Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

This case related to an arbitration award denying an express easement on Petitioners' property. Petitioners filed a petition in the circuit court to confirm the arbitration award, and Respondent filed a motion to vacate the same. Respondent argued that the award was irrational because, without an easement over Petitioners' land, his land would be landlocked. The circuit court confirmed the arbitration award, relying upon the Uniform Arbitration Act. The court of special appeals (CSA) reversed, overturned the arbitrator's denial of the easement, and directed that an easement by necessity be located over Petitioners' land. While recognizing the Act's limitation on the authority of the courts to overturn arbitration awards, the CSA pointed out that arbitration awards that were completely irrational or which were manifestly in disregard of the law had been overturned in previous opinions. The Court of Appeals vacated the judgment of the CSA and remanded with directions to vacate the circuit court, holding (1) the arbitration award, in part, was contradictory; and (2) Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 3-225(a) authorizes a court to vacate an award and order a rehearing before arbitrators when the award is ambiguous or contradictory. Remanded for further proceedings pursuant to section 3-225(a). View "Downey v. Sharp" on Justia Law

In 2008, the General Assembly enacted a statute to require that a foreclosing lender provide advance written notice to the borrower of its intention to foreclosure. Among the information to be provided in that notice is the identity of the "secured party," although the statute does not specifically define that phrase. In this case, there was more than one entity that qualified as a "secured party" under the commonly understood meaning of the phrase. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether, in such a situation, a foreclosing party was obligated to identify all secured parties in the advance written notice to the borrower. The Court held (1) a foreclosing party should ordinarily identify, in the notice of intent to foreclose, each entity that is a "secured party" with respect to the deed of trust in question; (2) however, a failure to disclose every secured party is not a basis for dismissing a foreclosure action when certain conditions are met; and (3) under the circumstances of the instant case, because many of the enumerated conditions were met even though the notice failed to disclose every secured party, the dismissal of the foreclosure action was not required. View "Shepherd v. Burson" on Justia Law

Tenant rented her residence from Landlord, who defaulted on the mortgage on that property. U.S. Bank National Association (USBNA), as trustee for a mortgage-backed security that owned that debt, foreclosed on Landlord's deed of trust and terminated Tenant's lease. In doing so, it sent conflicting notices to Tenant about her right under the Protecting Tenants at Foreclosure Act (PTFA) to remain on the property temporarily and filed a premature motion for immediate possession of the property. The circuit court granted USBNA's motion for possession. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) misleading and contradictory notices concerning a tenant's right to remain in a residence temporarily are ineffective to satisfy the purchaser's obligation under the PTFA; and (2) a motion for possession is premature when it is filed prior to the expiration of the period that the PTFA permits a bona fide tenant to remain in a residential property subject to foreclosure. Remanded. View "Curtis v. US Bank Nat'l Ass'n" on Justia Law

In the recent decision in Bates v. Cohn, the Court of Appeals reiterated that a borrower challenging a foreclosure action must ordinarily assert known and ripe defenses to the conduct of the foreclosure sale in advance of the sale. After the sale, the borrower is ordinarily limited to raising procedural irregulatories in the conduct of the sale, although the Court left open the possibility that a borrower could assert a post-sale exception that the deed of trust was itself the product of fraud. This case arose out of the foreclosure of a deed of trust for the residence of Darnella and Charles Thomas by Jeffrey Nadel and others. In apparent hope of fitting their post-sale exceptions within the question left open in Bates, the Thomases alleged certain defects in the chain of title of the note evidencing their debt and characterized them as a "fraud on the judicial system." The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the alleged defects did not establish that the Thomases' deed of trust was the product of fraud. View "Thomas v. Nadel" on Justia Law

Appellants, a power plant limited partnership and a power plant, leased from the City of Baltimore two adjoining pieces of real estate. After the properties were valued by the City's supervisor of assessments, Appellants challenged the valuations. The property tax assessment appeals board and tax court affirmed. In both cases, Appellant introduced appraisals and testimony that valued the properties at a lower figure based in part on the existence of ground leases owned by the City. The leases, however, were not introduced into evidence during the proceedings. The circuit court affirmed the valuation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tax court did not err in its decision to disregard the effect of the ground leases because Appellants did not establish that the leases in issue restricted its use of the properties. View "Cordish Power Plant Ltd. P'ship v. Supervisor of Assessment" on Justia Law

