Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

In these actions brought by tax sale buyers for declaratory and injunctive relief alleging that Maryland sheriffs exceeded their express and implied authority by adopting policies concerning how to execute writs of possession in tax sale foreclosure cases the Court of Appeals held that the sheriffs had the implied authority to adopt policies for how to serve writs of possession in such cases.This case involved a challenge to two policies used by sheriffs in evicting people from their homes when a tax sale buyer obtains a judgment foreclosing the right of reception with respect to a property and the homeowner does not redeem the property. Under the "mover policy," sheriffs require tax sale buyers to provide movers to remove personal property from the premises when serving writs of possession. Under the "weather policy," sheriffs postpone the service of writs of possession during bad whether conditions. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower courts' judgments in favor of the sheriffs, holding that, in the execution of writs of possession, both the mover policy and the weather policy constituted a valid exercise of powers daily implied by the sheriffs' expressly given duties and authority. View "Thornton Mellon LLC v. Frederick County Sheriff" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court did not err in ordering the City of Balitmore to execute a tax sale deed conveying legal title to the property to Ty Webb, LLC, the assignee of Thorton Mellon, LLC, the tax sale purchaser.The day after the circuit court entered a judgment foreclosing the right of redemption in connection with a tax sale proceeding pending in the circuit court Thorton Mellon executed an assignment purporting to assign Ty Webb its interest in the judgment and tax sale certificate. The Director refused to execute a tax deed to Ty Webb. Thornton Mellon then substituted its interest in the action to Ty Webb, which, as substitute plaintiff, filed a motion requesting an order directing the City to issue a tax sale deed to Ty Webb. The circuit court granted the motion, and the court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court did not err in concluding that the certificate of sale and judgment were assignable and directing the City to execute the tax deed in favor of Ty Webb. View "Mayor & City of Baltimore v. Thornton Mellon, LLC" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that a determination of whether to order reimbursement of attorney's fees under Md. Code Ann., Tax-Property (TP) 14-843(a)(4)(i) after a complaint has been filed is discretionary and that a circuit court may consider whether the tax sale certificate holder (TSCH) impeded the property owner's exercise of the right of redemption in making a determination as to reimbursement.After a tax sale at which the TSCH purchased property, the TSCH billed the owner for attorney's fees and expenses for a complaint that had not yet been filed and did not promptly notify the owner that an expired release could be used to redeem the property. The owner reimbursed the TSCH for the attorney's fees owed at the time, but before the redemption process was completed the TSCH filed a complaint to foreclose the owner's right of redemption. The owner later paid all amounts necessary to redeem the property. At issue was whether the owner was required to reimburse the TSCH for attorney's fees incurred after the complaint was filed. The Court of Appeals held that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion in declining to order reimbursement of the TSCH's attorney's fees under TP 14-843(a)(4)(i) or in declining reimbursement of attorney's fees in exceptional circumstances under TP 14-843(a)(4)(iii). View "Thornton Mellon LLC v. Adrianne Dennis Exempt Trust" on Justia Law

