Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

Complainants were disabled residents of a condominium. Complainants filed a complaint against the condominium's board of directors (the Condo) and their property management company, alleging that the Condo had discriminated against them by refusing to grant a reasonable accommodation for their disabilities. Specifically, Complainants alleged that the Condo refused to provide keys to the side and back doors to their building. The Office of Administrative Hearings ruled that Complainants had not proven that giving them the keys to the side and back doors was necessary and reasonable. The Appeal Board of the Commission on Human Relations (Board) disagreed and determined that the Condo (1) was required to prove that giving Complainants keys was an unreasonable financial burden, and (2) failed to establish that giving Complainants keys presented an undue burden. The circuit court reversed. The court of special appeals vacated the circuit court's decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the Condo was required to prove that providing keys to Complainants was unreasonable in light of the costs attendant in doing so; and (2) the Board properly performed the requisite balancing test when it concluded the Condo unreasonably denied Complainants' requests to be given the disputed keys. View " Cameron Grove Condo. Bd. of Dirs. v. Comm'n on Human Relations" on Justia Law

This dispute arose out of the alleged exposure of Plaintiff to lead paint at the homes in which she spent her childhood. Petitioner, by her mother, sued the owners of two of the homes, for negligence and unfair trade practices under the Consumer Protection Act. Only the claims against the second owner proceeded to trial. The circuit court awarded summary judgment in favor of Defendant after excluding proposed expert opinion testimony of a pediatrician to establish Defendant's building as the source of Plaintiff's lead exposure and elevated blood lead levels. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it excluded the proposed expert testimony; but (2) summary judgment in this case was not appropriate, as disputes of material fact existed to foreclose a grant of summary judgment. View "Ross v. Housing Auth. of Baltimore City" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a challenge by a borrower, Respondent, to the authority of various individuals and entities to effectuate a valid foreclosure on her residential property. After a foreclosure sale was scheduled by the substitute foreclosure trustees, but before the sale took place, Respondent filed a separate action seeking compensatory damages and declaratory and injunctive relief against the substitute trustees, Deutsche Bank, and BAC Home Loans Servicing for alleged defects in the foreclosure process and the authority of Defendants to foreclose on her property. Deutsche Bank and BAC (Petitioners) filed a motion for summary judgment on Respondent's action, which the circuit court granted. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that Petitioners did not prove they were persons entitled to enforce the promissory note, and thus genuine issues of material fact precluded summary judgment. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that BAC was entitled to enforce the note. Remanded. View "Deutsche Bank Nat'l Trust Co. v. Brock" on Justia Law

Petitioner entered into a consent order with the several Queen Anne's County officials regarding resolution of their disputes over Petitioner's proposed construction of a project in the county. The consent order terminated litigation in Kent Island I in the Anne Arundel County circuit court. Seeking invalidation of the consent order, Respondents filed suit in the Queen Anne's County circuit court (Kent Island II). On Petitioner's motion, the case was transferred to the Anne Arundel County circuit court, which granted summary judgment for Petitioner. The court of special appeals vacated the judgment, finding that venue was appropriate in the Queen Anne's County circuit court. The Supreme Court reversed, holding (1) the circuit court for Queen Anne's County did not have jurisdiction to modify or revise the consent order, a final judgment, entered by the Anne Arundel County circuit court; and (2) moreover, the Anne Arundel County circuit court was not empowered to revise or modify the judgment entered in Kent Island I in a manner sought by Respondents, as none of Respondents were a party in Kent Island I, and therefore, they could not maintain an action seeking either circuit court to exercise revisory power over the judgment in Kent Island II. View "Kent Island, LLC v. DiNapoli" on Justia Law

In 1982, two elderly widows (the Millers) sold land to one party. Four years later, the Millers purported to sell the same land to Petitioner (the Partnership). The Partnership engaged two title companies (the Title Companies) to complete the title work, and the Title Companies failed to locate and report the Millers' first land sale. Chicago Title Insurance Company (Chicago Title) underwrote the insurance policies on the land. These transactions led to numerous lawsuits. At issue in this appeal was (1) whether a title company owes a duty of care when conducting a title search; and (2) whether a title insurance company may be held vicariously liable as a result of the title company's negligent title search. The Court of Appeals held (1) the Title Companies owed a duty of care to the Partnership in conducting the title search and issuing the title commitment; and (2) under the circumstances, Chicago Title may not be held vicariously liable for the Title Companies' negligence. View "100 Investment Ltd. P'ship v. Columbia Town Ctr. Title" on Justia Law

