Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

The Maryland Real Estate Commission revoked the real estate licenses of Joel Pautsch pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Bus. Occ. & Prof. 17-322(b)(24)(i) based on Pautsch's convictions for child abuse. The circuit court affirmed after finding there was competent, material and substantial evidence to support the Commission's decision. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) there was substantial evidence upon which the Commission relief to support its finding that there was a nexus between Pautsch's convictions and his professional activities; and (2) the sanction was neither arbitrary nor capricious because Pautsch's crimes undermined his trustworthiness in dealing with the public during the course of providing real estate brokerage services and negatively impacted his character and reputation. View "Pautsch v. Real Estate Comm'n" on Justia Law

Petitioner Mary Thomas slipped and fell on black ice that occurred in the premises of her apartment complex. Thomas filed a negligence action against the owner of the apartment complex and the apartment management company (collectively, Respondents). The circuit court granted summary judgment for Respondents based on Petitioner's alleged assumption of the risk. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the trial judge erred by ruling, as a matter of law, that Petitioner assumed the risk. The issue of Petitioner's assumption of the risk, including her knowledge of the risk of slipping on black ice, and the voluntariness of her conduct in using the front steps as she exited her apartment building, were questions of fact to be resolved by the jury. View "Thomas v. Panco Mgmt. of Md." on Justia Law

Petitioner Erik Stoddard was convicted by a jury of child abuse resulting in the death of a child and manslaughter. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the trial court erred by placing an impermissible restriction on Petitioner's right against self-incrimination and infringing his right to due process when it required him to testify prior to the completion of the defense case or to forgo testifying at all, but this error was harmless under the circumstances of this case and did not prejudice Petitioner; and (2) the trial court did not err in admitting evidence of prior bad acts and a question implying that Petitioner posed a threat to another child. View "Stoddard v. State" on Justia Law

Petitioner Matthew Tracy was incarcerated when he wrote a letter to a potential witness in a criminal case against Petitioner's half brother. After the woman who received the letter turned it over to the State's county attorney, Petitioner was charged with retaliating against a witness and intimidating and/or influencing a witness based on the contents of the letter. Tracy was convicted of both charges. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed the court of special appeals' judgment affirming Petitioner's conviction for retaliating against a witness, holding that Petitioner was charged and convicted under an inapplicable statute; and (2) otherwise affirmed. Remanded. View "Tracy v. State" on Justia Law

A jury convicted Petitioner Terry Stevenson of conspiracy to commit attempted armed robbery and reckless endangerment. The court of special appeals affirmed the conspiracy conviction and reversed Petitioner's conviction for reckless endangerment. Petitioner filed a petition for writ of certiorari for the Court of Appeals' review, questioning whether conspiracy to attempt armed robbery was a cognizable crime because it was doubly inchoate and defied logic. The Court granted certiorari. After analyzing case law from several different jurisdictions, including its own jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that conspiracy to commit attempted armed robbery, a doubly inchoate crime, was a cognizable offense. View "Stevenson v. State" on Justia Law

While making a delivery during the course of his employment, Appellant George Pool walked through a stream of running water that flowed across a parking lot. As a result, Appellant slipped and fell on black ice and suffered injuries. Appellant sued Defendants, the construction company that allegedly pumped the water into the parking lot and the owner of the parking lot, alleging negligence. Several additional defendants were subsequently added. The trial judge granted summary judgment in favor of the original defendants and the two defendants named in Appellant's amended complaint on the ground that Appellant had assumed the risk of his injury. Appellant appealed. The Court of Appeals (1) reversed summary judgment entered in favor of the original defendants because Appellant did not assume the risk of his injury as a matter of law; (2) affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of one later-named defendant and the dismissal in favor of the other later-named defendant; and (3) disavowed the reasoning related to assumption of the risk in Allen v. Marriott Worldwide Corp. View "Poole v. Coakley & Williams Constr., Inc." on Justia Law

Employee received two knee injuries while working as a firefighter for Employer. Employee filed claims with the Worker's Compensation Commission, requesting disability compensation for the loss of income stemming from each injury. The Commission ordered that Employee should receive temporary partial disability compensation for the period in which he worked light duty after both injuries. Employer sought judicial review. At issue before the circuit court was whether a loss of Employee's ability to work overtime, and its associated loss in overtime compensation, qualified as a lessening of Employee's wage earning capacity for the purposes of Md. Code Ann. Lab. & Empl. 9-615(a). The circuit court affirmed the Commission's order, ruling that the term "wage earning capacity" could fairly include overtime compensation. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) the term "wage," as used in the phrase "wage earning capacity" in section 9-615(a), includes compensation paid for overtime hours worked prior to temporary partial disability; and (2) the Commission correctly determined that Employee's wage earning capacity was "less," under section 9-615(a), entitling him to compensation payment in accordance with the calculation scheme set forth in that section. View "Montgomery County v. Deibler" on Justia Law

Petitioner Shawn Johnson was convicted of robbery, conspiracy to commit armed robbery, and related offenses. At trial, the State admitted two inoperable cell phones allegedly used by Petitioner's cousin, who was a State's witness at Petitioner's trial. While the jury was deliberating, one of the jurors inserted his own battery into one of the cell phones, turned it on, and discovered information corroborative of the cousin's testimony. Petitioner moved for a mistrial, alleging that the action of the juror constituted an improper investigation, thereby violating Petitioner's constitutional right to an impartial jury. The trial court declined to declare a mistrial. The court of special appeals affirmed the conviction. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in denying the mistrial without first conducting a voir dire of the jury to ascertain the nature and scope of potential prejudice resulting from at least one juror's exposure to the electronic data on the cell phone. View "Johnson v. State" on Justia Law

During Petitioner Darryl Harrod's first trial for possession with intent to distribute cocaine, a chemist called by the state testified and was subjected to cross-examination. A mistrial was subsequently declared. At the retrial, the trial court admitted the chemist's report and testimony without the presence of the chemist. Ultimately, Harrod was convicted of the charge. Harrod appealed, challenging the admission of the chemist's testimony and report. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) it was error to admit the chemist's report and testimony and report during Harrod's retrial because the State failed to provide the requisite notice pursuant to Md. Code Ann. Cts. & Jud. Proc. 10-1003; and (2) the error was not harmless because the report and testimony were adduced to satisfy proof of the elements of the crime. View "Harrod v. State" on Justia Law

This appeal presented the Court of Appeals with its first opportunity to interpret Md. Code Ann. Crim. P. 8-301, which provided for petitions for writs of actual innocence based on newly discovered evidence. The two Appellants in these consolidated cases were serving their respective sentences when section 8-301 went into effect. Both Appellants filed pro se petitions for writs of actual innocence, which the circuit court denied without a hearing. The Court of Appeals reversed the order denying one Appellant's petition and affirmed the order denying the other Appellant's petition, holding (1) the denial of a petition for writ of actual innocence is an immediately appealable order, regardless of whether the trial court held a hearing before denying the petition; and (2) section 8-301 imposes a burden of pleading such that a petitioner is entitled to a hearing on the merits of the petition provided the petition sufficiently pleads grounds for relief under the statute, includes a request for a hearing, and complies with the filing requirements of section 8-301(b). View "Douglas v. State" on Justia Law