Justia Maryland Supreme Court Opinion Summaries

A pit bull named Clifford escaped from its pen and attacked Dominic Solesky, a minor, who initially sustained life threatening injuries as a result of his mauling. Dominic's parents, as next friends of Dominic, sued Defendant landlord. The trial court granted judgment for Defendant, concluding that the evidence was insufficient to permit the issue of common law negligence to be presented to the jury. The court of special appeals reversed, finding that the evidence had been sufficient to create a valid jury issue as to the extent of Defendant's knowledge of Clifford's dangerousness with respect to the then common law standards in dog attack negligence cases. The Court of Appeals affirmed after modifying the Maryland common law of liability as it relates to attacks by pit bull dogs against humans, holding that when an owner, landlord, or other person who has the right to control the pit bull's presence on the subject premises knows, or has reason to know, that the dog is a pit bull or pit bull mix, that person is strictly liable for the damages caused to a plaintiff who is attacked by the dog on or from the owner's or lessor's premises. Remanded for a retrial. View "Tracey v. Solesky" on Justia Law

Deputy Erick Gindlesperger of the county sheriff's office filed a subpoena request seeking to compel Sheriff Darren Popkin to produce documents prior to a disciplinary hearing under the Law Enforcement Officers' Bill of Rights (LEOBR). The hearing board denied the request, and Gindlesperger field a motion for show cause order. The circuit court determined that Md. Code Ann. Pub. Safety 3-107(d) entitled Gindlesperger to pre-hearing production of various enumerated documents. Sheriff Popkin appealed. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the circuit court committed reversible error when it ordered the pre-LEOBR hearing production of the enumerated documents, as section 3-107(d)(1) does not provide for compelling production of records and documents by subpoena in advance of an LEOBR disciplinary hearing. View "Popkin v. Gindlesperger" on Justia Law

In December 2008, State Employee was notified that her employment was terminated. Employee submitted a timely written appeal of her termination to the secretary of her agency. In August 2009, when Employee received no response to her repeated requests for a decision, Employee sought to have the matter appealed to the Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management (DBM). The Secretary forwarded the appeal to the Office of Administrative Hearings. The ALJ dismissed the appeal pursuant to several provisions of the State Personnel Management System. The circuit court and court of special appeals affirmed. At issue before the Court of Appeals was how the provisions of the State Personnel Management System are to be implemented when, as here, a terminated employee notes a timely appeal to the head of the principal unit and the head of the principal unit fails within fifteen days thereafter to issue a written decision. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that a state employee in this circumstance must assume at the end of the fifteen-day period that the appeal has been denied and take any further appeal within ten days thereafter. View "Fisher v. E. Corr. Inst." on Justia Law

Lynne Swartzbaugh purchased motor vehicle insurance with Encompass Insurance Company. The policy named Lynne, her husband, and their daughter Kelly (Petitioners) as drivers. Lynne executed a waiver of higher uninsured motorist (UM) coverage on the standard Maryland Insurance Administration form. Immediately beneath the signature line below the waiver appeared the legend: "Signature of First Named Insured." By its terms, consistent with Maryland law, the waiver remained in effect until withdrawn, and the waiver was never withdrawn. Later, Kelly was injured in an accident involving an under-insured driver. Kelly was unable to collect further damages from Encompass under that policy's UM coverage. Petitioners sought a declaration that the waiver was ineffective because Lynne was not in fact the "first named insured" on the policy. The circuit court ruled that the waiver signed by Lynne was valid and enforceable. The court of special appeals affirmed. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that, in the context of a motor vehicle insurance policy, the phrase "first named insured" refers to a person insured under the policy and specifically named in the policy who acts on behalf of the other insured parties and is designated as "first named insured" in the policy documents. View "Swartzbaugh v. Encompass Ins. Co. of Am." on Justia Law

Johnette Cosby requested an administrative hearing to challenge a determination by the Department of Social Services that she was responsible for "indicated child neglect." Prior to the hearing, Cosby's son was adjudicated to be a Child in Need of Assistance based on the same allegations of neglect presented in the administrative action. As a result, the administrative law judge granted the Department's motion to dismiss Cosby's administrative appeal based on collateral estoppel. Cosby filed a petition for judicial review, arguing that amendments to Md. Code Ann. Fam. Law 5-706.1 precluded application of the common law defense of collateral estoppel. The circuit court reinstated Cosby's administrative appeal, but the court of special appeals reversed that determination. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that section 5-706.1 was not amended so as to preclude the common law defense of collateral estoppel when the elements are otherwise satisfied, and therefore, the dismissal of the administrative appeal was proper. View "Cosby v. Dep't of Human Res." on Justia Law