The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints requested that it be exempt from paying property tax on an apartment complex it owned in Maryland to house missionaries. The county supervisor of assessments concluded that the apartment complex did not qualify for a property tax exemption under Md. Code Ann. Tax-Prop. 7-204 because the complex was not exclusively used as a "parsonage" or a "convent." The Maryland tax court upheld the decision. The circuit court reversed, determining that the complex qualified as both a parsonage and a convent. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that the tax court applied the wrong standard in assessing whether the apartment complex constituted a convent. Remanded for the tax court to issue an order granting the exemption. View "Green v. Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints" on Justia Law

Petitioners filed a petition for judicial review of the Baltimore City Council's approval of a planned unit development (PUD) with a Wal-Mart supercenter. Both Petitioners' residences were approximately 0.4 miles away from the PUD. The Mayor and City Council of the City, the owners of the property, and the developers of the PUD (Respondents) filed motions to dismiss, alleging that Petitioners lacked standing to challenge the PUD. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions and dismissed Petitioners' petition for review. The court of special appeals affirmed, concluding that Petitioners did not qualify for prima facie aggrieved status and that they had failed to show any special aggrievement different from the general public. The Supreme Court granted certiorari and held that the circuit court did not err in its judgment, as Petitioners failed to allege specific facts that they had been specially aggrieved in a manner different than the public generally. View "Ray v. Baltimore" on Justia Law

Petitioner, an LLC, sought an exception from the Charles County Zoning Regulation to build an office building, gun range, and driving track on a parcel of land in a rural community in the County. The property was subject to zoning restrictions prohibiting such activity except as authorized through a special exception. In deciding Petitioner's application, the Board conducted one trip to the property in question. The Board allowed representatives from the LLC as well as two citizens to attend but prohibited any other members of the public from attending and kept no transcript or other record of that which transpired. The Board then granted Petitioner's application. Various individuals filed a petition for judicial review. The circuit court affirmed. The court of special appeals reversed, holding that the Board improperly conducted the visit to the property in a manner that was closed to the public. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding (1) the site visit constituted a "meeting", which was required to be open to the public; and (2) because the Board violated the open meeting provisions of the Maryland Code, the Charles County Code, and its own Rules of Procedure, the matter should be remanded for a new hearing. View "WSG Holdings, LLC v. Bowie" on Justia Law

In this case the Court of Appeals was asked to decide on the existence and possible means of locating a general easement that provided a right-of-way from a major road. The easement in question crossed the property of USA Cartage Leasing, LLC as an access route for neighboring property owned by Todd Baer. Maryland's recording statute for deeds requires that a deed contain a description of the property sufficient to identify it with reasonable certainty. This case presented the novel question of whether this requirement, in the context of a grant of land that includes an easement, applied to the description of the easement itself or merely to that of the servient property. The court of special appeals determined that the correct answer was the latter and instructed the circuit court to locate the easement according to the principles set forth in section 4.8 in the Restatement 3d of Property: Servitudes. The Court of Appeals affirmed and adopted the Restatement's approach for locating a valid general easement that is not precisely defined in the deed or by custom or usage. View "USA Cartage Leasing, LLC v. Baer" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was whether Respondents, a property management company, law firm, and mortgage servicer, committed an impermissible forcible entry when they enforced, through lock-out, the foreclosure purchaser's lawful possessory interest in a dwelling by the means of the common law remedy of self-help, as opposed to receiving first the issuance of a statutory writ of possession from the circuit court. The circuit court granted Respondents' motions to dismiss, and the intermediate appellate court affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the common law right of peaceable self-help permits a foreclosure purchaser to surreptitiously enter a residential property and change the locks while the resident is out; and (2) the court of special appeals erred in dismissing Plaintiff's conversion claim and in holding that Plaintiff had abandoned all personal property in the residence, as there was no adequate basis from which to conclude that Plaintiff abandoned his personalty or that Respondents acted reasonably in disposing of his belongings. View "Nickens v. Mt. Vernon Realty" on Justia Law