In this case questioning whether the addition of a definition of "lender" to the Maryland Usury Law during code revision effected a significant change in that law that lay latent for four decades before this case arose, the Court of Appeals held that code revision did not change Maryland law applicable to assignees of mortgage loans.Donna Kemp entered into a mortgage loan secured by a deed of trust on her home. The loan was later assigned to Fannie Mae, which contracted with the predecessor of Nationstar Mortgage, LLC to service the loan. Nationstar later declared Kemp to be in default. Kemp, Fannie Mae, and Nationstar entered into a loan modification agreement to resolve the default, but Kemp objected to the assessment of property inspection fees. Kemp filed a complaint, which the circuit court dismissed for failure to state a cause of action. The Court of Appeals held (1) the prohibition on property inspection fees applied to Nationstar as the agent of Fannie Mae; and (2) Kemp's complaint adequately stated a claim under the Maryland Consumer Debt Collection Act. View "Nationstar Mortgage v. Kemp" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's declaratory judgment concluding that Homeowners' amended restrictive covenant validly prohibited the construction of a commercial driving range on a lot within a residential subdivision and that a restrictive covenant permitted the realignment of the lot's property boundaries, holding that the circuit court did not err.Petitioner applied for zoning variances and exceptions from the Talbot County Board of Appeals to modify the boundaries of the sixth of five lots in the Swan Point Subdivision and to construct a driving range. Respondents, property owners in Swan Point, opposed the variance and amended the restrictive covenant specifically to prohibit a driving range on any lot within Swan Point. The Board granted the zoning variance for Petitioner. After the circuit court affirmed, Respondents brought this declaratory judgment action. The circuit court declared that Respondents' restrictive covenant validly prohibited the construction of a driving range on the lot at issue and that the original Swan Point restrictive covenant permitted the realignment of the lot's property boundaries. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the circuit court reached the correct result. View "RDC Melanie Drive v. Eppard" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals held that Md. Code Ts. & Jud. Proc. (CJP) 11-1110 limits the recovery for compensatory damages to the amount specified by that statute and does not allow for recovery of noneconomic compensatory damages stemming from the tortious injury or death of a pet.A police officer shot and killed Respondent's dog in the front yard of Respondent's home. Respondent brought suit, alleging that the officer committed a trespass to Respondent's chattel, acted with gross negligence, and violated Respondent's rights under Articles 24 and 26 of the Maryland Declaration of Rights. The jury returned a verdict in favor of Respondent. The court of appeals reversed in part, holding (1) CJP 11-110 did not bar Respondent from recovering noneconomic damages related to the death of his dog, and (2) there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict that the officer acted with gross negligence. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) CJP 11-110 defines and caps the recovery of compensatory damages in the case of the tortious death or injury of a pet; and (2) under the single recovery rule, Respondent may not recover any damages under the gross negligence claim. View "Anne Arundel County v. Reeves" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the circuit court's grant of summary judgment to the Bank of New York Mellon (BNYM) in this negligence complaint, holding that Ashley Hector and Alyaa Hector alleged sufficient facts for their claim against BNYM in its individual capacity to go to the jury.The Hectors lived as children in a row house that contained lead-based paint. The Hectors' landlord had taken out a mortgage on her interest in the property that became part of a residential mortgage backed securitization trust. When the landlord's interest in the property was sold at foreclosure BNYM as trustee as the purchaser. The Hectors filed a negligence complaint against BNYM. The circuit court granted summary judgment to BNYM, concluding that the Hectors erroneously named BNYM in its individual capacity as opposed to its fiduciary capacity. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) a trustee may be held individually liable for a tort committed in the course of trust administration if the trustee is personally at fault; and (2) the Hectors produced facts from which a jury could find that BNYM breached a duty it owed to the Hectors as the "owner" of the property. View "Hector v. Bank of New York Mellon" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part the judgment of the court of special appeals dismissing an amended complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, holding that Petitioners' amended complaint adequately set forth a cause of action under Md. Code Real Prop. (RP) 7-113.Petitioners, occupants of residential property that they owned or leased, brought this action against Respondents, a mortgage servicer and a real estate broker, after Respondents posted eviction notices on Petitioners' properties in an attempt to gain possession of the properties without a court order. Petitioners claimed that Respondents violated RP 7-113 and the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (MCPA), Md. Code Comm. Law 13-101 et seq. The circuit court dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) Petitioners set forth a cause of action under RP 7-113; and (2) this Court has not established a more demanding standard for pleading damages in private actions brought under the MCPA. View "Wheeling v. Selene Finance LP" on Justia Law

The Court of Appeals answered a certified question of law by the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District of Maryland by holding that the Maryland Contract Lien Act (MCLA), Md. Code Ann. Real Prop. 14-201 - 206, does not permit liens that secure unpaid damages, costs, charges, and fees that accrue after the recordation of the lien.According to Appellant, if a lien complies with the procedural requirements for creation under the MCLA, the lien can secure unpaid damages arising after the recordation of the lien, and therefore, the MCLA permits continuing liens. Appellee, in turn, argued that continuing liens are prohibited by the plain language of the statute, its legislative history, and due process requirements. Specifically, Appellee argued that the MCLA prohibits any sum from being secured by a statutory lien before the property owner has the opportunity to contest the sum prior to attachment. The Court of Appeals held that the plain text, legislative history, and case law relevant to the MCLA collectively demonstrate the Legislature's intent to prohibit continuing liens. View "In re Walker" on Justia Law

In this family dispute regarding a family business the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals affirming the decision of the trial court entering judgment in favor of Valley Mill Camp, Inc., holding that a person claiming the right to possession against a person in actual peaceable possession of real property can bring an action in circuit court for common law trespass to recover possession of the property.In 2017, after some escalating family disagreements, Valley Mill terminated the employment of Bruce Uthus and requested that he vacate the campground residence, where he had been living for approximately twenty years. Uthus refused to leave, and Valley Mill brought this trespass action. The circuit court entered judgment in favor of Valley Mills. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) Valley Mill had the choice to take legal action to remove Uthus from the campgrounds either by filing a trespass action in circuit court or a wrongful detainer action in district court; and (2) Valley Mill met all the elements of trespass. View "Uthus v. Valley Mill Camp" on Justia Law