Appellant Alonzo King was arrested in 2009 on first- and second-degree assault charges. Pursuant to the Maryland DNA Collection Act, King's DNA was collected, analyzed, and entered into Maryland's DNA database. King was convicted on the second-degree assault charge but, pending his trial on that charge, his DNA profile generated a match to a DNA sample collected from a sexual assault forensic examination conducted on the victim of an unsolved 2003 rape. This hit provided the sole probable cause for a subsequent grant jury indictment of King for the rape. A later-obtained search warrant ordered collection from King of an additional reference DNA sample, which also matched the DNA profile from the 2003 rape. King was subsequently convicted of first-degree rape and sentenced to life in prison. The Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the portions of the DNA Act authorizing collection of a DNA sample from a mere arrestee were unconstitutional as applied to King, as the State had no probable cause or individualized suspicion supporting obtention of the DNA sample collection for King's first- and second-degree assault charges. View "King v. State" on Justia Law

After a jury trial, Reginald Stringfellow was convicted of possessing a regulated firearm after having been convicted of a disqualifying crime and wearing, carrying, or transporting a handgun. Stringfellow appealed, arguing that his objection to a voir dire question proposed by the prosecutor and given by the trial judge during jury selection prejudiced the jurors against him by imputing his guilt, devaluing fingerprint evidence, and lowering the State's burden of proof. At issue before the Court of Appeals was whether Stringfellow's unsuccessful objection to the question went to the composition of the jury, which would have resulted in his objection being waived for the purposes of appellate review because he accepted the jury chosen pursuant to the questioning, or whether the nature of his objection was incidental to the composition of the jury, which, notwithstanding Stringfellow's acceptance of the jury, would have preserved his objection for appellate consideration. The Court held that Stringfellow's objection went to the composition of the jury, and thus, Stringfellow waived any future opportunity to complain on appeal about the objected-to question and its potential effect. In addition, even assuming the objection was not waived, the asking of the question was harmless error. View "State v. Stringfellow" on Justia Law

In 1991, the predecessor in title to the disputed property at issue in this case to Petitioner, HNS Development, and Baltimore County failed to resolve conclusively whether certain development restrictions would be placed on parcels including and adjacent to a historic building. HNS purchased the two parcels in 2004 with knowledge of a cautionary note on the 1991 development plan. After having its proposed amended development plan rejected by three county agencies, the circuit court, and the court of special appeals, HNS asked the Court of Appeals to conclude that its amended development plan met the applicable development regulations of the Baltimore County Code and ignore the conceded Baltimore County Master Plan conflict. Respondents, People's Counsel for Baltimore County and the Greater Kingsville Community Association, argued that the Master Plan conflict provided a stand-alone basis for the County to reject the proposed amended development plan. The Court of Appeals agreed with Respondents and affirmed the judgment of the court of special appeals. View "HNS Dev., LLC v. People's Counsel for Baltimore County" on Justia Law

This was an action for judicial review to determine whether the Maryland Board of Public Works committed legal error in denying, by a two-to-one vote, Respondent's application for a license to fill and dredge on certain State wetlands. The circuit court concluded that the Board did err, by basing its decision on considerations outside the lawful scope of its discretion, and reversed the Board's decision. The Court of Appeals vacated the circuit court's judgment and remanded with instructions to vacate the Board's decision and remand the case to the Board, holding that the Board, through its majority vote, committed legal error by basing its decision on factors outside the scope of its authority and discretion. View "Bd. of Pub. Works v. K. Hovanian's Four Seasons" on Justia Law

The decedent in this case died in 1993, leaving an estate of more than $28 million to his wife, Helen Nassif, and his two children. Instead of receiving her bequest in the will, Nassif elected to take a statutory share of the estate. The personal representative, Carlton Green, the decedent's son, litigated a number of issues against Nassif. Green filed a complaint for declaratory judgment in the circuit court before distributing Nassif's elective share. The court ruled in his favor. The court of special appeals reversed. The Court of Appeals affirmed in part, reversed in part, and vacated in part, holding, inter alia, that (1) "enforceable claims," as used in Md. Code Ann. Est. & Trusts 1-101(n), means claims that in fact reduce the assets in the estate or are allowed by the court; (2) assets in a spouse's elective share are valued, when paid in kind by legatees, as of the date of distribution, and when paid in cash as of the date of the spouse's election to take a statutory share; and (3) ordinarily, and under the circumstances here, legatees cannot exercise the option to pay a spouse's elective share in cash thirteen years after the decedent's death. View "Green v. Nassif" on Justia Law