This case involved a long-standing dispute between Appellants, the Tomes Landing Condominium Association and MRA Property Management, and Appellees, twenty-five condominium unit purchasers. The unit purchasers were granted partial summary judgment in the amount of one million dollars against MRA and the Association on the ground that the operating budget that MRA and the Association supplied as part of a "resale package" provided to the unit purchasers violated the Maryland Consumer Protection Act (Act) because the budgets had the effect of misleading the unit purchasers in connection with their purchases of the condominiums. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the etnry of summary judgment was inappropriate, as (1) the Act could apply to disclosures made in a resale certificate by a condominium association and its management company during the sale of a condominium; and (2) there existed a dispute of material facts as to whether the operating budgets provided by MRA and the Association to the unit purchasers constituted unfair or deceptive trade practices under the Act. View "MRA Prop. Mgmt., Inc. v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

In 1999, the Baltimore City Council enacted an urban renewal plan (Plan) to renew a portion of Baltimore City. A five-block area located in the renewal area was the subject of protracted litigation between 120 West Fayette, LLLP and the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore. The current iteration of the litigation focused on a memorandum of agreement (MOA) between the City and the Maryland Historical Trust relating to the treatment of historic properties in connection with the Plan. The MOA required the City to submit redevelopment plans to the Trust for approval. After the Trust's director provided conditional approval of a fifth set of plans 120 West Fayette (Appellant) filed a complaint seeking a declaration of rights interpreting the terms of the MOA. The circuit court dismissed the complaint, finding that Appellant was neither a party to, nor an intended beneficiary of, the MOA, and therefore, Appellant failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Appellant, at best an incidental beneficiary to the MOA, could not file a suit requesting declaratory judgment that interprets and enforces an agreement to which it had no part. View "120 W. Fayette St., LLLP v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor in title to the disputed property at issue in this case to Petitioner, HNS Development, and Baltimore County failed to resolve conclusively whether certain development restrictions would be placed on parcels including and adjacent to a historic building. HNS purchased the two parcels in 2004 with knowledge of a cautionary note on the 1991 development plan. After having its proposed amended development plan rejected by three county agencies, the circuit court, and the court of special appeals, HNS asked the Court of Appeals to conclude that its amended development plan met the applicable development regulations of the Baltimore County Code and ignore the conceded Baltimore County Master Plan conflict. Respondents, People's Counsel for Baltimore County and the Greater Kingsville Community Association, argued that the Master Plan conflict provided a stand-alone basis for the County to reject the proposed amended development plan. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondents and affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals. View "HNS Dev., LLC v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a mortgage foreclosure proceeding involving a residential sale. In the advertisement for the sale, the trustees included an additional condition not found in the mortgage documents or authorized by the Maryland Rules that any successful purchaser at the sale would be required to pay the legal fees of attorneys who would be utilized to review the documents on behalf of the trustees by which they would hold settlement and ultimately convey title. The circuit court and court of special appeals ratified the sale. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that in the absence of specific authority in the contract of indebtedness or contained in statute or court rule, it is an impermissible abuse of discretion for trustees or the lenders who 'bid in' properties to include the demand for additional legal fees for the benefit of the trustees in the advertisement of sale or in any other way that is in contrary to the duty of trustees to maximize the proceeds of the sales and, moreover, is not in conformance with state or local rules and is against public policy. View "Maddox v. Cohn" on Justia Law

After an auction sale was ratified, Respondent David Simard defaulted on his contract to purchase the real property in question. Simard admitted liability for the risk and expense of the initial resale, but when the purchaser at the resale defaulted as well, Simard balked at paying the expense and loss incurred at a second resale. Applying Md. R. Civ. P. 14-305(g), the circuit court held that Simard was liable for the risk and expense of both resales. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that Rule 14-305(g) required that a defaulting purchaser be responsible for only one resale. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that absent special circumstances, a defaulting purchaser at a foreclosure sale of property is liable, under Rule 14-305(g), for only the one resale resulting from his or her default. View "Burson v. Simard" on Justia Law