reversed, and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. At issue on appeal was whether the “taxable assessment” used to compute the homestead tax credit under Md. Code Tax-Property (TP) 9-105 should include the value of renovations when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home. The Court of Appeals reversed the judgments of the Court of Special Appeals and circuit court affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that, when a homeowner razes and rebuilds a home, the homeowner may retain existing homestead tax credit if the homeowner satisfies certain criteria and the tax credit computation for the property with the rebuilt house is to be done in accordance with TP 9-105(c)(5) and TP 9-105(e)(1). View "Dep’t of Assessments & Taxation v. Andrecs" on Justia Law

These proceedings involved a development project spearheaded by K. Hovnanian’s Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC (Appellee). Appellee obtained all of the necessary permits and approvals from state and local agencies, except one. At issue in these proceedings was Appellee’s application for a State wetlands license. Appellee filed a complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief and for a writ of mandamus against the Board of Public Works seeking an order compelling the Board to vote promptly on Appellee’s long-outstanding application for the wetlands permit following delays resulting from a perceived appearance of impropriety. The circuit court granted the requested relief and ordered the Board to vote promptly on the application. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment, holding that the circuit court’s order was improper for want of a prior final administrative decision and because mandamus was unavailable under the circumstances. View "Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovnanian's Four Seasons at Kent Island, LLC" on Justia Law

Petitioners purchased real property comprised of two lots in a community of single family homes in Hampton. Petitioners later purported to subdivide their property to create an additional undeveloped parcel, which Petitioners offered for sale as separate and buildable. The Hampton Improvement Association (HIA) responded that the restrictive covenants prohibited property owners from erecting more than one house per deeded lot. Petitioners filed a complaint for declaratory relief seeking a declaration that their property consisted of two separate buildable lots and that the restrictive covenants did not prohibit the building of a home on the second lot. The circuit court denied relief. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed, concluding that the circuit court (1) correctly denied the Shaders’s attempted use of offensive non-collateral estoppel, and (2) properly found that the restriction prohibiting the construction of more than one dwelling on a single lot was not abandoned by the HIA. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in determining that (1) the HIA was barred from relitigating the enforcement of the restrictive covenants due to a prior judgment entered against the HIA, and (2) the HIA did waive by abandonment the restrictions allowing the construction of numerous buildings. View "Shader v. Hampton Improvement Ass'n" on Justia Law

Respondent filed in the circuit court a “complaint for title by adverse possession and bill to quiet title” against Petitioners concerning the ownership of a piece of land known as the Landing on Watts Creek (the Landing). Respondents answered and filed a countercomplaint alleging that they held title to the Landing and that Respondent’s use of the Landing constituted trespass. The circuit court ruled that Respondent had established a claim to the Landing by adverse possession. The Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the “woodlands exception,” previously applied only to prescriptive easements, also applies to adverse possession where the land at issue is unimproved or otherwise in a general state of nature; (2) the “woodlands exception” does not apply under the circumstances of this case, and therefore, no presumption of permissive use arose; and (3) because Petitioners failed to meet the burden of demonstrating permissive use, both the Court of Special Appeals and the circuit court were correct in holding that Respondent obtained title to the Landing by adverse possession. View "Breeding v. Koste" on Justia Law